St Louis, Aug. 31, 1861.
Circumstances in my judgment of sufficient urgency render it necessary that the Commanding General of this Department should assume the administrative power of the State. Its disorganized condition, the devastation of property by bands of murderers and marauders who infest nearly every County in the State, and avail themselves of the public misfortunes and the vicinity of a hostile force to gratify private and neighborhood vengeance, and who find an enemy wherever they find plunder, finally demand the severest measures to repress the daily increasing crimes and outrages which are driving off the inhabitants and ruining the State. In this condition the public safety and the success of our arms require unity of purpose, without let or hindrance to the prompt administration of affairs.
In order, therefore, to suppress disorders, to maintain, as far as now practicable, the public peace, and to give security and protection to the persons and property of loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial law thru-out the State of Missouri. The lines of the army of occupation in this State are, for the present, declared to extend from Leavenworth, by way of the posts of Jefferson City, Rolla and Ironton to Cape Girardeau, on the Mississippi River. All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court- martial, and, if found guilty, will be shot. The property, real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States, or shall be directly proven to have taken active part with their enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the public use; and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men.
All persons who shall be proven to have destroyed, after the publication of this order, railroad tracks, bridges or telegraphs, shall suffer the extreme penalty of the law.
All persons engaged in treasonable correspondence, in giving or procuring aid to the enemies of the United States, in disturbing the public tranquility by creating and circulating false reports or incendiary documents, are in their own interest warned that they are exposing themselves.
{198} All persons who have been led away from their allegiance are required to return to their homes forthwith; any such absence, without sufficient cause, will be held to be presumptive evidence against them.
The object of this declaration is to place in the hands of the military authorities the power to give Instantaneous effect to existing laws, and to supply such deficiencies as the conditions of war demand. But it is not intended to suspend the ordinary tribunals of the country, where the law will be administered by the civil officers in the usual manner and with their customary authority, while the same can be peaceably exercised.
The Commanding General will labor vigilantly for the public welfare, and, in his efforts for their safety, hopes to obtain not only the acquiescence, but the active support, of the people of the country.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General Commanding.
Another man who appeared on the scene as Colonel of the 2d Iowa was Samuel R. Curtis, an Ohio man, who graduated from West Point in 1831, in the same class with Gens. Ammen, Humphreys and W. H. Emory. He resigned the next year and became a prominent civil engineer in Ohio. He served in the Mexican War as Colonel of the 2d Ohio, and at the close of that struggle returned to his profession of engineering, removed to Iowa, and at the outbreak of the war was a member of Congress from that State. He was a man of decided military ability, and the victory won at Pea Ridge was his personal triumph. He was to rise to the rank of Major-General and command an independent army, but become involved in the factional fights in Missouri and have his further career curtailed.
{199} Still another name which appears with increased frequency about this time is that of U. S. Grant, an Ohio man, who had graduated from West Point in 1843, and had shown much real enterprise and soldiership in Mexico, but had fallen under the disfavor of his commanding officers; had been compelled to resign while holding the rank of Captain in the 4th U. S., and for eight years had had a losing struggle in trying to make a living in civil pursuits. A happy accident put him at the head of the 21st Ill., with which he had entered Missouri to guard the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad, and incidentally to dispose of one Thomas A. Harris, a very energetic and able man who held a Brigadier-Generalship from Gov. Jackson, and who was making himself particularly active in the neighborhood of that railroad. Grant showed much energy in chasing around for Harris, but had never succeeded in bringing him into battle, though when he left for other scenes Harris was hiding among the knobs of Salt River, with his command reduced to three enlisted men and his staff.
Though he was out of favor with Gen. McClellan and many others who were directing military operations, in some way a Brigadier-General's commission came to U. S. Grant, and he was assigned to the District of Southeastern Missouri, with headquarters at Cape Girardeau, where his duty was to hold in check the poetical M. Jeff Thompson, the noisy Gideon J. Pillow and the prelatic Leonidas J. Polk in their efforts to get control of the southeastern corner of the State and menace Cairo and St. Louis.
Maj. Sturgis was promptly made a Brigadier-General to date from Wilson's Creek, and assigned to the command of Northeast Missouri, where he had five or six thousand men under him.
Capt. Fred Steele had accepted a commission as Colonel of the 8th Iowa; Capt. Jos. B. Plummer shortly took the Colonelcy of a new regiment, the 11th Mo.; Capt. Totten became Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel of the 1st Mo. Art., of which Schofield was Major.
{200} Notwithstanding the feeling of the officers and soldiers who had participated in the battle of Wilson's Creek against Sigel, it was found so necessary to "recognize the Germans" and hold them strongly for the Union cause that he was made a Brigadier-General to date from May 17, 1861, which put him in the same class of Volunteer Brigadier-Generals as Hunter, Heintzelman, Fitz John Porter, Wm. B. Franklin, Wm. T. Sherman, C. P. Stone, Don Carlos Buell, John Pope, Philip Kearny, Joseph Hooker, U. S. Grant, John A. McClernand and A. S. Williams, all of whose volunteer commissions bore the date of May 17. This was subsequently a cause of trouble.
There appeared also another of those figures so common among the State builders of this country, and upholding to the fullest the character of a leader of pioneers. James H. Lane was an Indiana man, son of a preacher; had served with credit as Colonel of Indiana troops in Mexico, and had been Lieutenant-Governor of Indiana and Member of Congress, but getting at odds with his party had migrated to Kansas, where his natural talents and fiery, aggressive courage speedily brought him to the front as the leader of the warlike Free State men, who resisted with force and arms the attempts of the Pro-slavery men to dominate the Territory. His instant readiness for battle and the unsparing energy with which he prosecuted his enterprises so endeared him to the Free State men that when the State was admitted there was no question about his election as her first United States Senator.
{201} Kansas had promptly raised two regiments, which had fought superbly at Wilson's Creek and afterwards joined in the retrograde movement to Rolla. This left Kansas without any protection, and the people naturally reasoned that in the advance upon the territory left unguarded by the retirement of the Union army, Gen. Price and his Missourians would embrace the opportunity to pay back with interest the debt of vengeance which had been running since the wars of '56 and '57. Therefore Lane received the authority to recruit five regiments in Kansas, and went about his work with his characteristic energy.
The 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Kan. at once began organizing, receiving many recruits from the young Union men who had been forced to leave Missouri, and within a week or more after the battle of Wilson's Creek Gen. Lane had mustered an effective force of about 2,500 men, who had received some clothing and equipment and much instruction from the Regular officers and men at Forts Scott, Riley and Leavenworth.
With these forces in hand under a man of Lane's well-known character, neither Gen. Price nor his men had much disposition to meddle with Kansas, even if the General had not other and more comprehensive views.
Gen. Price was not waiting for Fremont's plans to develop before executing his own. He employed the two weeks after the battle in diligently organizing his men, and Aug. 26 left Springfield at the head of a column of about 10,000 enthusiastic young Missourians, who had in that brief time made great progress in soldiership. He caused great alarm at Fort Scott, by pointing the head of his column toward that place, and arriving within 10 miles of it on the night of the 1st of September, sent Rains's Division, which was made up of men from southwest Missouri, forward to reconnoiter.
{202} Rains's advance of 30 mounted men under Capt. Rector Johnson pushed forward to within sight of Fort Scott, on the morning of Sept. 1, and captured a drove of 80 Government mules which had been sent out to graze on the prairies. They also carried off all the able-bodied men that they could find on their line of march. Two companies of the newly-raised Kansas cavalry promptly attacked Johnson's command, which fell back across the line toward the main body, encamped at Dry Wood. Gen. Lane gathered up such of his volunteers as were in reach, and moved to Dry Wood, where he offered Gen. Rains battle, but the latter declined to be drawn from the shelter in the woods in which he had formed his lines, and Lane did not think it was prudent to attack a force the strength of which he could not ascertain.
A noisy, long-range skirmish ensued, which terminated at nightfall by Lane withdrawing his forces to Fort Scott. The next day, leaving Col. Jennison with 400 cavalry in Fort Scott, Lane crossed the Little Osage and threw up fortifications on its banks to oppose Price's further advance and give him battle should he attempt to move into Kansas.
Gen. Price declined to fight him in his chosen position, but drew his forces together and started to execute his cherished plan of advancing to the Missouri River and forming connection there with the troops which Gens. Harris and Green had been raising in northern Missouri, not seriously molested in their work by the Union forces under Gens. Pope and Sturgis. The action at Dry Wood was made the most of by the Secessionists, who claimed a defeat for the terror-striking "Jim" Lane. The casualties were insignificant for the forces engaged, as there were but five killed and 12 wounded on the Union side, and four killed and 16 wounded on the Confederate.
{203} It was feared that after Gen. Price had moved forward to the Missouri River McCulloch would come up from Arkansas and take Fort Scott, which he had been authorized to do by the Confederate Secretary of War; but McCulloch seems to have had other ideas, and spent the weeks in inaction.
The situation of the Union men of southwest Missouri became gloomy in the extreme. The whole country was overrun with guerrilla bands hunting down the Union men, and not infrequently shooting them on sight.
Gen. Fremont had seriously alarmed Polk, Pillow and Thompson by his showy reinforcement of Cairo with 3,800 men. Though Pillow was reputed to have about 20,000 troops at his disposal, he was seized with a great fear, wrote to Hardee at Pocahontas urging him to come to his help, and limited the sphere of the operations of his dashing lieutenant, M. Jeff Thompson. Maj.-Gen. Polk seems to have also been deeply impressed, for he wrote to Pillow urging him to put his troops in trenches in the neighborhood of New Madrid, strongly fortify that place and stretch a chain across the river to prevent the passage of gunboats.
Then Polk had another tremor, and ordered Pillow to evacuate New Madrid at once, taking his men and heavy guns across the river to the strong works of Fort Pillow. Pillow, however, as insubordinate and self-seeking as he had been in the Mexican War, and thirsting for the distinction of taking Cape Girardeau, did not obey his superior's orders, but retained his forces at New Madrid. He had the audacity to write to his superior, "Withdraw your control over me for a few hours."
{204} Pillow, merely hanging on to the remotest fringe of the State, assumed the title of "Liberator of Missouri", and his correspondence, orders and proclamations were headed, "Headquarters Army of Liberation."
About the same time an old acquaintance, Lieut-Gov. Thos. C. Reynolds, he of the ready pen and fluent phrases, taking advantage of a hasty journey of Gov. Jackson to Richmond, assumed full gubernatorial powers, set up his capital in Pillow's camp at New Madrid, and proceeded to clothe him with the most extraordinary prerogatives. He made himself the whole of the "Sovereign people of Missouri," and issued a proclamation withdrawing the State from the Union. He said that "disregarding the forms and considering only realities, I view an ordinance for the separation from the North and union with the Confederate States as a mere outward expression giving notice to others of an act already consummated in the hearts of the people." He then proceeded to establish a military despotism which made the worst of what had been said of Fremont pale before it. He clothed all the military commanders-not merely those of Missouri provided by the odious Military Act, but such Confederate commanders as Pillow and Hardee, who should enter the State-with a most absolute power over the lives and property of the people of Missouri.
{205} The following oath was prescribed which all citizens were to be compelled to take by any officer of the Missouri State Guards or Confederate army who might come upon them: Know all men, that I------, of the County of-----, State of Missouri, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the State of Missouri, and support the Constitution of the State, and that I will not give aid, comfort, information, protection or encouragement to the enemies or opposers of the Missouri State Guards, or their allies, the armies of the Confederate States, upon the penalty of death for treason.
In the meanwhile Gen. Price, more practical and capable than any of them, with true military foresight was rushing his troops toward the Missouri River, gaining recruits and arousing enthusiasm with every day's march. Leading his own advance he hurried towards Warrensburg, the County seat of Johnson County, about 30 miles south of Lexington, where he hoped to seize about $100,000 deposited in the State banks. He arrived too late for this however, because the Union troops had the same object in view, and had anticipated him, carrying the money off with them and leaving behind some very clever caricatures, drawn by the skillful artists among the Germans, which irritated Price and his men more than it was reasonable they should.
The Union commander at Warrensburg, Col. Everett Peabody, of the 13th Mo., had kept himself well informed as to Price's movements, and retreated from Warrensburg to Lexington, burning the bridges after he had crossed them. He sent notice to Fremont of Price's movements.
Col. James A. Mulligan, with the 23d 111., an Irish regiment, was ordered forward to Lexington to Col. Peabdy's assistance, and to hold the place to the last.
{206} The 1st Ill. Cav., Col. Thos. A. Marshall, and fragments of Home Guard regiments in process of organization, were drawn back to Lexington, in face of the advance of Price's columns. There was also a mongrel field battery, consisting of one 4-pounder, three 6-pounders, one 12-pounder and two little 4-inch howitzers, the latter being useless on account of having no shells.
The cavalry was only armed with pistols and sabers.
No official Union reports are on file as to the affair, but the total strength of the garrison is given unofficially at from 2,640 to 3,300. The correspondent of the Missouri Republican gives these figures: 23d 111., Col. Mulligan............................... 800
Home Guards, Col. White.......................... 500
13th Mo., Col. Peabody................................ 840
1st Ill. Cav., CoL Marshall........................... 500
Total...................................................2,040 Col. Mulligan assumed command of the whole by seniority of commission. He was an Irishman with all his race's pugnacity, and also its effervescence. He was born in Utica, N. Y., in 1830, had graduated from a Roman Catholic college, studied law, and edited the principal Roman Catholic paper in the West, "The Tablet."
{207} Lexington, which is the County seat of Lafayette County, was a very important place in frontier times, and the center of the great hemp-growing region of Missouri. It is situated on the south bank of the Missouri River, about 300 miles by its course above St. Louis, and about 84 miles below Kansas City by water, or 42 miles by rail. It consisted of two towns, Old and New Lexington, about a mile apart, having altogether about 5,000 people. It had some manufactories and two or three colleges, one of which, the Masonic College, situated on high ground between Old and New Lexington, a half mile from the river, was taken by Col. Mulligan for his position, which he proceeded to fortify with high, substantial works to accommodate 10,000 men, inclosing about 15 acres on the summit of the bluffs. Between 2,000 and 3,000 horses and other animals of the trains were gathered inside this inclosure.
A week before Col. Mulligan's arrival, on Sept. 9, Gov. Jackson had briefly set up his Capital there, and held a session of that portion of the Legislature which adhered to him. The approach of Col. Pea-body caused a precipitate adjournment, and there was left behind $800,000 in coin, which was buried in the cellar of the college, with the great seal of the State of Missouri.
At dawn on Sept. 12, Gen. Price, riding with his advance, Rains's Division, struck the Union pickets stretching through the cornfields outside of Lexington, but though he brought up all his infantry within reach, and McDonald's, Guibor's, and Clark's batteries, his heads of columns were beaten back everywhere by the stubborn Union soldiers, who had been waiting three days for him, and he wisely decided to withdraw two or three miles and wait for the rest of his forces and ammunition wagons to come up.
{208} Col. Mulligan telegraphed to Col. Jeff C. Davis, at Jefferson City-120 miles away-the fact of Price's advance and his need for help, and Davis sent the news to Fremont, who ordered forward three regiments and two batteries to Davis, and directed him to reinforce Mulligan, which he could do by rail and river. Fremont also sent orders to Pope and Sturgis to help Mulligan out, but there was not much urgency in the orders, and each of his subordinates seems to have taken his own time and way of obeying or not obeying.
Jeff C. Davis had at that time something over 5,000 men at Jefferson City, and subsequent reinforcements raised this number, it was claimed, to 11,000-certainly to 8,000. Davis afterward became a valuable division and corps commander, but he certainly did not show up well in this transaction. He, also, had too much of the "Regular" in him. He complained of a lack of wagons and harness, commissary supplies and ammunition, to enable him to make a forward movement. He had none of the spirit of Lyon and Price, to impress teams and supplies and make means to do what ought to be done.
It was harvest time in that fertile part of Missouri, and his army need not have suffered for food, wherever he went. But all that he did was to send forward a couple of regiments to occupy points and prevent the Secessionists from crossing the river at those places. They had all either crossed or found other unguarded places.
Pope showed similar incapacity. He had 5,000 men in easy reach of Lexington, but he was more engrossed in the Hannibal & St Joseph Railroad and in matters in Keokuk and Canton than in Lexington. He telegraphed to Gen. Fremont that he would move forward 4,000 men to Lexington, and actually did send forward Lieut.-Col. Scott with the 3d Iowa and Robt. F. Smith with the 16th 111., with instructions to form a junction at liberty, in Clay County, and then proceed to Lexington. Lieut-Col. Scott pushed on to the Blue Mills Landing on the Missouri River, where he came in contact with a large Secession force. Six regiments of the Missouri State Guard were there, making their way to Lexington.
{209} D. R. Atchison, former Senator from Missouri, President of the United States Senate, and of much notoriety during the Kansas and Nebraska troubles, took command of this force and attacked Col. Scott, compelling rapid retreat. Atchison reported to Price the usual story about the small number under his command and the large force of the Yankees routed, but this does not harmonize with his praises to Cols. Sanders, Patten, Childs, Cundliff, Wilfley, and Maj. Gause, each of whom he says handled his "regiment" with great gallantry.
Col. Smith met Col. Scott in his retreat, learned from him the overwhelming force in front, and retreated with him, so that portion of the relief came to naught.
Gen. Sturgis moved forward from Mexico with about 4,000 men and reached the Missouri River, but finding no means for crossing, and surveying the host that was gathered around the city, retired with such haste as to leave his tents and camp equipage.
Gen. Price proceeded with astonishing deliberation, when we consider that he must have known that Fremont had something over 20,000 men within striking distance.
Retreat was still open for Col. Mulligan, as he had two steamboats at his command, but he felt that his orders obliged him to remain in Lexington for the protection of much public property which had been gathered there, and that as his situation was known to Gen. Fremont, relief would be speedily sent to him.
{210} In the meantime, every hour had swelled Gen. Price's forces. Some of the Secession writers have claimed that there were actually as many as 38,000 men gathered in his camps. Of course, a large proportion of his force was useless unless to help beat off a relieving column, because, owing to the small extent of the position occupied by Col. Mulligan, only a limited number of men could be employed against it, and 10,000 were as effective as 100,000. A very large portion of Gen. Price's forces were men who flocked to his camp as to a picnic or a barbecue, because something was going on, and they fell away from him again when he began a backward movement, as rapidly as they came.
Then ensued for six days a very strange battle. Swarms of Missourians crowded the ravines in the bluffs, behind trees, stones, the walls, fences and chimneys of the houses, and whatever else would afford adequate protection, and kept up an incessant fusillade upon the garrison safely ensconced behind thick banks of earth. When a squad occupying a secure shelter grew tired, or had fired away all its ammunition, it would go back to camp for dinner, when their places would be taken by others eager to share in the noise and excitement and have a story to take back home of the number of Yankees who had fallen under their deadly aim. If all these stories of the men "who had been at Lexington" could have been true, more men would have been sent to the grave than answered Lincoln's call for 500,000 volunteers. The artillerists were as enthusiastic and industrious as the men with "Yager" rifles and shotguns, and banged away with unflagging zeal and corresponding lack of mortality. The walls of the college were badly scarred, but the worst effect was that an occasional shell would take effect among the horses, and drop on the ground carcasses which speedily putrified under the hot sun, and added an unbearable stench to the other hardships of the garrison.
{211} This went on day and night, for the moon was bright, and there was no reason why a man who had powder and shot, and could not get an opportunity at any of the coverts during the day, should not put in pleasantly a few hours at night.
Naturally a rain of bullets, even though they might hit rarer than lightning strokes, had a wearing effect on the garrison.
While this noisy fusillade by the mob of truculent bushwhackers was going on, there were much more soldierly occurrences by the more soldierly men on both sides.
There were sorties and counter-sorties in which the greatest gallantry was displayed on both sides, and in which substantially all the losses occurred. The Secessionists captured a Union flag in one of these, which was balanced by a Secession flag captured by the 1st 111. Cav. Owing to the great superiority of the enemy in numbers, the finality of all these was against the garrison, which was everywhere pushed back from the edges of the bluff, and also from some buildings on the bluffs overlooking the works.
Gen. Rains's Division invested the eastern and northeastern position of Mulligan's works; Gen. Parsons the southwestern, with Clark's Division, commanded by Col. Congreve Jackson, and Steen's Division as reserves.
{212} Col. Rives, commanding Gen. Slack's Division, occupied the west along the river bank and captured the steamboats by which Mulligan could escape or receive reinforcements; Gens. Harris and Mc-Bride extended this line along the north, cutting off the garrison from all access to the river and water. This became very effective in forcing surrender, as not only the men but the animals suffered terribly from thirst.
By the morning of Sept. 18, six days after the first encounter with the pickets, Gen. Price had all his forces up and properly disposed about the garrison. He and his principal subordinates were very weary of the noisy and fruitless bushwhacking, and eager for something more conclusive.
Orders were issued for the whole line to close in upon the Union works, and they were gallantly responded to and met as gallant resistance from the beleaguered garrison in the 52 hours of stubborn fighting which ensued. Col. Congreve Jackson, commanding Gen. John B. Clark's Third Division, reported that he succeeded in getting to within 460 yards of the College.
Col. Benj. A. Rives, commanding Gen. Slack's Fourth Division, says that after having been driven back by a gallant counter-assault, he got within 100 yards of the College.
Gen. Steen lays claim for his division of having defeated Lieut.-Col. Scott, after which he passed back into the reserve.
{213} Gen. Mosby M. Parsons, commanding the Sixth Division, says that he reached to within 500 yards of the College, and also crossed the river with 3,000 men, to repel Sturgis, who "retired in confusion, leaving 200 of their tents."
Gen. J. H. McBride, commanding the Seventh Division, says that he succeeded in forming a breastwork with hemp bales "100 yards from the enemy's works."
Gen. Jas. S. Rains says that with the Second Division, numbering 3,025 rank and file, he succeeded in gaining a position 350 yards north and 500 yards east of the College.
Gen. Thos. A. Harris does not give the point he reached, but the concurrent testimony is that he was the closest of all, and is supported by the fact that his division sustained the heaviest loss. To his division is due the credit of the famous device of hemp bales as advancing breastworks.
Gen. Price quietly appropriates the credit for the device to himself, saying in his report: On the morning of the 20th inst I caused a number of hemp bales to be transported to the river nights, where moveable breastworks were speedily constructed out of them by Cols. Harris, McBride, Rives and Maj. Winston, and their respective commands. Capt. Kelly's battery was ordered at the same time to the position occupied by Gen. Harris's force, and quickly opened an effective fire under the direction of its gallant Captain.
These demonstrations, particularly the continued advance of the hemp breastworks, which were as efficient as the cotton bales at New Orleans, quickly attracted attention and excited and alarmed the enemy. They were, however, repulsed in every instance by the unflinching courage and fixed determination of the men.
Gen. Harris says in his report to Gen. Price: "I then directed Capt. Geo. A. Turner, of my staff, to request of you 132 bales of hemp, which you promptly credited.
{214} "I directed the bales to be wet in the river to protect them against the casualties of fire of our troops and the enemy's, and soon discovered that the wetting was so materially increasing the weight as to prevent our men in their exhausted condition from rolling them to the crest of the hill. I then adopted the idea of wetting the hemp after it had been transported to this position."
The credit has also been stoutly claimed for Col. Thomas Hinkle, of Wellington County, Mo., who two years later was killed in command of a guerrilla organization. No matter whose, the idea was singularly effective, and despite the most gallant efforts of the garrison, the hemp bales were steadily rolled nearer, until by 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th they were in places as close as from 50 to 75 yards of the Union works. At this distance it would be easy to mass an overpowering force behind their cover to rush upon and instantly overwhelm the garrison.
The garrison, which had now been fighting for eight long days; which was so short of ammunition that most of the cartridge boxes were empty, and there was no supply from which to refill them; which was tortured with thirst, surrounded with hundreds of animals dying from lack of water, at last raised the white flag.
After eight days of waiting there was no more sign of rescue than there was on the first, and everywhere they could look their enemies swarmed in apparently limitless numbers. Gen. Price granted the garrison honorable terms. The officers were to remain as prisoners of war, the men to lay down their arms, take the oath not to fight any more against Missouri, and to be sent across the river and allowed to go whither they would.
{215} With shrewd policy he allowed Col. Mulligan to retain his sword and showed him a great many civilities. Mulligan was a representative Irishman, and this would bear fruit in the attitude of the Irish toward the war. In his report to Gov. Jackson Gen. Price sums up the fruits of his victory as follows: Our entire loss in this series of engagements amounts to 25 killed and 72 wounded. The enemy's loss was much greater.
The visible fruits of this almost bloodless victory are very great-about 3.500 prisoners, among whom are Cols. Mulligan, Marshall, Peabody, White, and Grover, Maj. Van Horn and 118 other commissioned officers, five pieces of artillery and two mortars, over 8,000 stands of Infantry arms, a large number of sabers, about 750 horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, wagons, teams and ammunition, more than 8100,-000 worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. In addition to all this, I obtained the restoration of the great seal of the State and the public records, which had been stolen from their proper custodian, and about $900,-000 in money, of which the bank at this place had been robbed, and which I have caused to be returned to it.
Of Gen. Price's characteristics that of under-statement was certainly not one; but there is no use caviling about this, since the disaster was in all conscience bad enough for the Union side.
Col Mulligan's official report is not included in the Rebellion Records. It was quite a rhetorical statement of the affair, with unstinted praise for his own regiment and Irish valor generally, much condemnation for the Germans, between whom and the Irish there was at that time a great deal of feeling, and absolutely ignoring all the rest who participated in the defense. This was particularly unjust to the 1st ID. Cav. While the 23d 111. had taken the best and strongest part of the line, the 1st 111. Cav. had defended the weakest and most exposed part, that, too, with only pistols and sabers, and had captured the only flag taken during the siege.
{216} The total loss of the garrison is usually given as 39 killed and 120 wounded.
Probably Gen. Price in his report only mentioned the losses in his organized forces. If his wounded did not exceed 72, his men showed unusual ability in keeping under cover.
While the loss did not approach that of the desperate fight at Wilson's Creek, yet it was respectably large according to European standards, the garrison having lost about six per cent before surrendering.
Gen. Fremont announced this calamity to Washington in the following telegrams: Headquarters Western Department, St. Louis, Sept. 28, 1861.
I have a telegram from Brookfleld that Lexington has fallen into Price's hands, he having cut off Mulligan's supply of water. Reinforcements 4,000 strong, under Sturgis, by capture of ferryboats, had no means of crossing the river in time. Lane's force from the southwest and Davis's from the southeast upwards of 11,000, could not get there in time. I am taking the field myself, and hope to destroy the enemy either before or after the junction of forces under McCulloch. Please notify the President immediately.
J. C. FREMONT,