In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.
On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:
M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland,--(British "White Paper" No. 97.)
Proofs Lacking.
On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White Paper" No. 113) states:
Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.--(British "White Paper" No. 113.)
So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof.
The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:
He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia and the German Foreign Office, had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussion--and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature--but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.--(British "White Paper" No. 121.)
Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the Reichstag, stated with full justification:
The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at mediation on the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the eve of success, by the mobilization, endangering the safety of the empire. The measures for a mobilization, about whose seriousness the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, in connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia wanted war.
To this is to be added that the English Government also was made fully cognizant of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a witness that could not be suspected, namely, its own representative in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear full responsibility.
II.
GREY'S OMISSIONS AND ERRORS.
We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London was informed at the very latest on July 24 by his Ambassador in St.
Petersburg of the plan of the Russian mobilization and consequently of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his own documents.
From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:
The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible.
If as many as four great powers of Europe--let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany--were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.--(British "White Paper" No. 3.)
Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note--meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:
The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government....
I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.--(British "White Paper" No. 5.)
We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London:
M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St.
Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late for any mediation.--(British "White Paper" No. 10.)
Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:
I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.--(British "White Paper" No. 11.)
From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25:
Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling [this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincare and Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views.--(British "White Paper" No. 25.)
If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.
That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as it was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by the assurance of the Chancellor; he declares:
In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late] we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the monarchy.--(German "White Paper," Page 17, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint.)
Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna.
He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue Book," Page 67):
It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.--(British "White Paper" No. 67.)[02]
Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31 the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:
The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.--(British "White Paper" No.
108.)
England and Russia.
How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be found. The French Government thus far has not published any series of documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.
On the contrary, the latter power, wherever she puts in an appearance--as for instance in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sazonof, as mentioned above--appears as fully identical with Russia.
It is also stated on July 24:
The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in all diplomatic negotiations.... It seems to me from the language held, by French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.--(British "White Paper" No. 6.)
One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.
In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a weak and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective advice to postpone mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.
The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British documents themselves. De Bunsen on July 26 telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:
Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th inst.--(British "White Paper" No. 40.)
Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid efforts to maintain peace by the London Secretary of State, even where these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria.
Another proof: Sazonof on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which concerns itself with the much mentioned proposition of the latter to have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great powers not immediately concerned.