"In numerical strength his army so much exceeded that under General Lee that, after covering the entire Confederate front with double lines of battle, he had in reserve a large force with which to extend his flank and compel a corresponding movement on the part of his adversary, in order to keep between him and his coveted prize--the capital of the Confederacy." [99]
On the 18th another assault was made upon our lines, but it produced no impression. On the 20th of May, after twelve days of skirmish and battle at Spottsylvania against a superior force, General Lee's information led him to believe that the enemy was about to attempt another flanking movement, and interpose his army between the Confederate capital and its defenders. To defeat this purpose Longstreet was ordered to move at midnight in the direction of Hanover Junction, and on the following day and night Swell's and Hill's corps marched for the same point.
The Confederate commander, divining that Grant's objective point was the intersection of the two railroads leading to Richmond at a point two miles south of the North Anna River, crossed his army over that stream and took up a line of battle which frustrated the movement.
Grant began his flanking movement on the night of the 20th, marching in two columns, the right, under General Warren, crossing the North Anna at Jericho Ford without opposition. On the 23d the left, under General Hancock, crossing four miles lower down, at the Chesterfield or County Bridge, was obstinately resisted by a small force, and the passage of the river was not made until the 24th. After crossing the North Anna, Grant discovered that his movement was a blunder, and that his army was in a position of much peril.
The Confederate commander established his line of battle on the south side of the river, both wings refused so as to form an obtuse angle, with the apex resting on the river between the two points of the enemy's crossing, Longstreet's and Hill's corps forming the two sides, and Little River and the Hanover marshes the base. Ewell's corps held the apex or center.
The hazard of Grant's position appears not to have been known to him until he attempted to unite his two columns, which were four miles apart, by establishing a connecting line along the river. Foiled in the attempt, he discovered that the Confederate army was interposed between his two wings, which were also separated by the North Anna, and that the one could give no support to the other except by a double crossing of the river. That the Confederate commander did not seize the opportunity to strike his embarrassed foe and avail himself of the advantage which his superior generalship had gained, may have been that, concluding from past observation of Grant's tactics, he felt assured that the "continuous hammering" process was to be repeated without reference to circumstances or position. If Lee acted on this supposition, he was mistaken, as the Federal commander, profiting by the severe lessons of Spottsylvania and the Wilderness, with cautious, noiseless movement, withdrew under cover of the night of the 26th to the north side of the North Anna, and moved eastward down to the Pamunkey River.
At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, which had been on detached service in North Carolina, and by a small force under General Breckinridge from southwestern Virginia, twenty-two hundred strong. Hoke's brigade, of Early's division, twelve hundred strong, which had been on detached duty at the Junction, here also rejoined its division. On the 29th the whole of Grant's army was across the Pamunkey, while General Lee's army on the next day was in line of battle with his left at Atlee's Station. By another movement eastward the two armies were brought face to face at Cold Harbor on June 3d. Here fruitless efforts were made by General Grant to pierce or drive back the forces of General Lee. Our troops were protected by temporary earthworks, and while under cover of these were assailed by the enemy:
"But in vain. The assault was repulsed along the whole line, and the carnage on the Federal side was fearful. I[100] well recall having received a report, after the assault, from General Hoke--whose division reached the army just previous to this battle--to the effect that the ground in his entire front, over which the enemy had charged, was literally covered with their dead and wounded; and that up to that time he had not had a single man killed. No wonder that, when the command was given to renew the assault, the Federal soldiers sullenly and silently declined. 'The order[101] was issued through the officers to their subordinate commanders, and from them descended through the wonted channels; but no man stirred, and the immobile lines pronounced a verdict, silent yet emphatic, against further slaughter. The loss on the Union side in this sanguinary action was over thirteen thousand, while on the part of the Confederates it is doubtful whether it reached that many hundreds.' After some disingenuous proposals, General Grant finally asked a truce to enable him to bury his dead. Soon after this he abandoned his chosen line of operations, and moved his army so as to secure a crossing to the south side of James River. The struggle from the Wilderness to this point covered a period of over one month, during which time there had been an almost daily encounter of arms, and the Army of Northern Virginia had placed _hors de combat_, of the army under General Grant, a number exceeding the entire numerical strength, at the commencement of the campaign, of Lee's army, which, notwithstanding its own heavy losses and the reinforcements received by the enemy, still presented an impregnable front to its opponent."
By the report of the United States Secretary of War (Stanton), Grant had, on the 1st of May, 1864, two days before he crossed the Rapidan, 120,380 men, and in the Ninth Army Corps 20,780, or an aggregate with which he marched against Lee of 141,160. To meet this vast force, Lee had on the Rapidan less than 50,000 men. By the same authority it appears that Grant had a reserve upon which he could draw of 137,672.
Lee had practically no reserve, for he was compelled to make detachments from his army for the protection of West Virginia and other points, about equal to all the reenforcements which he received. In the "Southern Historical Papers," vol. vi, page 144, upon the very reliable authority of the editor, there appears the following statement:
"Grant says he lost, in the campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, 39,000 men; but Swinton puts his loss at over 60,000, and a careful examination of the figures will show that his real loss was nearer 100,000. In other words, he lost about twice as many men as Lee had, in order to take a position which he could have taken at first without firing a gun or losing a man."
On June 12th the movement was commenced by Grant for crossing the James River. Pontoon-bridges were laid near Wilcox's Wharf for the passage of his army. J. C. Pemberton, who, after the fall of Vicksburg, was left without a command corresponding to his rank of lieutenant-general in the provisional army, in order that he might not stand idle, nobly resigned that commission, and asked to be assigned to duty according to his rank in the regular army, which was that of lieutenant-colonel. Ho was accordingly directed to report to General Lee for service with the Army of Northern Virginia. Being a skillful artillerist, he was directed to find a position where he could place a mortar so as to throw shells on the enemy's bridge when it should be put into use. By a daring reconnaissance and exact calculation, he determined a point from which the desired effect might be produced by vertical fire, over a wood. At the proper moment he opened upon the bridge, and his expectations were verified by the shells falling on the troops harassingly. This, his first service with the Army of Northern Virginia, was interrupted by the failure to send promptly a cohering force to protect the mortar, the position of which was disclosed by its fire. The injury it inflicted caused the Federal commander to send a detachment which drove away the gunners and captured the mortar.
On the 14th and 15th of June the crossing of Grant's army was completed. It will be remembered that he had crossed the Rapidan on the 3d of May. It had therefore taken him more than a month to reach the south side of the James. In his campaign he had sacrificed a hecatomb of men, a vast amount of artillery, small-arms, munitions of war, and supplies, to reach a position to which McClellan had already demonstrated there was an easy and inexpensive route. It is true that the Confederate army had suffered severely, and, though the loss was comparatively small to that of its opponents, it could not be repaired, as his might be, from the larger population and his facility for recruiting in Europe. To those who can approve the policy of attrition without reference to the number of lives it might cost, this may seem justifiable, but it can hardly be regarded as generalship, or be offered to military students as an example worthy of imitation. After an unsuccessful attempt, by a surprise, to capture Petersburg, General Grant concentrated his army south of the Appomattox River and commenced the operations to be related hereafter.
[Footnote 95: "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 96: "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 97: Letter from Colonel C. S Venable, "Southern Historical Society Papers," vol. viii, p. 106, March, 1880.]
[Footnote 98: "Memoir of the Last Year," etc, by General Early.]
[Footnote 99: "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 100: Taylor, "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 101: Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 487.]
CHAPTER XLVII.
Situation in the Shenandoah Valley.--March of General Early.--The Object.--At Lynchburg.--Staunton.--His Force.--Enters Maryland.-- Attack at Monocacy.--Approach to Washington.--The Works.-- Recrosses the Potomac.--Battle at Kernstown.--Captures.--Outrages of the Enemy.--Statement of General Early.--Retaliation on Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.--Battle near Winchester.--Sheridan's Force routed.--Attack subsequently renewed with New Forces.-- Incapacity of our Opponent.--Early falls back.--The Enemy retires.--Early advances.--Report of a Committee of Citizens on Losses by Sheridan's Orders.--Battle at Cedar Creek.--Losses, Subsequent Movements, and Captures.--The Red River Campaign.-- Repulse and Retreat of General Banks.--Capture of Fort Pillow.
Before the opening of the campaign of 1864, the lower Shenandoah Valley was held by a force under General Sigel, with which General Grant decided to renew the attempt which had been made by Crook and Averill to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad west of Lynchburg as a means to his general purpose of isolating Richmond; and a prompt movement of General Morgan had defeated those attempts and driven off the invaders. Sigel, with about fifteen thousand men, commenced his movement up the Valley of the Shenandoah. Major-General Breckinridge, commanding in southwestern Virginia, was notified, on the 4th of May, of the movement of Sigel, and started immediately with two brigades of infantry to Staunton, at which place he arrived on the 9th. The reserves of Augusta County, under Colonel Harmon, were called out, numbering several hundred men, and the cadets of the Military Institute at Lexington, numbering two hundred, voluntarily joined him. With this force Breckinridge decided to march to meet Sigel. General Imboden, with a cavalry force of several hundred, had been holding, as best he might, the upper Valley, and joined Breckinridge in the neighborhood of New Market, informing him that Sigel then occupied that place. Breckinridge having marched so rapidly from Staunton that it was probable that his advance was unknown to the enemy, he determined to make an immediate attack. His troops were put in motion at one o'clock, and by daylight was in line of battle two miles south of New Market. Sigel seems to have been unconscious of any other obstruction to the capture of Staunton than the small cavalry force under Imboden. At this time Lee was engaged with the vastly superior force of Grant, which had crossed the Rapidan, and Sigel's was a movement to get upon our flank, and thus cooperate with Grant in his attempt to capture Richmond. Breckinridge had an infantry force not much exceeding three thousand. The hazard of an attack was great, but the necessity of the case justified it.
Breckinridge's force was only enough to form one line of battle in two ranks, the cadets holding the center between the two brigades.
There were no reserves, and Colonel Harmon's command formed the guard for the trains. Skirmish lines were promptly engaged, and soon thereafter the enemy fell back beyond New Market, where Sigel, assuming the defensive, took a strong position, in which to wait for an attack. Our artillery was moved forward, and opened with effect upon the enemy's position; then our infantry advanced, "with the steadiness of troops on dress parade, the precision of the cadets serving well as a color-guide for the brigades on either side to dress by... . The Federal line had the advantage of a stone wall which served as a breastwork." [102] Sigel's cavalry attempted to turn our right flank, but was repulsed disastrously, and in a few moments the enemy was in full retreat, crossing the Shenandoah and burning the bridge behind him.
Breckinridge captured five pieces of artillery and over five hundred prisoners, exclusive of the wounded left on the field. Our loss was several hundred killed and wounded. General Lee, after receiving notice of this, ordered Breckinridge to transfer his command as rapidly as possible to Hanover Junction. The battle was fought on the 15th, and the command reached Hanover Junction on the 20th of May.
Before General Breckinridge left the Valley, he issued an order thanking his troops, "particularly the cadets, who, though mere youths, had fought with the steadiness of veterans."
Brigadier-General W. E. Jones had, with a small cavalry force, come from southwestern Virginia to the Valley after Breckinridge's departure, and this, with the command of Imboden, only sufficient for observation, was all that remained in the Valley when the Federal General David Hunter, with a larger force than Sigel's, succeeded the latter. Jones, with his cavalry and a few infantry, encountered this force at Piedmont, was defeated and killed. Upon the receipt of this information, Breckinridge with his command was sent back to the Valley.
On June 13th Major-General Early, with the Second Corps of Lee's army, numbering a little over eight thousand muskets and two battalions of artillery, commenced a march to strike Hunter's force in the rear, and, if possible, destroy it; then to move down the Valley, cross the Potomac, and threaten Washington. On the 17th he reached Lynchburg, and Hunter arrived at the same time. Preparations were made for the attack of Hunter on the 19th, when he began to retreat, and was pursued with much loss, until he was disposed of by taking the route to the Kanawha River. On the 27th Early's force reached Staunton on its march down the Valley. It now amounted to ten thousand infantry and about two thousand cavalry, having been joined by Breckinridge, and Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, with a battalion of Maryland cavalry. The advance was rapid. Railroad bridges were burned, the track destroyed, and stores captured. The Potomac was crossed on the 5th and 6th of June, and the move was made through the gaps of South Mountain to the north of Maryland Heights, which were occupied by a hostile force. A brigade of cavalry was sent north of Frederick to strike the railroads from Baltimore to Harrisburg and Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the Gunpowder, and to cut the railroad between Washington and Baltimore, and threaten the latter place. The other troops moved forward toward Monocacy Junction, where a considerable body of Federal troops under General Wallace was found posted on the eastern bank of the Monocacy, with an earthwork and two block-houses commanding both bridges. The position was attacked in front and on the flank, and it was carried and the garrison put to flight. Between six and seven hundred unwounded prisoners fell into our hands, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater than ours, which was about seven hundred.
An advance was made on the 10th nearly to Knoxville, on the Georgetown Pike. On the next day it was continued to Washington, with the hope of getting into the fortifications before they could be manned. But the heat and the dust impeded the progress greatly. Fort Stevens was approached soon after noon, and appeared to be lightly manned, but, before our force could get into the works, a column of the enemy from Washington filed into them on the right and left, skirmishers were thrown out in front, and an artillery-fire was opened on us from a number of batteries. An examination was now made to determine if it were practicable to carry the defenses by assault.
"They were found to be exceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be inclosed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works in front of each, pierced for an immense number of guns, the whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and strengthened by palisades and abatis. The timber had been felled within cannon-range all around and left on the ground, making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was raked by artillery." As far as the eye could reach, the works appeared to be of the same impregnable character. The exhaustion of our force, the lightness of its artillery, and the information that two corps of the enemy's forces had just arrived in Washington, in addition to the veteran reserves and hundred-days-men, and the parapets lined with troops, led us to refrain from making an assault, and to retire during the night of the 12th. On the morning of the 14th General Early recrossed the Potomac, bringing off the prisoners captured at Monocacy and everything else in safety, including a large number of beef-cattle and horses. There was some skirmishing in the rear between our cavalry and that which was following us, and on the afternoon of the 14th there was artillery-firing across the river at our cavalry watching the fords. Meantime General Hunter had arrived at Harper's Ferry and united with Sigel, and some skirmishing took place; but General Early determined to concentrate near Strasburg, so as to enable him to put the trains in safety, and mobilize his command to make an attack. On the 22d he moved across Cedar Creek toward Strasburg, and so posted his force as to cover all the roads from the direction of Winchester. Learning on the next day that a large portion of the column sent after him from Washington was returning, and that the Army of West Virginia, under Crook, including Hunter's and Sigel's forces, with Averill's cavalry, was at Kernstown, he determined to attack at once.
After the enemy's skirmishers had been driven in, it was discovered that his left flank was exposed, and General Breckinridge was ordered to move Echols's division undercover of some ravines on our right and attack that flank. The attacking division struck the enemy's left flank in open ground, doubling it up and throwing his whole line into great confusion. The other divisions then advanced, and his rout became complete. He was pursued by the infantry and artillery beyond Winchester. Our loss was very light; his loss in killed and wounded was severe. The whole defeated force crossed the Potomac, and took refuge at Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. The road was strewed with debris of the rapid retreat--twelve caissons and seventy-two wagons having been abandoned, and most of them burned.
On the 26th the Confederate force moved to Martinsburg:
"While at Martinsburg," says General Early in his memoir, "it was ascertained beyond all doubt that Hunter had been again indulging in his favorite mode of warfare, and that, after his return to the Valley, while we were near Washington, among other outrages, the private residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, a member of the Virginia Senate, Mr. Alexander R. Boteler, an ex-member of the Confederate Congress, as well as of the United States Congress, and Edmund I.
Lee, a distant relative of General Lee, all in Jefferson County, with their contents, had been burned by his orders, only time enough being given for the ladies to get out of the houses. A number of towns in the South, as well as private country-houses, had been burned by Federal troops, and the accounts had been heralded forth in some of the Northern papers in terms of exaltation, and gloated over by their readers, while they were received with apathy by others. I now came to the conclusion that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough, and that it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to its enormity by an example in the way of retaliation. I did not select the cases mentioned as having more merit or greater claims for retaliation than others, but because they had occurred within the limits of the country covered by my command, and were brought more immediately to my attention.[103]
"The town of Chambersburg was selected as the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCausland was ordered to proceed with his brigade and that of Johnson's and a battery of artillery to that place, and demand of the municipal authorities the sum of one hundred thousand dollars in gold, or five hundred thousand dollars in United States currency, as a compensation for the destruction of the houses named and their contents; and in default of payment to lay the town in ashes, in retaliation for the burning of those houses and others in Virginia, as well as for the towns which had been burned in other Southern States. A written demand to that effect was also sent to the municipal authorities, and they were informed what would be the result of a failure or a refusal to comply with it. I desired to give the people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town, by making compensation for part of the injury done, and hoped that the payment of such a sum would have the desired effect, and open the eyes of people of other towns at the North to the necessity of urging upon their Government the adoption of a different policy.
"On July 30th McCausland reached Chambersburg, and made the demand as directed, reading to such of the authorities as presented themselves the paper sent by me. The demand was not complied with, the people stating that they were not afraid of having their town burned, and that a Federal force was approaching. The policy pursued by our army on former occasions had been so lenient that they did not suppose the threat was in earnest at this time, and they hoped for speedy relief.
McCausland, however, proceeded to carry out his orders, and the greater part of the town was laid in ashes. He then moved in the direction of Cumberland, but found it defended by a strong force. He then withdrew and crossed the Potomac, near the mouth of the South Branch, capturing the garrison and partly destroying the railroad-bridge. Averill pursued from Chambersburg, and surprised and routed Johnson's brigade, and caused a loss of four pieces of artillery and about three hundred prisoners from the whole command."
Meantime a large force, consisting of the Sixth, Nineteenth, and Crook's corps, of the Federal army, had concentrated at Harper's Ferry under Major-General Sheridan. After various manoeuvres, both armies occupied positions in the neighborhood of Winchester. Early had about eight thousand five hundred infantry fit for duty, nearly three thousand mounted men, three battalions of artillery, and a few pieces of horse-artillery. Sheridan's force, according to the best information, consisted of ten thousand cavalry, thirty-five thousand infantry, and artillery that greatly outnumbered ours both in men and guns.
On the morning of September 19th, the enemy began to advance in heavy force on Ramseur's position, on an elevated plateau between Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run, about a mile and a half from Winchester, on the Berryville road. Nelson's artillery was posted on Ramseur's line, covering the approaches as far as practicable; and Lomax, with Jackson's cavalry and a part of Johnson's, was on the right, watching the valley of Abraham's Creek and the Front Royal road beyond, while Fitzhugh Lee was on the left, across the Red Bud, with cavalry, watching the interval between Ramseur's left and the Red Bud. These troops held the enemy's main force in check until Gordon's and Rodes's divisions arrived, a little after 10 A.M. Gordon was placed under cover in rear of a piece of woods, behind the interval between Ramseur's line and the Red Bud. Rodes was directed to form on Gordon's right, in rear of another piece of woods. Meanwhile, we discovered very heavy columns, that had been massed under cover between the Red Bud and the Berryville road, moving to attack Ramseur on his left flank, while another force pressed him in front. Rodes and Gordon were immediately hurled upon the flank of the advancing columns. But Evans's brigade, of Gordon's division, on the extreme left of our infantry, was forced back through the woods from behind which it had advanced by a column, which followed to the rear of the woods and within musket-range of seven pieces of Braxton's artillery.
Braxton's guns stood their ground and opened with canister. The fire was so well directed that the column staggered, halted, and commenced falling back. Just then Battle's brigade moved forward and swept through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans's brigade was rallied and cooperated. Our advance was resumed, and the enemy's attacking columns, the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, were thrown into great confusion and fled from the field. General Early exclaims, "It was a grand sight to see this immense body hurled back in utter disorder before my two divisions, numbering very little over five thousand muskets!" This affair occurred about 11 A.M., and a splendid victory had been gained. But the enemy still had a fresh corps which had not been engaged, and there remained his heavy force of cavalry.
Our lines were now formed across from Abraham's Creek to Red Bud, and were very attenuated. There was still seen in front a formidable force, and away to the right a division of cavalry massed, with some artillery overlapping us at least a mile. Late in the afternoon, two divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force that had been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook's corps, which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time on the north side of Red Bud and forced back our brigade of infantry and cavalry. A considerable force of cavalry then swept along the Martinsburg road to the skirts of Winchester, thus getting in the rear of our left flank. This was soon driven back by two of Wharton's brigades, and subsequently another charge of cavalry was also repulsed. But many of the men in the front line, hearing the fire in the rear, and thinking they were flanked and about to be cut off, commenced to fall back. At the same time Crook's corps advanced against our left, and Evans's brigade was thrown into line to meet it, but, after an obstinate resistance, that brigade also retired. The whole front line had now given way, but was rallied and formed behind some old breastworks, and with the aid of artillery the progress of the enemy's infantry was arrested. Their cavalry afterward succeeded in getting around on our left, producing great confusion, for which there was no remedy.
We now retired through Winchester, a new line was formed, and the hostile advance checked until nightfall. We then retired to Newton without serious molestation. Our trains, stores, sick, and wounded that could be removed had been sent to Fisher's Hill. This battle, beginning with the skirmishing in Ramseur's front, had lasted from daylight until dark, and, at the close of it, we had been forced back two miles, after having repulsed the first attack with great slaughter, and subsequently contested every inch of ground with unsurpassed obstinacy. We deserved the victory, and would have gained it but for the enemy's immense superiority in cavalry. In his memoir General Early says:
"When I look back to this battle, I can but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent."
Our loss was severe for the size of our force, but only a fraction of that ascribed to us by the foe, while his was very heavy, and some prisoners fell into our hands.
On the 22d, after two days spent in reconnoitering, the enemy prepared to make an attack upon our position at Fisher's Hill; but, as our force was not strong enough to resist a determined assault, orders were given to retire after dark. Before sunset, however, an advance was made against Ramseur's left by Crook's corps. The movement to put Pegram's brigades into line successively to the left produced some confusion, when the enemy advanced along his entire line, and, after a brief contest, our force retired in disorder. We fell back to a place called Narrow Passage, all the trains being removed in safety. Some skirmishing ensued as we withdrew up the Valley, but without important result.
On October 1st our force was in position between Mount Sidney and North River, and the enemy's had been concentrated around Harrisonburg and on the north bank of the river. On the 5th we were reenforced by General Rosser with six hundred mounted men, and Kershaw's division, numbering twenty-seven hundred muskets, with a battalion of artillery. On the morning of the 6th it was discovered that the foe had retired down the Valley. General Early then moved forward and arrived at New Market with his infantry on the 7th.
Rosser pushed forward on the back and middle roads in pursuit of the cavalry, which was engaged in burning houses, mills, barns, and stacks of wheat and hay, and had several skirmishes with it.
A committee, consisting of thirty-six citizens and the same number of magistrates, appointed by the County Court of Rockingham County, for the purpose of making an estimate of the losses of that county by the execution of General Sheridan's orders, made an investigation, and reported as follows:
"Dwelling-houses burned, 30; barns burned, 450; mills burned, 31; fences destroyed (miles), 100; bushels of wheat destroyed, 100,000; bushels of corn destroyed, 50,000; tons of hay destroyed, 6,233; cattle carried off, 1,750; horses carried off, 1,750; sheep carried off, 4,200; hogs carried off, 3,350; factories burned, three; furnaces burned, one. In addition there was an immense amount of farming utensils of every description destroyed, many of them of great value, such as reapers and thrashing-machines; also, household and kitchen furniture, and money, bonds, plate, etc., pillaged."
General Early, having learned that Sheridan was preparing to send a part of his troops to Grant, moved down the Valley again on the 12th, and reached Fisher's Hill. The enemy was found on the north bank of Cedar Creek in strong force. He gave no indication of an intention to move, nor did he evince any purpose of attacking us, though the two positions were in sight of each other. At the same time it became necessary for us to move back for want of provisions and forage, or to attack him in his position with the hope of driving him from it.
An attack was determined upon by General Early, and, as he was not strong enough to assault the fortified position in front, he resolved to get around one of the enemy's flanks and attack him by surprise.
His plan of attack is thus stated by him: