There was once another neutral State, the city and district of Cracow, also established by a treaty to which Great Britain was a signatory.
Three of the signers considered the conditions developing in Cracow to be so threatening that they abolished Cracow as an independent State.
Great Britain sent a polite note of protest, and dropped the matter.
Since that time, however, two Hague Conferences have been held and certain rules agreed upon concerning the rights and duties of neutrals.
The Belgian status of inviolability rests on these rules, called conventions, rather than on the Treaty of 1839. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 Mr. Gladstone very clearly stated that he did not consider the Treaty of 1839 enforceable. Great Britain, therefore, made two new treaties, one with France and one with Prussia (quoted and discussed in Boston Evening Transcript, Oct. 14, 1914) in which she promised to defend Belgian neutrality, by the side of either France or Prussia, against that one of them who should infringe the neutrality.
These treaties were to terminate one year after peace had been concluded between the contestants. A treaty, like the one of 1839, however, which was considered unenforceable in 1870, can hardly be claimed to have gained new rights in 1914. In calm moments nobody will claim that a greater sanctity attaches to it than to the treaty in which Alsace and Lorraine are ceded forever to Germany.
No, it is The Hague Conventions to which we must look. The first convention (1899) contained no rules forbidding belligerents from entering neutral territory. In the second conference it was thought desirable to formulate such rules, because it was felt that in war belligerents are at liberty to do what is not expressly forbidden. At the request of France, therefore, a new set of rules was suggested, to which Great Britain and Belgium offered valuable amendments. The rules were finally accepted, and are today parts of international law. They read; "Article I. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Article II. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power."
These articles, together with the whole convention called "Rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land," have been ratified and therefore accepted as law by the United States of America, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia and other minor powers. Great Britain experienced a change of heart, and, although her own delegates had moved these articles, she refused to ratify them, when she ratified most of the other conventions on Nov. 27, 1909. (A table showing the ratifications of conventions has been published by The World Peace Foundation, Boston.)
The Case of Belgium.
Since Great Britain did not accept these articles as law, she was not bound by them, for the principle of The Hague Conferences is that a nation is bound only by those laws which it accepts. The remarkable fact, therefore, appears that the only one of the big nations which had refused to accept these articles, and which, therefore, might have moved her troops across a neutral country and have claimed that she could do so with a clear conscience because she broke no law which was binding on her, was Great Britain. And the world now sees the spectacle of Great Britain claiming to have gone to war because another power did what she herself could have done, according to her own interpretation, with impunity. Japan has broken the international law by infringing the neutrality of China, but Great Britain can claim that she did not break a law by doing exactly what Japan did.
It is not asserted here that the citizens of Great Britain are not absolutely sincere in their belief of the causes which have allied them with the Russians and the Japanese, and the Indians and the Zouaves, and the negroes and the French and the Belgians against Germany. Their Government, however, should have known that the presumption of insincerity exists when one charges against others a crime which one would have felt at liberty to commit one's self. Yet, more, the British Government knew better than anybody else that Germany had not even committed this crime; for, according to all laws of justice, no person or nation can claim the inviolability of a neutral when he has committed "hostile acts against a belligerent, or acts in favor of a belligerent."
(Article XVII. of The Hague Conference of 1907.)
The question, therefore, arises, "Did Belgium commit acts in favor of one of Germany's opponents, if not actually hostile acts against Germany?" In order to understand Germany's charge that Belgium had committed such acts, attention must be directed to one of the most unfortunate stipulations of the Treaty of 1839, which compelled Belgium to maintain several fortresses. This meant that a small neutral people, sandwiched in between two great powers, had to keep itself informed on military affairs. Instead of being able to foster a peaceful state of mind, which is the surest guarantee of neutrality, the Belgians were forced to think military thoughts.
[Illustration: ANDREW CARNEGIE
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[Illustration: JACOB H. SCHIFF
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In the eighties and early nineties they suspected France of designs on their integrity. Since then a change in the popular feeling has taken place and in recent years the instruction of the Belgian artillery, for instance, was intrusted to French officers in active service. These officers were constantly at home and very properly concerned with solving military problems such as a future war with Germany might present. What was more natural than that these same officers, when they were detached for a few months or years to Liege or Namur or Huy, taught their Belgian charges to prepare against a German attack, and to look upon the French as their friends and the Germans as their enemies? If conditions had been different, and German officers had been in charge of Belgian fortresses, the Belgian guns in practice would always have been trained on imaginary French invaders.
French Officers in Belgian Forts.
If this is understood it will be seen that in the case of war the actual neutrality of the Belgian garrisons would naturally be determined by the position taken by that nation whose officers had been in charge of the Belgian fortresses. And this might be entirely independent of the professed wishes of the Belgian people or their Government. If French officers in active service remained in the several fortresses, or even only in one after the beginning of hostilities, and if the French campaign plans contemplated an attack through Belgium, then Belgium had committed an "act in favor of France" by not forcing the French officers to leave, and had forfeited the rights and privileges granted by The Hague Convention of 1907 to a neutral State.
