September 1810
Early in the morning of 27 September, the voltigeurs voltigeurs of the 69 of the 69eme Regiment Regiment rooted about their baggage. Water was on the boil for their coffee, and some gnawed at stale bread or some morsel of corn left over from their meal of the night before. They had marched deep into Portugal, part of an invasion army of sixty-five thousand under Marshal Andre Massena. The 69th belonged to Ney's corps within it, and had already had several brushes with the Light Division. rooted about their baggage. Water was on the boil for their coffee, and some gnawed at stale bread or some morsel of corn left over from their meal of the night before. They had marched deep into Portugal, part of an invasion army of sixty-five thousand under Marshal Andre Massena. The 69th belonged to Ney's corps within it, and had already had several brushes with the Light Division.
In the early-morning gloom, they could make out the Sierra de Busaco, which they knew was lined with British troops. The massif lay in front of them, like some great snoozing bear. The feet were anchored on the River Mondego, securing one flank. The ground rose up into a great ridge almost four miles long, and then dropped down somewhat at the neck of the beast, where there was a village called Sula. Not far from Sula was the walled convent of Busaco, but it was on the reverse slope, invisible to the French. The natural dip or neck offered the easiest path for the local road from Moura, at the base of the ridge, up across, through Sula and on to Lisbon. Up beyond this road (to the British left or French right of it) the ground went up again slightly, forming the head of the position. Beyond this crown was a difficult little valley, a gorge almost of a stream called the Milijoso, which secured Wellington's other flank.
Massena and a party of his staff officers had already been gazing up at this monstrous position, having gone as far forward as Moura in their reconnaissance. One officer with the Imperial Army noted noted: Their generals could observe all our movements and even count the number of files. Their reserves were hidden on the other side of the mountain. They could concentrate strong masses in less than half an hour, on any attacked point, while the French needed an hour even to get to their outposts, and during that passage would find themselves exposed to grapeshot and musketry from a multitude of skirmishers hidden among the rocks. Their generals could observe all our movements and even count the number of files. Their reserves were hidden on the other side of the mountain. They could concentrate strong masses in less than half an hour, on any attacked point, while the French needed an hour even to get to their outposts, and during that passage would find themselves exposed to grapeshot and musketry from a multitude of skirmishers hidden among the rocks.
There had been a heated discussion the night before about the wisdom of assaulting the Busaco position under such adverse conditions. Massena dismissed his chief of staff's desire to bypass the ridge, telling him, 'You like manoeuvring, but this is the first time that Wellington seems ready to give battle and I want to profit from the opportunity.' Massena, like many of the French officers, considered Wellington's tactics so far to have been an unseemly combination of timidity where his own soldiers' lives were concerned and ruthlessness, in overseeing the removal of much of the Portuguese rural population, as well as their crops, so that the French would not be able to sustain themselves. If Wellington that day was ready to fight like a man for a change, then Massena, a tactician considered second only to Napoleon himself in skill and daring, intended to take the bull by the horns.
The noisy arguments between Massena and his subordinates were quite typical of the French staff's proceedings in the Peninsula. These fellows like Ney, Reynier and Junot owed their advancement to Napoleon's personal patronage. Since the Emperor had been absent from Spain for more than a year and a half, they became quite nervous about suffering some disaster that might result in their fall from grace. Although placed under Massena's orders, they reserved the right to criticise his decisions while circulating their own version of events through letters to friends in Paris. On the evening of 26 September, however, they were forced into an uncomfortable calculation. Ney and some of the others believed the moment to force the British position had already passed and there was some justice in this because Wellington had received some late reinforcements but they had no choice but to fall in with Massena because the Emperor's orders were unambiguous on the point of his authority. As far as the marshal was concerned, Busaco would offer his one chance of a knockout blow against the British.
Massena's orders involved throwing two corps d'armee corps d'armee into the assault. General Reynier's would take a small track that led up to the peak of the sierra, with the aim of breaking the British line and forcing them to commit their reserves. Marshal Ney would then send his divisions up the road from Moura to Sula and break through at that vital point. Massena ordered Ney's 6th Corps to be 'preceded by its skirmishers. Arriving on the mountain's crest it will from in [battle] line.' A third corps under General Junot would hang back in reserve. into the assault. General Reynier's would take a small track that led up to the peak of the sierra, with the aim of breaking the British line and forcing them to commit their reserves. Marshal Ney would then send his divisions up the road from Moura to Sula and break through at that vital point. Massena ordered Ney's 6th Corps to be 'preceded by its skirmishers. Arriving on the mountain's crest it will from in [battle] line.' A third corps under General Junot would hang back in reserve.
Sub-Lieutenant Marcel of the voltigeur voltigeur or light-infantry company of the 69 or light-infantry company of the 69eme formed his men up early that morning, ignorant of Massena's precise orders, but quite sure that if there was going to be a battle, his skirmishers would be leading the way. Marcel had been conscripted from his native Aube in 1806 and his rise showed how an active and intelligent man could climb in the French system. He was rapidly promoted to corporal and then sergeant, gaining his officer's commission early in 1810 for his gallantry in the field. For a British soldier, the promotion from recruit to officer in under four years would have been unthinkable. There were other rewards too: a cross of the formed his men up early that morning, ignorant of Massena's precise orders, but quite sure that if there was going to be a battle, his skirmishers would be leading the way. Marcel had been conscripted from his native Aube in 1806 and his rise showed how an active and intelligent man could climb in the French system. He was rapidly promoted to corporal and then sergeant, gaining his officer's commission early in 1810 for his gallantry in the field. For a British soldier, the promotion from recruit to officer in under four years would have been unthinkable. There were other rewards too: a cross of the Legion d'honneur Legion d'honneur did not just make a nice bauble on a soldier's chest, it also carried a pension. There was no flogging in the French Army. Instead, the officers would inspire a column that faltered under enemy fire with slogans, among them: ' did not just make a nice bauble on a soldier's chest, it also carried a pension. There was no flogging in the French Army. Instead, the officers would inspire a column that faltered under enemy fire with slogans, among them: 'L'Empereur recompensera le premier qu'avancera qu'avancera' (The Emperor will reward the first to go forward).
Marcel, a tough little man, had every confidence that his voltigeurs voltigeurs could climb the Busaco ridge. They had fought the British at the Coa and they'd beaten them, just like the Emperor had beaten all the others. The young officer believed that 'happiness, ardour, and love of glory showed on the face of each soldier: the youngest had three years of service; what couldn't one do with such men?' could climb the Busaco ridge. They had fought the British at the Coa and they'd beaten them, just like the Emperor had beaten all the others. The young officer believed that 'happiness, ardour, and love of glory showed on the face of each soldier: the youngest had three years of service; what couldn't one do with such men?'
As the attack columns moved up past Massena, the marshal knew it was vital that they keep going until they had crowned the heights. If his men stopped so they might return fire at the British, then all momentum would be lost and the attack would fail. The need to move forward even overrode the fact that marching slowly up the steep slope while staying in deep columns would make them horribly vulnerable to British fire. As the 69eme filed past him, Massena called out to the troops: 'No cartridges, go in with the bayonet!' filed past him, Massena called out to the troops: 'No cartridges, go in with the bayonet!'
Plumes of dust were kicked up by the French columns as they wheeled towards the foot of the ridge. The 95th were able to watch the whole spectacle, for they were on the mountain's forward slope, having taken up positions to shoot at the French with every plodding step they took up the forbidding incline. The usual arrangements for combining battalions within the Light Division had been changed this day, with Beckwith commanding a great force of skirmishers, including his own 95th, the 1st Cacadores Cacadores of the Portuguese army, light infantrymen, many of whom had also been given the excellent Baker rifle, and some similarly armed King's German Legion men in all over 1,200 sharpshooters. Beckwith had placed his British riflemen on the left of his line and the rest to the right. Watching the French approaching, the riflemen chose positions among the boulders and firs that littered the steep incline. Few men were held in reserve as supports, since there was no prospect of cavalry being used against them. Further along the ridge, towards the Mondego, there were many more Allied skirmishers from Portuguese battalions or the light companies of British ones waiting too. By 5.45 a.m., the leading French scouts were exchanging shots with the British forward posts. of the Portuguese army, light infantrymen, many of whom had also been given the excellent Baker rifle, and some similarly armed King's German Legion men in all over 1,200 sharpshooters. Beckwith had placed his British riflemen on the left of his line and the rest to the right. Watching the French approaching, the riflemen chose positions among the boulders and firs that littered the steep incline. Few men were held in reserve as supports, since there was no prospect of cavalry being used against them. Further along the ridge, towards the Mondego, there were many more Allied skirmishers from Portuguese battalions or the light companies of British ones waiting too. By 5.45 a.m., the leading French scouts were exchanging shots with the British forward posts.
Wellington's position was a very long one, but he had made sure that there were sufficient forces to hold the col at Sula, where he felt sure the French would hit him. The night before he had gone about the ridge, deploying each battalion. The 43rd and 52nd Light Infantry were waiting in Sula, out of view of the French, supported by a couple of guns from the Royal Horse Artillery. To their left and right there were brigades of Portuguese infantry, stiffened with British officers and retrained by them.
As the minutes ticked by that morning, it became apparent that Reynier's attack was going in first, just as Massena had ordered. These troops clambered up the slope for in places it is so steep that a heavily laden man will have to help himself with his hands towards the centre of the line, held by General Picton's 3rd Division.
Beckwith's troops could not see the fighting going on in Picton's sector, but they could certainly hear it. Massena, on the other hand, had positioned himself near a windmill at Moura and could make out the head of Reynier's corps mounting the ridge. The battle was going to plan; it was time to hurl Ney forward.
Loison's division of Ney's corps marched directly up the Sula road. Another division, under General Maucune, followed somewhat behind and veered off to the left, where a Portuguese brigade under the British general Pack awaited them. As soon as the heads of Loison's columns were in range, the Rifles and Portuguese began taking shots at them. They had already seen enough of the French Army in action to know the importance of aiming for the officers first.
General Simon, commanding one of the two brigades now coming towards the Light Division, was out in front, having assumed personal control of the skirmishers. Simon's six battalions were marching behind in tight, long columns, little more than thirty or forty men across the front of each. The French brigade commander's aim was to suppress the Rifles, by making them worry more about preserving themselves than about hitting the dense infantry columns. The Rifles, though, had the benefit of height, as they scampered from rock to rock, moving up the ridge ahead of the French, and so could fire over the heads of the voltigeurs voltigeurs, picking their targets with ease. Of course, they could not stop the advance of thousands of Ney's troops as one 95th officer observed, 'We must give the French their due and say that no men could come up in a more resolute manner.'
With riflemen starting to scurry back over the lip at the top of the ridge, Craufurd could not contain his curiosity. He would dart to the edge, watching the French, hearing the thumping of their drums and shouts of their officers. Then he would rush back again, making sure that the 43rd and 52nd were aligned just right, ready to receive Loison's division with a volley and bayonets when its men came into view at last.
Near the top of the ridge, the French found themselves under devilish fire. Craufurd sent more Portuguese light infantrymen from the 3rd Cacadores Cacadores down to help Beckwith. Several guns firing grapeshot had joined in the British barrage, and were cutting down swaths of men. The colonel of the 6 down to help Beckwith. Several guns firing grapeshot had joined in the British barrage, and were cutting down swaths of men. The colonel of the 6eme Leger fell to the ground, his head taken clean off by a piece of grape. The French attack was faltering. The officers shouted until they were hoarse, urging the men forward one more time, ' fell to the ground, his head taken clean off by a piece of grape. The French attack was faltering. The officers shouted until they were hoarse, urging the men forward one more time, 'En avant! En avant!' Simon, who had himself been shot in the face, was close to the Royal Horse Artillery's guns near Sula: he had to silence the battery. With one last effort, a few score of exhausted, blood-spattered troops followed him over the ridge.
The first French had staggered up in front of Craufurd's formed battalions as the last riflemen were running, fast as their legs could carry them, to get behind the red-coated wall. The artillery gunners left their pieces, pelting back too. Simon had got his guns. The shout went around the decimated French companies: the guns were captured! But this triumph was to be short-lived indeed.
'When I saw the head of the French column within about twenty yards of the top of the hill,' wrote Craufurd, 'I turned about to the 43rd and 52nd Regiments and ordered them to charge.' An officer of the 52nd recalled that 'the head of the enemy's column was within a very few yards of [Craufurd], he turned around, came up to the 52nd, and called out, "Now 52nd, revenge the death of Sir John Moore! Charge! Charge! Huzza!" and waving his hat in the air, he was answered by a shout that appalled the enemy and in one instant the brow of the hill bristled with two thousand British bayonets.'
The few French soldiers who had made it to the top never managed to form a firing line, as Massena had planned. Instead they loosed off a ragged volley at the chargers, but in seconds they were thrown back. Some men were bayoneted, other stumbled, fell and were trodden underfoot. Among those lying wounded on the ridge as the British passed was General Simon himself, who was taken prisoner. The 43rd and 52nd went to the front of the ridge, where they could look down on hundreds of French troops milling about in confusion on the slope. There the British light infantry gave them a thundering volley. The RHA men ran back to their guns and began to serve them again. 'We kept firing and bayoneting till we reached the bottom,' wrote an officer of the 52nd.
Many of the Rifles, left behind and watching this maelstrom, now turned to their right and looked up to where Maucune's brigade was about to suffer the same fate at the hands of Pack's Portuguese. The Scottish general gave the order to advance. Captain Leach of the 95th wrote home, 'I was quite hoarse with cheering and hallooing. Whenever we saw the Portuguese about to charge, who were nearly a mile distant, we all set up a howl which undoubtedly spirited them on.'
Captain Marcel, who had led his men to the top, was a small part of Maucune's brigade. He looked around: where was their support? There was nobody behind the 69eme, and looking across to his right, Marcel could see Simon's brigade, 'going back down the slope, under a terrible artillery fire and under attack from a column of English of four times its strength [sic]; very soon, that same column hit us, and it was our turn to be thrown back.'
For the Light Division men and Pack's Portuguese, weeks of retreating across muddy, execrable roads were being paid back: their blood lust was up. Ney's corps suffered almost 2,500 casualties that day, with Simon's brigade losing the most. Elsewhere, the initial attack by Reynier's corps had met the greatest success: its columns had reached the plateau at the highest point of the ridge and begun to deploy, and only a countercharge by Picton's division had managed to turn the tide.
On the slope in front of Sula it was impossible to say exactly who had lost his life to the 95th, and who to the 52nd or indeed the Portuguese. But it is clear that the six battalions taken forward by Simon suffered terrible casualties among their officers. The Legion Legion Hanovrienne Hanovrienne had nine of them killed or wounded, including eight of its twelve company commanders. The 26 had nine of them killed or wounded, including eight of its twelve company commanders. The 26eme Regiment had twenty-one officer casualties (a little under half of those present with its two battalions). Ferey's brigade, which had tried to follow Simon up the hill, also suffered badly: Colonel Bechaud of the 66 had twenty-one officer casualties (a little under half of those present with its two battalions). Ferey's brigade, which had tried to follow Simon up the hill, also suffered badly: Colonel Bechaud of the 66eme, for example, having recovered from his chest wound in July at the Coa, received the same compliment at Busaco. These losses among leaders were the telltale symptom of well-aimed fire.
Busaco, despite this, was a fight in which traditional notions might have seemed, to a British general of conservative cast, to have given Wellington his triumph: devastating volleys at point-blank range and bayonet charges delivered with perfect timing. Even the laurels for successful skirmishing had to be shared between the 95th, Portuguese Cacadores Cacadores and the light companies of various line battalions. The French, though, deduced a general lesson from their officer casualties: that, in the words of one staff officer, 'the English were the only troops who were perfectly practised in the use of small arms, whence their firing was much more accurate than that of any other infantry.' They had become 'the best marksmen in Europe'. That this had come about could be attributed in large part to the training pioneered by the 95th's founders and the growing influence of the system developed before the Peninsular War by General Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe even the and the light companies of various line battalions. The French, though, deduced a general lesson from their officer casualties: that, in the words of one staff officer, 'the English were the only troops who were perfectly practised in the use of small arms, whence their firing was much more accurate than that of any other infantry.' They had become 'the best marksmen in Europe'. That this had come about could be attributed in large part to the training pioneered by the 95th's founders and the growing influence of the system developed before the Peninsular War by General Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe even the Cacadores Cacadores had fallen under it, for they had been retrained by British officers, including several of the 95th. had fallen under it, for they had been retrained by British officers, including several of the 95th.
If Beckwith and the other officers of the 95th had only a general idea of how well they had picked off the French commanders, they certainly knew that their own losses had been slight: just nine men killed and thirty-two wounded in the battalion. None of the casualties had been officers. Simon's skirmishers had made a great deal of noise and smoke as they came up the mountain, but their effect on the crouching riflemen had been minimal. Concealment was an important factor in this, for the riflemen had become expert in this, whereas other regiments, such as the Portuguese light troops, were less experienced and so suffered more heavily. But there was something else at work here too. Just as the British Army might have its idees fixes idees fixes about the bayonet or flogging, so the French had been blunted in their effectiveness by their generals' received wisdoms about rifles and target shooting. about the bayonet or flogging, so the French had been blunted in their effectiveness by their generals' received wisdoms about rifles and target shooting.
The French did not want to issue rifles to their men. A small-scale experiment had ended in 1807, the weapons being hard to load and their barrels fouling too easily (since they were of inferior design to the British Baker). The French also considered the rifle a very suspect thing if it just caused the soldier to sit, trying to pick off his enemy at long range, rather than close with him and decide the matter by bayonet. Napoleon's generals understood why such a weapon might be of use in the hands of an American frontiersman, a German forester or even an Englishman, but it would not do for their own people, ruled in war as in so many other matters by Gallic passion. One leading French theorist summed up the aversion to the rifle: 'It was an unsuitable weapon for the French soldier, and would only have suited phlegmatic, patient, assassins.'
Napoleon's light infantry carried instead the fusil de dragons fusil de dragons, a smoothbore musket slightly shorter than that of the rest of the infantry, and originally designed for mounted troops. As for the whole business of aiming, the French were in something of a muddle. The fusil fusil had a fore-sight, a metal blade close to its muzzle, but no back-sight with which to align it. What's more, conscripts like Sub-Lieutenant Marcel's received no training in marksmanship. They pointed at their targets all right, but were self-taught in the business of aiming, that is, adjusting their fire to take account of the distance and movement of their prey. By Busaco some French officers were beginning to appreciate the cost of this neglect. had a fore-sight, a metal blade close to its muzzle, but no back-sight with which to align it. What's more, conscripts like Sub-Lieutenant Marcel's received no training in marksmanship. They pointed at their targets all right, but were self-taught in the business of aiming, that is, adjusting their fire to take account of the distance and movement of their prey. By Busaco some French officers were beginning to appreciate the cost of this neglect.
At the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo just a few months before, one of the more professional French generals present had been staggered by the poor shooting of Ney's infantry. Writing to Paris in order to request an urgent shipment of musket cartridges, he wrote: The consumption of this munition is quite incredible; it has happened through the inexperience and the negligence of the soldiers, by the carelessness of officers and by the numerous detachments marching with convoys of supplies and munitions. The siege of Rodrigo has seen the consumption of more than nine hundred thousand infantry cartridges solely by skirmishers. The consumption of this munition is quite incredible; it has happened through the inexperience and the negligence of the soldiers, by the carelessness of officers and by the numerous detachments marching with convoys of supplies and munitions. The siege of Rodrigo has seen the consumption of more than nine hundred thousand infantry cartridges solely by skirmishers.
This enormous expenditure of ammunition occurred in one month by light companies whose combined strength did not amount to more than a couple of thousand of Ney's corps. It might be supposed that Marcel's men and the other voltigeurs voltigeurs firing off so many rounds might have become first-rate marksmen, but actually the effect was more haphazard. While some did indeed become good shots, others never grasped the basic principles of adjusting their fire. firing off so many rounds might have become first-rate marksmen, but actually the effect was more haphazard. While some did indeed become good shots, others never grasped the basic principles of adjusting their fire.
Despite these apparently basic limitations, Napoleon's light troops had gained a considerable reputation in the wars of the previous decade. Audacious command and high morale had generally more than compensated for their poor shooting. However, from Busaco onwards, quite a few French officers realised that they were condemmed to fight the British skirmishers at a considerable disadvantage, one that arose from their lack of systematic marksmanship training.
Massena's defeat came as a profound shock to his people. One eyewitness lamented the army's 'enormous loss of officers'. For the marshal, any hope of hurling the British out of Portugal began to falter. On 28 September, Wellington returned to his old tricks, falling back towards his prepared lines of defence at Torres Vedras. The French could not understand his lack of aggression. Why wasn't he following up his success of the day before? But the British general only liked to give battle on terms of his own choosing. He had succeeded in causing Massena almost 4,500 casualties and was now inviting an army that had failed to carry the heights of Busaco to come and try its luck against the trenchworks and batteries of Torres Vedras. There Massena would have to deal with the psychological impact of the Busaco defeat, one staff officer commenting, 'Our heavy losses at Busaco had chilled the ardour of Massena's lieutenants, and bred ill-will between them and him; so that now all were trying to paralyse his operations, and representing every little hillock to be a new height of Busaco the capture of which would cost copious bloodshed.'
The battle was an enormous relief for Craufurd. He had been despondent after the Combat of the Coa but even he probably did not understand that he had been a whisker away from being sent home. In his official Busaco dispatch, Wellington praised Craufurd for conducting a fighting withdrawal to the Busaco position, 'with great regularity', and for the bayonet charge which had caused the enemy 'immense loss'.
Wellington's Army had performed very well in a general action, the first of its kind since Talavera more than a year before. But whereas the losses at Talavera had been great, this was a more emphatic victory. British officers took pride in throwing back regiments that were veterans of France's fabled triumphs in Italy or central Europe: the fields of Lodi, Marengo and Austerlitz where Napoleon had made his reputation. A company commander of the 95th walked about in the dusk of that September day gathering buttons from the coats of the French dead strewn across the hillside so that he might ascertain their regiments and therefore their pedigree. He was perfectly satisfied with what he found, writing home, 'The 26th, 66th and 82nd are Bridge of Lodi boys, but of the heights of Busaco I daresay they will be less proud.'
EIGHT.
The Corporal's Stripes
September 1810February 1811
It took from 28 September to 10 October for the Rifles to march down through the hilly Portuguese countryside to a little town called Arruda. It was a tortuous journey, attended by the usual hardships and more. Men with sore feet and empty bellies were drenched by daily downpours, one officer noting on the 8th, 'This day's march was about as miserable as I wish to see. Incessant rain all day. We got into a rascally hovel which we contrived to set fire to but soon put it out again.'
During the two-month withdrawal from the frontier, Wellington's soldiers had become used to treating Portuguese property recklessly. It was their commander's intention to fight in the style of Fabius, laying waste to the Portuguese hinterland so that the French would be unable to find food, or indeed people. Orders had been issued by the Portuguese authorities for the evacuation of all inhabitants, if necessary by force, from the path of Massena's army. Wellington's rearguard daily raided abandoned houses for any food they could find, or indeed for firewood.
When they got to Arruda, the 95th took up a bivouac on a ridge overlooking the town. There they discovered one of the great secrets of the Napoleonic wars: that Wellington had ordered the construction of lines of fortifications stretching twenty-nine miles from the Atlantic coast in the west, in an arc through the hill country of the Peninsula behind Lisbon, to the River Tagus in the east. Arruda was close to the eastern end of this defence, being in a sector where there were twenty-three redoubts armed with ninety-six cannon. The whole programme, involving construction of scores of strongpoints, diversion of streams, emplacement of cannon and drilling of militia, had taken more than one year to accomplish, with a bill of 100,000 for the labour alone, and yet somehow it had remained unknown to the French.
The 95th's task in this scheme was not to man some fort, a task that had been assigned to third-rate troops of the Portuguese militia. The Rifles would remain part of the reserve that would rush to any threatened point and also patrol no man's land in this eastern part of the lines, so as to prevent French penetrations be they for foraging or surprise attacks.
After such a miserable march, Captain O'Hare's pleasure at finding Second Lieutenant George Simmons in charge of a roaring fire and a laid table can easily be imagined. Simmons had come up from Lisbon with a party of convalescents and quickly commandeered a suitable little house for the officers of his 3rd Company.
It took no time for natural scavengers such as the men of the 95th to start investigating the place in front of their position. 'Never was a town more completely deserted than Arruda,' one officer remarked. 'The inhabitants, dreading the approach of the French, had taken flight to Lisbon, leaving their houses, many of which were magnificently furnished, without a human being in them. The chairs and tables were subsequently carried up to the camp.'
Few riflemen were housed; instead some tents were issued (for the first time since they had arrived in Portugal) to allow them to escape the cold and rain. The soldiers, though, wasted no time in beginning expeditions in Arruda, breaking into houses, where 'many of them had some food in the larder, and a plentiful supply of good wines in the cellar'.
The 95th were guilty of a good deal of vandalism on these missions, since they assumed that Arruda would eventually fall into French hands. Houses were stripped, and ornate furniture was broken up for firewood. 'This was the only instance during the war in which the light division had reason to blush for their conduct,' one veteran later wrote.
Reunited with his messmates, Simmons heard for himself about Busaco and the skirmishes of the retreat from the frontier. He reacquainted himself with old friends and recounted his experiences in Lisbon.
Simmons was pleased to see Private Robert Fairfoot, for the rifleman, who celebrated his twenty-seventh birthday in Arruda, had become something of a friend and a personal project. During his brief campaigns, Simmons had come to learn the value of a steady soldier. He had seen the Belem Rangers, and when he and Harry Smith had been placed at the head of a party of eight hundred convalescents for the three-day march from Lisbon to the lines of Torres Vedras, a quarter of these 'heroes' disappeared before they reached their destination.
Fairfoot had gone absent without leave three times while in the Royal Surrey Militia, but on joining the 95th he had at last been able to show his true colours. The 2nd Royal Surreys were ruled by one Major Hudson, 'as great a tyrant as ever disgraced the Army'. The men called him 'Bloody Bob' or 'Wheel 'em again Bob' because of his penchant for the lash and drill respectively. Fairfoot found himself buffeted between the ranks, where he had to drill all day under Hudson's beady eye, and the post of drummer, where his duties included whipping his comrades. Fairfoot's desertions arose from the unhappiness that follows when a man must pick morsels of his comrades' flesh from the knots of his cat, having been forced to flog them all day for no good reason.
Early in the spring of 1809, when the 2nd Royal Surreys found themselves in the south of England as volunteers for the regulars were called for, hundreds had escaped the militia. One of their privates wrote home, 'I have taken the first opportunity and volunteered ... into what regiment I cared not a straw.' Some 127 of the Royal Surreys went into the 51st (a smart light-infantry regiment) and around 90 joined Fairfoot in the Rifles.
In the 95th, Fairfoot had learnt the difference between parade-ground drill and the life of danger and comradeship in the Rifles. He had shown himself so good a soldier at Barba del Puerco, the Coa and Busaco that he had been marked down for promotion.
The 95th prided itself on giving advancement to deserving, bright men. One of its sergeants, William Weddeburne, had argued in print that the regiment's form of warfare meant that 'frequent opportunities are afforded for the display of personal courage, activity, and intelligence, and, to persons possessed of such qualities, it is a certain road to distinction'. The publication of Weddeburne's text on training light troops was in itself a mark of the unusual position an NCO could achieve in the Rifles. It was evident to any soldier, once in the 95th, that serving in small groups in outposts or patrols rather than in line regiments offered many more opportunities for the deserving soldier to show his mettle, or for a corporal to demonstrate he was fit for further promotion.
As it was, the rank of corporal was a recent introduction to the Army. The printed Monthly Returns forms sent out for the 95th's adjutant to complete had columns marked for 'sergeants', 'buglers' and 'rank and file', but none for corporals. The practice of marking this rank and that of sergeant with stripes on the sleeve was only just beginning. The founders of the 95th had been so pleased with the beneficial effects of giving men these distinctions that they had established a further category albeit unofficial between private and corporal, that of 'chosen man'. This was a private being prepared for promotion, who was given extra responsibilities; the officers hoped that these steps would give men something to aspire to, and redress some of the advantages the French had reaped by offering so many rewards to their troops.
The theory of promotions was one thing, but there was a more practical and urgent need for O'Hare to rebuild his company: half of it had been captured at the Coa. Lieutenant Colonel Beckwith had obliged with some transfers of riflemen from other companies, but O'Hare also had to alleviate a shortage of non-commissioned officers. His company had set sail in May 1809 with six sergeants and six corporals. He had since lost two sergeants and three corporals dead, captured or promoted. One sergeant, Esau Jackson, who'd been given to O'Hare to alleviate matters, soon decided he had seen more than enough of the enemy, and got himself appointed to a comfy sinecure in charge of stores at Belem.
Two weeks after the battalion arrived in Arruda, Fairfoot was promoted to corporal. His pay more than doubled, to one shilling, two and a quarter pence per day. He had been in the Army long enough to know that with that money came added duties and responsibilities. Fairfoot had been an Army child, following his father about, hearing his views about what made a good corporal or a bad one.
In the 95th, a corporal's duties were set out in some texts, like the 'Green Book' written by Colonel Coote Manningham, one of the regiment's founders, and in other pamphlets such as the printed pages of Craufurd's Standing Orders for the Light Division. Reading and writing were essential to the discharge of these duties. Evidently Robert Fairfoot conquered this challenge of literacy, whereas it may well be that his father, with more than twenty-eight years' service as a private soldier, did not. But the 95th's senior officers certainly believed in offering their brighter soldiers the chance to learn.
In each company, there was an orderly sergeant of the day who would be assisted by a corporal, both answering to a duty officer. On the march, their duties ranged from arresting stragglers who had not been issued with tickets by their officers entitling them to fall out, to securing the bivoauc. The posting of sentries was equally important on the march or in a place like Arruda.
Colonel Manningham had decreed: The non-commissioned officer will make the most minute inspection of the men about to be placed as [sentries], and must see both that their arms are in good order, and that the powder in the pan is not wet. The inspection being made, the non-commissioned officer will conduct the sentries to the officer who will also examine them himself; when this is done the non-commissioned officer will march them to their several stations, taking care that the most intelligent men are posted in those stations which require the most circumspection. The non-commissioned officer will make the most minute inspection of the men about to be placed as [sentries], and must see both that their arms are in good order, and that the powder in the pan is not wet. The inspection being made, the non-commissioned officer will conduct the sentries to the officer who will also examine them himself; when this is done the non-commissioned officer will march them to their several stations, taking care that the most intelligent men are posted in those stations which require the most circumspection.
The Light Division Standing Orders, as one might expect from Craufurd, took the business of posting sentries to extremes. There were to be outlying and inlying pickets to prevent the brigade being surprised by the enemy then there was to be a regimental camp guard (mainly to hinder the riflemen's mischief) and a company guard of one corporal and four privates. If Fairfoot was part of the outlying or inlying picket, camp guard or company guard then the night promised to be one of close attention to duty and little sleep. Given the numbers of different tasks, these could be assigned to NCOs every other day, at a time when their company was light of corporals, and it is clear that a man who was unable to abandon the hard-drinking ways of the private soldier would soon come unstuck if discovered drunk on duty he would usually be relieved of his stripes. This is what had happened to Sergeant Plunket at Campo Maior a year before, and to many others in the 95th since they had landed. Fairfoot, though, applied himself conscientiously, for he had turned some kind of corner in his life, leaving behind the misery of his militia days. His stripes were never taken from him.
For those who had been broken to the ranks, however, resurrection was possible. If there was ever a moment when Joseph Almond, the Cheshire man who had been busted from corporal in 1808, could have redeemed himself, then Arruda was a propitious one, because of the shortage of NCOs. But while bright enough, and no skulker on the battlefield, Almond's company commander had taken against him, and it proved impossible to regain his former station. He may well have fallen foul of the notion many officers had, that a man in his late thirties who had not learnt to moderate his drinking was, in the words used on discharge papers, 'worn out', 'a bad soldier' or 'dissolute'.
For the illiterate private, there was almost no advancement possible. If, however, he had a good ear, such a man could be appointed as one of the company's two buglers. While at Arruda, William Green was made up to this post by O'Hare, enjoying the better pay. The bugler's bargain, however, was not always a happy one for he, playing that part carried out by the drummers in a line regiment, was responsible for laying the lash onto unfortunate members of his company.
The 95th's stay in Arruda proved pleasant enough, for they drank plenty of plundered wine, lived under canvas and ate well. Four weeks after their arrival, they awoke to discover that the French pickets posted in front of them had disappeared.
Massena had realised that his men would starve in front of Torres Vedras and that to assault the fortifications was to invite a bloodbath. Every day French troops had to wander further and further away in their foraging expeditions, and with these ever-widening patrols, the number being lost to Portuguese partisans or desertion increased. The Army of Portugal, as Massena's three corps had been designated, was melting away. Its horses were dying too, or becoming so emaciated that French generals began doubting their ability to draw all the cannon and supply caissons they had brought with them back to Spain, should the order come to quit Portugal. The marshal resolved to pull back to Santarem, a city in a fertile region several marches away from Lisbon and nearer to his sources of supply across the Spanish frontier. There he intended to winter, while awaiting further instructions from Paris.
Craufurd's division was set rapidly on the Army of Portugal's tail, its commander scenting the chance for further distinction. On the second day after they left Arruda, Craufurd spotted a French brigade moving across a plain towards some high ground at a place called Cartaxo. He drew up his division, but before giving any orders for an assault, he berated them for their behaviour on the march there. The text of this harangue has survived, and a quotation will give a flavour of the man in action: If I ever have any occasion to observe any man of the Brigade pick his road and go round a pool of water instead of marching through it I am fully determined to bring the officer commanding the Company to which that man belongs to a Court Martial. Should the court acquit the officer it shall not deter me from repeating the same ceremony on any other officer again and again ... I will insist on every soldier marching through water and I will flog any man attempting to avoid it. If I ever have any occasion to observe any man of the Brigade pick his road and go round a pool of water instead of marching through it I am fully determined to bring the officer commanding the Company to which that man belongs to a Court Martial. Should the court acquit the officer it shall not deter me from repeating the same ceremony on any other officer again and again ... I will insist on every soldier marching through water and I will flog any man attempting to avoid it.
Jonathan Leach, always one of Craufurd's harshest critics, commented sarcastically that it was 'a speech well calculated no doubt to make men and officers adore their leader and follow him enthusiastically up the French heights'. As Craufurd deployed his brigades ready to attack the superior French force to their front, Wellington appeared on horseback, 'in time enough to save us from total annihilation'. Seeing that Craufurd had drawn his battalions up in line, with just a single squadron of cavalry in support, Wellington asked him, 'Are you aware, General, that the whole of Junot's corps is close to the advanced body you now see, amounting to, at least, 23,000 men, a large portion of which is cavalry?' The attack was instantly called off, with many men reflecting bitterly on how close their brigadier had again come to destroying them.
The following day, the Light Division stopped just outside Santarem. There was a causeway leading to a bridge across the River Maior ahead of them, and it became clear that the French were prepared to defend it, having wheeled guns up to a position where they could bring a withering flank fire on anyone attempting the crossing. The river thus became the new demarcation line between the forces, for the Light Division was to stop in this area for several weeks, through the worst of the winter weather, while Massena made up his mind whether to go forward or back.
Craufurd had been making representations to Horse Guards for some time about the need for more troops, and while in Arruda, a further two companies of the 95th (one each from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions) had been made over to him. They had found themselves unable to march to the division's standards, one officer noting, 'The company with which I had just arrived were much distressed to keep pace with the old campaigners they made a tolerable scramble for a day or two, but by the time they arrived at the lines the greater part had been obliged to be mounted.'
The men of the 1st Battalion had already assumed the air of veterans. Their clothes were rain-washed and ingrained with dirt to the point where they had gone black or brown. Their bodies were lean and sinewy, faces tanned like leather. The spare shirts, brushes and the like which had been hauled up to Talavera had since been jettisoned from their packs as dead weight. This difference between what they had left behind and what they had become loomed increasingly large in the minds of those men who had sailed out in May 1809.
Simmons, who had delighted in the veteran's reputation he had earned in the battalion, found himself reluctantly recognising that his ardour to return to service had oustripped his body's powers to heal itself. He had come down with dysentery that and his leg wound meant he could not keep up on the marches. He wrote to his parents, 'Only a little while back I could run miles, always the first to go through or over anything; judge how my feelings must be hurt at so serious a difference.'
On surgeons' advice, Simmons returned to Lisbon, a check which he knew would damage his finances. Lieutenant Harry Smith too discovered that his return to action had been premature. Although his ample means bought him a mount, he was in acute pain from the ball lodged in his heel, and resolved to go back to hospital to have it removed.
Those who stayed took over farm buildings and made themselves as comfortable as they could. In one case, only a sheet draped across a barn divided the company officers from their men. This provided the subalterns with a golden opportunity to eavesdrop, since they generally steered clear of their men during the hours of darkness, for all sorts of unfortunate incidents might befall an officer who charted too close a course to them when they were drinking. 'The early part of their evenings was generally spent in witticisms and tales,' one lieutenant recalled. 'In conclusion, by way of a lullaby, some long-winded fellow commenced one of those everlasting ditties in which soldiers and sailors delight so much. They are all to the same tune, and the subject (if one may judge by the tenor of the first ninety-eight verses!) was battle, murder, or sudden death.'
Captain O'Hare knew well enough that the peace of his company was best ensured by keeping close tabs on its consumption of alcohol. His suspicions being aroused one morning by the number of soldiers who still seemed inebriated, he discovered and smashed a still they had set up in one of the outhouses. On another occasion, he was woken at night by the drunken ramblings of Private Tom Crawley, one of Costello's friends, and decided the man was boozing too much, even by his own rather liberal standards. Crawley's gin ration was stopped under normal circumstances each soldier had his blackjack filled with the early-evening meal, no mean ration since these cups held half a pint. 'Had sentence of death been pronounced, it could not have sounded more harsh,' Costello recalled of the moment the quartermaster refused Crawley his grog, explaining it was 'by order of Captain O'Hare'.
Corporal Fairfoot showed himself a reliable helper for O'Hare. He managed that difficult trick of retaining the good opinion of his former messmates, while discharging his new responsibilities fairly. Although an Englishman by parentage and outlook, having lived most of his life in Hampshire, Fairfoot well understood the Irish rankers who made up the company's toughest fighters and hardest drinkers. He had been born in Dublin and spent his childhood there, while his father's regiment was stationed in Ireland, and appreciated all of the complexities of that place.
During these cold, wet, winter days many of the soldiers considered tobacco to be an even more vital comfort than alcohol. The rank and file used clay pipes, which helped them keep their wits about them while on long hours of sentry duty. Officers preferred cigars, consuming them voraciously. Most considered them an essential tool, whether starting one of those hard marching days at 2 a.m. or 3 a.m., or spending time on some rain-swept hillside observing the enemy. 'If a man in England ... fancies that he really knows the comfort of tobacco in that shape he is very much mistaken,' Jonathan Leach later wrote. 'He must rise, wet to the skin and numb with cold, from the lee side of a tree or hedge where he has been shivering all night under a flood of rain, then let him light his cigar and the warmth which it imparts is incredible.'
These few comforts saw the 95th through the dying days of 1810. On Christmas Day, the officers raced their horses on the flats beside the River Maior. They were tolerably well supplied, because of their proximity to Lisbon, but nobody would have claimed that theirs was a particularly interesting duty.
During the weeks in Arruda and months outside Santarem, the officers tried to relieve the tedious routine of rounds, pickets and commands. Books were in short supply since it was most difficult for a subaltern of Rifles, slogging along on his two feet, often soaked through, to carry some little library with him. A small supply of reading matter was however available, precious volumes carried on captains' baggage mules and passed around freely. There were some of Shakespeare's tragedies, and romantic stuff like Rousseau's Nouvelle Heloise Nouvelle Heloise.
Since only a few of the 95th's officers had the education to read novels in French, they sought translations, particularly of plots that were set in Iberia. Lesage's Gil Blas of Santillane Gil Blas of Santillane, both as a novel translated by Tobias Smollett and as a subsequent play written in English, was a great favourite. Its setting in Salamanca and romantic twists and turns amused them greatly. They also liked to identify with the young hero's picaresque adventures as he made his way in the world, starting penniless but eventually arriving at a position of great power and influence. Don Quixote Don Quixote was another favourite, neatly satirising the notions of chivalry by which many officers tried to live. References to this novel were so widespread that it was quite common, even among the illiterate rank and file, to refer to broken-down old horses as Rosinante (the Don's steed) and to the objects of their romantic fantasies as Dulcinea. was another favourite, neatly satirising the notions of chivalry by which many officers tried to live. References to this novel were so widespread that it was quite common, even among the illiterate rank and file, to refer to broken-down old horses as Rosinante (the Don's steed) and to the objects of their romantic fantasies as Dulcinea.
Some even conceived the idea of acting out the texts they had available: having heard from some French deserters in Arruda that their officers were putting on little skits and plays, the Light Division men decided to do the same. Shakespeare became the basis for the early dramatic fumblings of several subalterns.
Craufurd soon became bored with all this. He also missed his wife and children deeply, frequently succumbing to what he called the 'blue devils'. He wrote to them of his 'miserable position', and his inability to serve their interests while living in this state. He resolved to ask Wellington's leave for a trip home.
The rules of seniority under which commands were doled out on the basis of time served in rank had already been violated by Craufurd's appointment. His substantive rank was only colonel: a brigade was properly a major general's post and a division one for a lieutenant general. Wellington had rebuffed Craufurd's legion critics, particularly after the Coa, and worked the military secretarial system judiciously to keep him in position. After receiving several requests for permission to visit home, the general at last wrote to Craufurd, 'I would beg you to reflect whether, considering the situation in which you stand in the Army, it is desirable that you should go home upon leave. Adverting to the number of General Officers senior to you in the Army, it has not been easy to keep you in your command.'
Such language from the aloof and conservative Wellington was highly unusual. Craufurd's response to Wellington's 'begging' was typical: he wrote back expressing the hope that other officers might be satisfied, 'without reducing me to the painful alternative which I have at present to contemplate.' In short, he was ready to resign. Many in the Army, including senior figures at Horse Guards as well as harassed company commanders, would have been only too pleased if the offer had been accepted but the secret of Craufurd's hold over Wellington was precisely that the Commander of Forces was a little in awe of this man of such prickly independence and powerful personality.
Early in February, having got his way, Craufurd left Portugal. His timing was as bad in his leave arrangements at it had been on the Coa the previous July, for the Light Division was about to enter a period of frenetic marching and fighting. The Light Brigade and then Division had lived in his dark shadow for the best part of two years and their initial reaction to his departure was relief. Captain Leach noted gleefully in his journal: 'Brigadier General Craufurd has sailed for England. God be praised we have got rid of the Vagabond.'
NINE.
Pombal