HALDANE.
(MEMORANDUM.)
It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever military discussions have taken place before this war have been limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium.
The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany.
The Germans have stated that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium and Belgium had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the British Government.
The extract inclosed, which is taken from an official publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to connive, at the breach of the treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger that this treaty might be violated the British Government made an appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be found in our first "White Paper" after the outbreak of the war.
The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin; and it is recorded in the second "White Paper" that we published. The attitude of the British Government throughout has been to endeavor to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded it and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the international treaty.
We have known for some years past that in Holland, in Denmark, and in Norway the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbors.
This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs that she herself entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack France through Belgium. A statement is inclosed, which was issued by us on Oct. 14 last, dealing with this point.
This memorandum and its inclosures should provide ample material for a reply to the German statements.
Foreign Office, Nov. 9, 1914.
Belgian Official Denials.
Here is inclosed a copy of the note of Aug. 3 sent by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister at Brussels, included in the Belgian "Gray Paper," and printed in full in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 18 and reprinted in THE TIMES'S pamphlet of the war's diplomatic papers. This is the note expressing the "profound and painful surprise" caused to King Albert's Government by the German invitation to it to abandon Belgian neutrality and denying that France had, as alleged by Germany, manifested any such intention.
A second inclosure gives this clipping from The London Times of Sept.
30:
OFFICIAL STATEMENT.
The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality, France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that "before Aug. 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and, again, "it is untrue that on Aug. 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds:
"For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian Army would oppose by force a 'preventive' disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crisis to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter."
The "Agreement" of 1903.
The third inclosure is this British official communique:
14 October, 1914.
The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906 published in the German press, and based on documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a fresh edition of a story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.
As the Germans well know, Gen. Grierson is dead and Col. (now Gen.) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tau. In 1906 Gen. Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office, and Col. Barnardiston was Military Attache at Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Col. Barnardiston, have taken place between Gen. Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British Army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbors violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels.
It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude toward France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed.
The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agreement of the nature indicated or to any design for the violation of Belgian neutrality is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such violation might come.
It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium, which was carried out two months ago.
Apportioning the Blame
By Arthur v. Briesen.
Of the law firm of Briesen & Knauth; Doctor of Laws, New York University; philanthropist; has served the American public as head of important civic bodies and Governmental commissions.
_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
Having been requested by you to express my views with reference to the war which is now lacerating Europe, I take pleasure to comply with your desire.
As an American citizen I am, of course, under obligations to be neutral and to send no ammunition to either belligerent. At the same time the German blood in my veins naturally causes me to sympathize with Germany in this conflict. But even if we leave out of consideration any matter of sympathy, if we look upon the situation in an entirely unbiased spirit, the conclusion which I propose to lay before you appears to be irresistible.
The questions that seem to have agitated the American public mostly in connection with this awful conflict have been:
_First_--Who is to blame for bringing about this war, and,
_Second_--Assuming that Germany was not to blame for beginning the war, is she to blame for violating the neutrality of Belgium?
If we should find the fault regarding the first question to lie primarily with England and secondarily with Russia, we should at once clear the German people and their Government from the charge that has heretofore been brought against them for having incited the war. And if we should find that the neutrality of Belgium was not binding upon any country whose existence or whose interests were threatened by other countries, that fact would then absolve either country from a charge which thus far seems to have been brought against one of them.
_How was the war brought about?_ As far back as 1906 it is known, and can be proved by the files of New York papers, to say nothing of official correspondence now found in Brussels and elsewhere, that measures were started by England to circumscribe or isolate the German Empire, and treaties were entered between England, France, and Russia (the Triple Entente) to insure joint action against Germany when necessary.
Germany herself has been peaceful, progressive, and anxious to retain her position as a nation undisturbed by others, as a nation that should advance in art, in science, in population, and in all things that make happiness through peace. What was the situation in other countries?
Since 1870 _France_ had cried for revenge (_revanche_). Its school books, newspapers, public speakers, and political leaders were all charged with the one great idea of seeking revenge against Germany for having retaken Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, which France had wrongfully occupied since the time of Louis XIV. Alsace and Lorraine had been German for centuries before; they were wrested from Germany without even a semblance of an excuse at the close of the seventeenth century, and were largely German in language and in spirit in 1870. Goethe's studies in Strassburg and his visits to Frederica von Sesenheim in the eighteenth century show that he was living in a German country whenever he was in Alsace. A _united_ Germany did not exist prior to 1870.
However, the cry for revenge was there, and France distinctly declared it to be her policy to take her revenge as soon as opportunity offered.
France was, therefore, a pronounced enemy of Germany ever since 1870, and when asked by the German Government on July 31, 1914, whether she would remain neutral in a Russian-German war (Annex 25, German "White Paper") she answered: "France would do that which might be required of her _by her interests_." This answer was given on Aug. 1, 1914, (Annex 27, German "White Paper.") Today we may well ask France whether, since Aug. 1, 1914, she has done that which was required by her interests.
_Russia_ may next be looked at. How did Russia become involved in this contest? The little kingdom of Servia, which had familiarized itself with the fine art of disposing of crowned heads by throwing its King and Queen, Alexandra and Draga, out of the window of their castle, caused through its officials and its followers to have the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife cruelly assassinated on June 28, 1914. This assassination was an act of enmity toward Austria and a step toward the enlargement of Servia. Deeming her existence threatened and her national dignity offended, Austria sent a rather sharp demand under date of July 23, 1914, to Servia, requiring prompt and thorough satisfaction for the gross attack made upon her and her reigning family through Servia's official directions.
Strange to say, however, the British "White Book" shows that three days before, on July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, (Paper 1, British "White Book,") wrote to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, a letter in which he states:
In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. _I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers_, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.
On July 24, 1914, the Austrian message to Servia became known to all countries, and on the same day Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, wrote that he had been asked by Mr. Sazonof, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austria's step clearly meant that war was imminent.
He wrote that Mr. Sazonof expressed himself as follows (British Paper 6):
He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to _proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France_. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.
Later, on July 29, 1914, Sir George Buchanan wrote to Sir Edward Grey (Paper 72, English "White Book") as follows: