With this telegram the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded.
If France--the question of French colonies is of very minor importance in this connection--must not be defeated by Germany, then England forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great power, even if she had backed down before such a challenge.
III.
THE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE.
Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.
In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations to other large powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech in the House of Commons on Aug, 3, 1914, which meant the war with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with France in any European crisis.
The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:
London Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.
My Dear Ambassador:
From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.
You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.
I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.
Yours, &c.,
E. GREY.
Was Parliament Deceived?
A few members of the English Parliament who on Aug. 3 dared to gingerly protest against the war may have had reason to complain about the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then--so far as England is concerned--the supervision of the Government, theoretically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction.
Veiled Defensive Alliance.
As a matter of fact, Grey does not desire to have accepted as political obligations the conversations of the French and English Army and Navy General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this agreement, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to immediately enter with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in every critical situation; it means in realty nothing less than a veiled defensive alliance which by clever diplomatic manipulations can be changed without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English Government promises to consult and work together with France, and consequently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investigation of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent position.
How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations lasting through years?
Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the basis of documentary proof.
If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied--in the year 1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence which in a case of war between European powers would interfere with or limit free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to whether or not Britain should take part at a war--then certain reports making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1914, concerning an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light.
Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.
It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attache in London, Capt. Wolkow. As a matter of fact Wolkow during June went to St.
Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.
Grey's "Twisty" Answer.
These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations would be entered into later on.
The big Liberal newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was not at all satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.
This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European war. In the light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.
Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies'
interest as far as England is concerned.
A German "Attack."
He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia.
Neither of these things would France admit.--(British "White Paper" No.
105.)
Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England to come to the aid!
In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the Frenchman:
If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider.... We were free from engagements and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.--(British "White Paper" No. 87.)
M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)
Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon:
Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved.... M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.... I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.--(British "White Paper" No.
119.)
Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.
At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the way by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by Grey's conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador:
He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be.... The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise.... (British "White Paper" No. 123.)
Belgium Not the Cause.
Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave on Aug. 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London:
I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.--(British "White Paper"
No. 148.)
As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality.