In spite of being a younger man than Col. Plummer, a younger Captain in the Regular Army, and in spite of Plummer's experience in the Mexican War and at Wilson's Creek, Carlin insisted upon the command of the whole, upon the grounds that he had been commissioned a Colonel Aug. 15, and by the Governor of Illinois; while Plummer's commission was from Fremont. Carlin insisted that he had a plan by which Thompson's whole force could be captured, but was at length induced to yield the command to Plummer, who went ahead with the combined force to attack Thompson, leaving Carlin, who was exhausted and ill, in town with a portion of his command.
Possibly, what helped induce Carlin to yield was the knowledge of an agreement between Col. Plummer and Col. Ross, of the 17th Ill., who outranked both of them, that if Carlin persisted in his claim, Ross should assert his seniority and take command of the whole. Carlin retained the 8th Wis. and two 24-pound howitzers in Fredericktown to hold the place, while Plummer took the rest of the force and started out in search of Thompson.
He did not have to go very far.
{250} A half mile from town shots were heard, and the cavalry came back with the information that the enemy was just ahead. The leading infantry regiment, the 17th Ill., went into line to the left and moved forward into a cornfield, where the enemy's skirmishers were immediately encountered.
Lieut. White came up with his section of artillery and opened fire upon a hill about 600 yards distant where it was likely that Thompson had his artillery masked. Thompson's guns could not stand the punishment quietly and opened up only to be speedily suppressed by other guns which Maj. Schofield hurried up to join two which had been firing.
Col. Lowe, commanding the Missouri State Guards, first engaged, was soon shot through the head and his regiment began falling back before the steady advance of the 17th Ill., to which was soon added the fire of the 33d Ill. and a part of the 11th Mo.
At first the Missourians fell back steadily, but after the rough handling of the artillery their retreat became a rout and Col. Baker dashed forward with the 1st Ind. Cav. in pursuit.. A half mile in the rear Thompson succeeded in rallying his men and also brought one piece of artillery into action, receiving the cavalry with a fierce volley, by which Maj. Gavitt, who had been active and prominent in the operations in that section, and Capt. Highman were killed.
Notwithstanding this, the cavalry rallied, charged, and took the gun, which they had, however, to soon give up under a charge led by Thompson himself.
{251} The 17th Ill. had already secured one gun, and now as the infantry came up Thompson's men broke and retreated rapidly in every direction. Hearing the noise of the fighting, Col. Carlin arose from a sick-bed, galloped to the battlefield, and took command of a part of the troops. The pursuit was continued by the infantry for 10 miles, and by the cavalry 12 miles farther, when it was decided that Thompson's men had scattered and gained a refuge in the swamps, and that further pursuit would be useless.
Plummer recalled his forces to Fredericktown. He claims that he took 80 prisoners, of whom 38 were wounded, and buried 158 of Thompson's dead, with other bodies being found from time to time in the woods. His own loss he reports as six killed and 16 wounded.
Thompson reported that he had lost 20 killed, 27 wounded, and 15 prisoners, but that he "had mowed down the enemy as with a scythe;" that "they acknowledge a loss of 400 killed and wounded," etc, etc. He admitted he had lost one cannon by its being disabled so that it could not be brought from the field. He said that his "dragoons" had stampeded in a shameful way, but that his infantry had behaved very well. Later, he reported from New Madrid that his command was "very much demoralized."
Gen. Polk seems to have been much depressed by the news of Thompson's defeat, because he ordered an abandonment of the post at New Madrid and the bringing over of the men and guns to his "Gibraltar" at Columbus.
Gen. Grant, though probably disappointed at the failure of his plans to capture Thompson's force, was careful to write complimentary letters to all the commanders, recognizing their good services in the expedition.
{252} The fight at Fredericktown quieted things pretty effectually in southeastern Missouri, and ended for a long while the project of capturing St Louis by the New Madrid route.
Gen. Grant was preparing some startling things to occupy the attention of Johnston, Polk and Pillow in quite another quarter.
{253}
CHAPTER XI. GEN. H. W. HALLECK IN COMMAND.
Henry Wager Halleck, who succeeded Gen. Fremont in command of the Department of Missouri, Nov. 9, 1861, had been pointed to as a brilliantly shining example of what West Point could produce. He was born in 1819 near Utica, N. Y., of a very good family, and had graduated July 1, 1839, from West Point, third in a class of which Isaac I. Stevens, afterward to conclude a brilliant career by dying a Major-General on the field of battle, was the head. Other conspicuous members of the class were Maj.-Gens. James B. Ricketts, E. O. C. Ord, H. J. Hunt, and E. R. S. Can-by, of the Union army, and A. R. Lawton, a Confederate Brigadier-General. Halleck was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, and during the Mexican War received a couple of the brevets so easily won in that conflict.
With his attainments and cast of mind, he made an admirable staff officer for Commodore Shubrick and Gens. Mason and Riley in their administration of California while the territory was being reduced to an American possession. He became a Captain in his Corps in 1852, but the opportunities in California were so tempting, that he resigned to enter the practice of the law and embark in various business enterprises of railroad building and quicksilver mining. He was unusually successful in all these, becoming Director-General of the New Almaden Quicksilver Mining Company, President of a railroad, and a member of a leading law firm. He kept up his military connection by accepting the commission of Major-General commanding the California Militia.
{254} He was a constant student and a ready writer, and during this time published a number of military and scientific books, some of which were original and others translations.
Intellectually, professionally and socially he stood very high, and the bestowal of a Major-General's commission upon him, dating from Aug. 19,1861, met with universal approval, though it gave him seniority in that coveted rank to many distinguished soldiers. At that time Halleck was in his 46th year and the very prime of his powers. He was tall, spare, and commanding in figure, with a clean-shaven, authoritative, intellectual face in which men read great things. He had large, searching eyes, which seemed to penetrate the one with whom he was talking. As far as education and observation could go, Halleck was as complete a soldier as could be produced. Whatever could be done by calculation and careful operation, he could do on a high plane. He only lacked military instinct and soldierly intuition. Of that moral force which frequently overleaps mere physical limitation he seems to have had little, nor could he understand it in others.
There was in him none of the fiery zeal of Lyon, or the relentless pugnacity of Grant; apparently these qualities were so absent in him that he did not know how to deal with them in others. He never put himself at the head of his troops to lead them in battle.
{255} He could build up, block by block, with patient calculation, without comprehension that somewhere might be a volcanic energy suddenly unloosed which would scatter his blocks like straws.
If he had political convictions, they were so unobtrusive as to be rarely mentioned in connection with him. Probably his views were the same as generally prevailed among the Regular Army officers of that day which were represented by the attitude of the Douglas Democrats and "Old Line Whigs."
He believed, above all things, in law and system, and wanted all the affairs of this world to go ahead in strict accordance with them. The soldier epithet of "Old Brains" was bestowed upon him, and he seemed to relish the appellation.
In the long and specific letter of instructions accompanying his assignment to command, Gen. McClellan directed him to carefully scrutinize all commissions and appointments, and revoke those not proceeding from the President or Secretary of War; to stop all pay and allowances to them, and if the appointees gave any trouble, send them out of the Department, and if they returned, place them in confinement. He was to examine into the legality of all organizations of troops serving in the Department, and deal with those unauthorized in a similar summary way. All contracts were to be rigidly probed, and payment suspended on those of which there was the slightest doubt. All officers who had in any way violated their duty to the Government were to be arrested and brought to prompt trial.
{256} Halleck began at once to justify the high expectations entertained of him. Order and system followed the erratic administration of his predecessor. Soldiers were subjected to vigorous discipline, but they were given the supplies to which they were entitled, and they were made to feel that they were being employed to some purpose.
The futile and aggravating marches made in pursuit of the elusive guerrillas and bushwhackers, who were never caught, were replaced by well-directed movements striking at the heart of the trouble.
Acting under Gen. Price's orders sometimes, but frequently under their own impulses to commit outrages, inflict blows, and create excitement, a large part of the State was covered by bands of guerrillas who appeared as citizens, were well armed, rode good horses, and were annoyingly successful in sweeping down on the railroad stations, water tanks, bridges, and settlements of Union people, burning, destroying, and creating havoc generally.
Gen. Halleck proclaimed martial law, and issued an order that any man disguised as a peaceful citizen, if caught in the act of burning bridges, etc., should be immediately shot. The troops proceeded to execute this order with good hearts. A large number of the offenders were shot down in the neighborhoods where they had committed their offenses; others were taken before a military commission and condemned to the same fate.
Gens. Pope, Prentiss, Schofield and Henderson were given sufficient forces and ordered to move directly upon the more important bodies of Secessionists who formed a nucleus and support for these depredators. They all did so with good effect.