Did French officers remain in Liege or in any other Belgian fortress after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to go through Belgium?
Germany has officially made both claims. The first can easily be substantiated by the Supreme Court of Civilization by an investigation of the prisoners of war taken in Belgium. Until an impartial investigation becomes possible no further proof than the claim made by the German Government can be produced.
The second charge is contained in No. 157 of the English "White Paper"
in these words of instruction from the German Foreign Secretary to the German Ambassador in London: "Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information."
Sir Edward Grey has attacked Germany for invading Belgium, but has nowhere denied that Germany had the unimpeachable evidence she said she had, and which of course nullified any previous assurance from France.
It is not known whether Sir Edward Grey was shown this evidence or not, but if the preservation of Belgian neutrality was Great Britain's chief concern, why did she not offer to negotiate treaties with Germany and France as she had done in 1870? It will be remembered that then she bound herself to join with either of the contestants in defending Belgian neutrality against the attacks of the other.
As the case stands today, on the evidence of Sir Edward Grey's own "White Paper" and speeches, Great Britain is making war on Germany because:
1. She broke the Treaty of 1839, although her own Gladstone had declared this treaty to be without force, and although the status of neutral States had been removed by The Hague Convention from the uncertainty of treaties to the security of international law.
2. Great Britain makes war against Germany because Germany has broken Articles I. and II. of Chapter 1 of The Hague Convention referring to neutrals, although Great Britain herself has refused to recognize these articles as binding upon her own conduct.
3. She makes war on Germany although she has never denied the correctness of Germany's assertion that she had unimpeachable proof of France's intentions of going through Belgium, which, together with the sojourn of French officers in Belgium, constitutes the offense which, according to The Hague Convention, deprives a so-called neutral State of the privileges granted in Articles I. and II.
It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are which Germany possesses, and which for military reasons she has not yet been able to divulge. She has published some of them, namely, the proof of the continued presence of French officers on Belgian soil, and has given the names and numbers of the several army corps which France had planned to push through Belgium.
The case then stands as follows:
1. Was the inviolability of Belgium guaranteed by Articles I. and II. of The Hague Convention? Yes.
2. Had Germany ratified these articles? Yes.
3. Had Great Britain ratified these articles? No.
4. Would Belgium have forfeited the right of having her country held inviolable if she had committed "acts in favor of France," even if these acts were not actually hostile acts? Yes, according to Article XVII. of The Hague Convention.
5. Did Belgium commit "acts in favor of France," and was Germany, therefore, justified in disregarding the inviolability of her territory?
The Main Question.
This is the important question, and the answer must be left to the Supreme Court of Civilization. The weight of the evidence would seem to point to a justification of Germany. Yet no friend of Germany can find fault with those who would wish to defer a verdict until such a time when Germany can present her complete proof to the world, and this may be when the war is over.
Throughout this argument the famous passage of the Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag has been disregarded. It reads:
Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as her opponents respect it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. The wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing we will endeavor to make good.
This has been understood to mean that the Chancellor acknowledged that Germany was breaking the Treaty of 1839 without warrant, and that Germany, therefore, deserved the contempt of the world. May it not bear another interpretation? Thus:
The Chancellor, like Gladstone in 1870, did not consider the 1839 Treaty enforceable, but saw the guarantee for Belgium in The Hague Convention.
He did not wish to offend Belgium by announcing to the world that she had lost her rights as a neutral because of her acts favorable to France, for when he spoke he was still of the opinion that she would accept the German offer which guaranteed to her both her independence and integrity.
And just as Servia would have accepted Austria's note if Russia had permitted her, so Belgium would not have resisted the German demand if it had not been for England.
This can be proved by the British "White Paper," Nos. 153 and 155. In the former the King of the Belgians appeals "to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium," being apparently of the impression that Germany wished to annex parts, if not the whole, of his country. The London reply advises the Belgians "to resist by any means in their power, and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years."
Has Mr. Beck really not noticed in this promise the omission of the word neutrality? By the Treaty of 1839 Belgium enjoyed not only independence and integrity, but also perpetual neutrality. Does Great Britain offer to fight Germany for the enforcement of the Treaty of 1839? No! Because hereafter the word neutrality is dropped from her guarantee, and since she alone of all the great powers has not ratified the articles of The Hague Convention concerning neutrals she alone will be able to disregard the inviolability of Belgian soil, even though Belgium kept strictly neutral in a future war.
And what, finally, does she guarantee her? Independence and integrity!
That is exactly the same that Germany had promised her. For this Belgium had to be dragged through the horrors of war, and the good name of Germany as that of an honest nation had to be dragged through the mire, and hatred and murder had to be started, that Belgium might get on the battlefield, from the insufficient support of Russia and France and England, what Germany had freely offered her--independence and integrity.
Casual readers would not miss the word neutrality from Sir Edward Grey's guarantee, because they do not differentiate between the words integrity, independence, and neutrality. Great Britain and her ally Japan, marching through China into Kiao-Chau, may be said to have violated China's neutrality, but not her independence, nor, so long as they refrain from annexing any Chinese territory, her integrity.