Gen. Prentiss moved against a force about 3,000 strong operating in Howard, Boone and Calloway Counties, and succeeded in striking them very heavily at Mount Zion Church, where they were dispersed with a loss of 25 killed, 150 wounded, 30 prisoners, 90 horses, and 105 stands of arms.
{257} Gen. Pope operating from Sedalia achieved even better success, capturing Col. Robinson's command of 1,300 men and about 60 officers, 1,000 horses and mules, and 73 wagons loaded with powder, lead and supplies and 1,000 stands of arms.
Gen. Prentiss very effectually cleaned out the State north of the Missouri River, and in conjunction with Gen. Pope's operations south of it, made it so threatening for Gen. Price, who had advanced to the Osage River to support the Secessionists there, that he broke up his camp and rather hurriedly retreated to Springfield.
The year 1861 therefore ended with the Union men again in possession of nearly four-fifths of the State, with their hands full of prisoners and supplies captured from the enemy.
The Secessionists of St. Louis had been encouraged by the untoward course of events in the East. After Bull Run had come the shocking disaster of Ball's Bluff, and with Gen. Price only a short distance away on the Osage threatening Jefferson City and north Missouri, they felt their star in the ascendant, and became unbearably insolent. Gen. Halleck repressed them with a vigorous hand, yet without causing the wild clamor of denunciation which characterized Gen. Butler's Administration of New Orleans.
{258} It will be remembered that at that time it was thought quite the thing for young Secessionist women to show their "spirit" and their devotion to the South by all manner of open insult to the Yankee soldiers. Spitting at them, hurling epithets of abuse, and contemptuously twitching aside their skirts were regarded as quite the correct thing in the good society of which these young ladies were the ornaments. This had become so intolerable in New Orleans, that Gen. Butler felt constrained to issue his famous order directing that women so offending should be treated as "women of the town plying their vocation." This was made the pretext of "firing the Southern heart" to an unwarranted degree, and Jeff Davis issued a proclamation of outlawry against Ben Butler, with a reward for his head.
Sanguine Secessionists hoped that this "flagrant outrage" by "Beast Butler" would be sufficient cause for the recognition of the Southern Confederacy by France and England.
Gen. Halleck met the same difficulty as Butler very shrewdly. The Chief of Police of St. Louis had some measure of control over the disreputable women of the city, and made law for them. Under Gen. Hal-leek's order he instructed these women to vie with and exceed their respectable sisters in their manifestations of hostility to the Union cause and of devotion to the South. Where the fair young ladies of the Southern aristocracy were wearing Secession rosettes as big as a rose, the women of the demimonde sported them as big as a dahlia or sunflower. Where the young belle gave a little graceful twitch to her skirts to prevent any possible contamination by touching a passing Yankee, the other class flirted theirs' aside in the most immodest way. It took but a few days of this to make the exuberant young ladies of uncontrollable rebel proclivities discard their Secession rosettes altogether, and subside into dignified, self-respecting persons, who took no more notice of a passing Union soldier than they did of a lamp-post or tree-box.
{259} Another of Gen. Halleck's orders did not result so happily. It will be remembered that Gen. Fremont declared free the slaves of men in arms against the Government, and that their freedom would be assured them upon reaching the Union lines.
In the inflamed condition of public sentiment in the Border States on the negro question this was very impolitic, and the President promptly overruled the order.
Gen. Halleck went still further in the issuance of the following order, which created as intense feeling in the North as Gen. Fremont's "Abolition order" had excited in the Border States: It has been represented that important information respecting: the number and condition of our forces is conveyed to the enemy by means of fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy this evil, it is directed that no such persons be hereafter permitted to enter the lines of any camp, or of any forces on the march, and that any now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom.
It was particularly distasteful to the Radicals in Missouri who had been represented by Gen. Fremont. During his administration the Union party in the State had divided into two wings-the Radicals and the Conservatives, who soon came to hate each other almost if not quite as badly as they did the Secessionists. The Radicals, or, as their enemies called them, "the Charcoals," were largely made up, as before stated, of the young, aggressive, idealistic Germans who had poured into Missouri after the suppression of the Rebellion of 1848, and who looked upon slavery as they did on "priest-craft" and "despotism"-all monstrous relics of barbarism. They had absolutely no patience with the "peculiar institution," and could not understand how any rational, right-thinking man could tolerate it or hesitate about sweeping it off the earth at the first opportunity. Those of them who had gone into the army had only done so to fight for freedom, and without freedom the object of their crusade was lost.
{260} The German newspapers attacked Halleck with the greatest bitterness, meetings were held to denounce him and secure his removal, and strong efforts were made to obtain Sigel's promotion to a Major-General and his assignment to the command.
Gen. Halleck, in a letter to F. P. Blair, explained and justified this order, as follows: Order No. 3 was, in my mind, clearly a military necessity. Unauthorized persons, black or white, free or slave, must be kept out of our camps, unless we are willing to publish to the enemy everything we do or intend to do. It was a military, and not a political order.
I am ready to carry out any lawful instructions in regard to fugitive slaves which my superiors may give me, and to enforce any law which Congress may pass. But I cannot make law, and will not violate it. You know my private opinion on the policy of confiscating the slave property of the rebels in arms. If Congress shall pass it, you may be certain that I shall enforce it.
Among other well-taken measures was the passage of a law by Congress authorizing the enrollment of citizens of Missouri into regiments to be armed, equipped and paid by the United States, but officered by the Governor of Missouri, and employed only in the defense of the State. This had many advantages besides giving the services to the Government of about 13,000 very good soldiers. It brought into the ranks many wavering young men who did not want to fight against the Union, nor did they want to fight against the South. To enlist for the "defense of the State" satisfied all their scruples.
{261} The time had come when every young man in the State had to be lined up somewhere. He could not remain neutral; if he was not for the Union he would inevitably be brought into the Secession ranks.
The law authorized the necessary staff and commanding officers for this force, and prescribed that it should be under the command of a Brigadier-General of the United States selected by the Governor of Missouri.
Our old acquaintance, John M. Schofield, Gen. Lyon's Chief of Staff at the battle of Wilson's Creek, who had since done good work in command of a regiment of Missouri artillery, was commissioned a Brigadier-General to date from Nov. 21, 1861, and put in command of the Missouri Enrolled Militia, beginning thus a career of endless trouble, but of quite extended usefulness.
It will be remembered that Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant, recently promoted from the Colonelcy of the 21st Ill., had been relieved from his command at Jefferson City, and sent to that of a new district consisting of southeast Missouri and southern Illinois. He had made his headquarters temporarily at Cape Girardeau, to attend to M. Jeff Thompson, who was determined to lead the way for Gens. Leonidas Polk and Gideon Pillow into St. Louis by the Mississippi River route. Grant, as we have seen, organized his movements so well that Thompson was driven back from Fredericktown and Ironton with some loss, and returned to his old stamping-ground at New Madrid, below Columbus, Ky., where Polk had established his headquarters and the fighting center of the Confederacy in the West.
{262} Polk was reputed to have at that time some 80,000 men under his command, and Grant, following his usual practice of getting into proximity to his enemy, transferred his headquarters to Cairo, where, also in accordance with his invariable habit, he begun to furnish active employment for those under him in ways unpleasant for his adversary. An enemy in the territory assigned to Gen. Grant was never allowed much opportunity to loll in careless indolence. This idiosyncrasy of Gen. Grant made him rather peculiar among the Union Generals at that stage of the war.
Two days after Grant arrived at Cairo he learned that Gen. Polk was moving to take Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, 45 miles above Cairo. This was a most important point, as a lodgment there would have stopped navigation on the Ohio, and absolutely controlled that on the Cumberland and Tennessee. Grant at once decided that he would anticipate him and telegraphed for permission to St. Louis, but his telegram and another one still more urgent received no attention, and he proceeded to act on his own volition, loading his men on the steamers and starting for Paducah in the night, arriving there in the morning, thereby anticipating the rebel advance some six or eight hours. This was characteristic of Grant's other operations around Cairo, and it was not long until he had that point not only free from apprehension as to what Polk might do against it with his mighty army, but he had Polk becoming anxious as to what Grant might do against him at Columbus, which he had proclaimed as the "Gibraltar of the West."
{263} Everywhere in his district Grant had introduced the best discipline into the force of 20,000 men which he had collected. He had looked out carefully for their wants, and had them well supplied, and he was gaining their confidence as well as his own by well directed movements which always led to considerable results.
Fremont, who had at last started out in his grand movement against Price, was fearful that Price's army might be strongly reinforced by Polk from Columbus, and it was made Grant's duty to prevent this.
Grant with his habitual boldness had been desirous of moving directly against Columbus, but the reputed strength of the works and the force there made the suggestion carry shivers to the minds of his superiors, where the memories of Bull Run and Ball's Bluff were so painfully recent. But if Grant was not allowed to do one thing, he would always do another. He heard of a force under M. J. Thompson, numbering about 3,000, on the St. Francois River, about 50 miles to the southwest of Cairo, and promptly started Col. Richard J. Oglesby with about 3,000 men to beat up Jeff Thompson and destroy him.
Later he ordered Col. W. H. L. Wallace to take the remainder of the 11th Ill., and some other troops to move after Oglesby, to give him help should he need it.
Soon after, believing that Jeff Thompson had gotten out of Col. Oglesby's reach, he sent another order to Oglesby to move directly upon New Madrid and take the place. This was a bold performance, for the capture of New Madrid would have placed him on the Mississippi below Columbus and cut off Polk's principal line of supplies.
{264} Urgent dispatches continued to come from Fremont to prevent any reinforcement of Price from Columbus, and Grant started in to impress Gen. Polk with the idea that he would have quite enough to attend to at home. He sent orders to Gen. C. F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, to send a column out to threaten Columbus from that side, and to Col. Marsh to advance from Mayfield, Ky., and Grant himself, gathering up about 3,000 men from the troops he had around Cairo, embarking them on steamers, and under the convoy of two gunboats (the Lexington and Tyler), steamed down the river directly for Columbus, 20 miles away.
Nov. 6 the flotilla dropped down the river to within six miles and in full view of Columbus, and landed a few men on the Kentucky side. This was to still further confuse the mind of Gen. Polk, and make him believe that he must expect an attack on the land side in co-operation with the forces advancing from Paducah and from Mayfield directly in front of Cairo.
Gen. Grant says that when he started out he had no intention of making a fight, and of course did not contemplate any such thing as a direct attack with the force he had upon the immensely superior numbers at Columbus, but he saw his men were eager to do something, and that they would be greatly discontented if they returned without a fight. Therefore, on learning that the enemy was crossing troops to the little hamlet of Belmont, opposite Columbus, presumably with the intention of cutting off and crushing Oglesby, he resolved to strike a blow, and determined to break up the small camp at Belmont, which would give the enemy something else to think about.
{265} About an hour after daybreak he began landing his men on the west side of the Mississippi River, while the gunboats moved down a little further and waked up the enemy by throwing shells into the works at Columbus. Grant handled his men with the skill he always displayed on the field of battle, pushing forward the main body through the corn fields and woods, but leaving a regiment in a secure position in a dry slough as a resource for an emergency. They with the gunboats were to protect the transports.
Gen. Polk probably saw all this, but interpreted it as a mere feint to get him to send troops across the river and thus strip his fortifications so as to make easier the work of the columns advancing from Paducah and Mayfield. He therefore held his men with him and did not interfere with Grant's movements.
Grant pushed on through the cornfields and woods for a mile or more, and then rearranged his lines and pushed forward a heavy line of skirmishers. By this time the enemy in camp at Belmont had learned of the movement, and started out to meet it. The two lines of skirmishers soon came in contact, and there was a spiteful, bickering fire opened between them. Both sides were expert woodsmen and riflemen, and thoroly at home at this kind of work. The Union line pressed the Confederates slowly back for four hours, receiving and inflicting considerable losses. Grant's horse was shot under him, but he got another, and kept his place in the advance, directing and encouraging the men, whom he says acted like veterans and behaved as well as any troops in the world could have done.
{266} He pushed the enemy so closely that when the latter reached the abatis they broke into confusion and rushed over the river bank for shelter, yielding possession of their camp to the victorious Unionists.
This triumph completely intoxicated the victors. They broke ranks, threw down their guns, began rummaging through the camps for trophies, running up and down and cheering wildly. Their officers were no better than they. Many of them had been political "spellbinders" in civil life and very naturally proceeded to "improve the occasion" by getting on stumps and delivering enthusiastic Union speeches and addresses of congratulation over the gallantry of their men and the wonderful victory achieved. In vain did Gen. Grant try to recall them to a sense of soldierly duty and discipline. He alone appeared to comprehend the object of the expedition, and what was necessary to be next done. He could not rally enough men to go down the river bank and capture the garrison which was sheltered there. A number of the men who were attracted by the captured cannon began firing them with great jubilation down the river at steamboats which they saw there, and Grant tried to have them, since they would fire guns, turn them upon the steamers which were coming across from Columbus loaded with troops. Polk had at last waked up to what was being done across the river, and began a fire upon Belmont from his siege guns, while he hurried troops aboard steamers to recover the lost position.
{267} The shells began to startle the exultant soldiers, and Grant took advantage of this to employ them in setting fire to the tents and other camp equipage. Presently the sky of victory was overcast by the sudden announcement that the rebels were in line of battle between them and the transports, and that they were cut off and surrounded. The exultation of victory was followed by almost a panic, but Grant steadied them with the quiet assurance "We have cut our way in here, and we can cut it out again." This was taken up by the officers as they reformed their men for the battle.
Again the skirmish line was pushed forward in search of the enemy, but he offered only a moderate resistance, and the troops made their way back to the transports with little difficulty, though the excitement was tremendous.
The commanders of the gunboats had kept alert, and came promptly forward to engage the guns on the Columbus bluffs and later to discourage the pursuing rebels with liberal volleys of grape and canister, which, as the bend of the river gave them an enfilade on the river line, were delivered with great effect and considerable slaughter.
The troops were gotten again on board the transports without any particular trouble, though about 25 wounded were left in the hands of the enemy. The Union troops had brought off about 175 prisoners and two guns, besides spiking four other cannon.
While the wounded were being gathered up and brought aboard, Gen. Grant rode out some distance to reconnoiter, and almost rode into a body of the enemy. He turned and made his way back to the transports, which were just starting; the Captain recognized him, and held his boat for a moment while Gen. Grant's horse slipped down the steep bank and then trotted on board over the single gangway. The expedition returned to Cairo immediately.
{268} Gen. Grant officially reported his losses as 485 in killed, wounded and missing. Gen. Polk officially reported his losses as killed, 105; wounded, 419; missing, 117; total, 641. He estimated the Union losses at 1,500; "fourteen-fifteenths of that number must have been killed, wounded or drowned." He also said that he had a stand of colors, something over 1,000 stand of arms, with knapsacks, ammunition, and other military stores.
Medical Director J. H. Brinton gives the following list of losses by regiments: Command. Killed. Wounded
27th Ill. Vol.......................... 11 47
80th Ill. Vol......................... 9 27
31st Ill. Vol.......................... 10 70
22d Ill. Vol........................... 23 74
7th Iowa Vol........................... 26 93
Cavalry and Artillery................. 1 11
Total.................................. 80 322 While Gen. Grant and the officers and men under him regarded the affair as a great victory, and deservedly plumed themselves upon their achievements that day, there was a decidedly different opinion taken in the North, and the matter has been the subject of more or less sharp criticism ever since. It was pronounced by the McClellan-Halleck school of military men as a useless waste of men in gaining no object, and probably the most charitable of Gen. Grant's critics could find no better excuse for him than that he was like the man in the Bible who had bought two yoke of oxen and wanted to go and try them. All this did not disturb the equanimity of Gen. Grant and his men in the least. He knew he had accomplished what he had set out to do, to give Gen. Polk something else to occupy his mind than capturing Oglesby or reinforcing Thompson and Price.
{269} Col. Oglesby made his way unmolested back to Cairo. Polk was probably beginning to think that he would have quite enough to do to stay in Columbus, and his dreams as to St. Louis were dissipated.
Gen. Grant's men knew that they had met their enemies on equal terms in the open field, and had driven them, whether they were in their front or rear, and so they were content.
The Confederates of course proclaimed a great victory, and made the most of it. Albert Sidney Johnston enthusiastically congratulated Polk, Jefferson Davis did the same, and the Confederate Congress passed a resolution of thanks to Maj.-Gen. Polk and Brig.-Gens. Pillow and Cheatham and the officers and soldiers under their commands.
The battle was the occasion of still further increasing the bitterness between Polk and his insubordinate subordinate, Gideon J. Pillow, who resigned his commission, and sent to the Confederate War Department a long and bitter complaint against Gen. Polk, a large part of which was taken up with charges against his superior for non-support when he, Pillow, was engaged in a terrible struggle on the west side of the river with a force "three times my own." Pillow asserted that he had repeatedly driven back the Unionists at the point of the bayonet, after his ammunition had been exhausted, and no more was furnished him by Gen. Polk. He said that Polk had thus needlessly sacrificed many brave men, and that a like, if not greater, calamity was possible if he were to continue in command. "His retention is the source of great peril to the country." Pillow said: "As a zealous patriot, I admire him; as an eminent minister of the Gospel, I respect him; but as a Commanding General I cannot agree with him."
{270} Southeastern Missouri had, therefore, a season of rest for some time.
{271}