A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated Governments of Germany a _confidential communication_ in which he recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added that
"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"
but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone--
"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, _which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize_."
In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of Servia by Austria. He says "_our closest interests therefore summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that
"if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire."
[German "White Paper," Annex 2.]
In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be betrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.
No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending that his nation wished nothing but peace and invoking Divine aid for its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted occasion when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.
Let us, then, analyze the record as already made up; and for the sake of clearness the events which preceded the war will be considered chronologically.
Immediately upon the receipt of the ultimatum in St. Petersburg on July 24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a formal communication to Austria-Hungary, suggested that the abrupt time limit "leaves to the powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have arisen," and added:
"To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the powers, which can follow the method of action of the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us that, above all, the delay given to Servia to reply should be extended."
Sazonof further suggested that time should be given for the powers to examine the results of the inquiry that the Austro-Hungarian Government had made in the matter of the Serajevo assassination, and stated that if the powers were convinced
"of the well-groundedness of certain of the Austrian demands they would find themselves in a position to send to the Servian Government consequential advice."
He justly observes that
"a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum ... would be in contradiction with the very bases of international relations."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 4.]
Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done to preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the uttermost farthing.
Concurrently with Sazonof's plea for a little time to preserve the peace of the world, Sir Edward Grey had seen the German Ambassador on July 24 and had suggested to him that the only method of preventing the catastrophe was
"that the four powers, Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, (England,) should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg."
[English "White Paper," No. 11.]
Germany had only to intimate to Austria that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," as well as common courtesy to great and friendly nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia, but to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially as the period was one of Summer dullness and many of the leading rulers and statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.
Under these circumstances was it not natural that Russia should announce on July 24
"that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia would not leave Russia indifferent,"
and that on the same day the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna suggested to the Austrian Foreign Office
"that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms"?
To which the only reply of the Austrian Foreign Minister was that their representative in Servia
"was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted in their integrity by 4 P.M. tomorrow."
[English "White Paper," No. 7.]
Austria's only concession then or subsequently to the cause of peace was the assurance that Austria would not _after its conquest_ of Servia demand any territory.
The action of Germany on this day, July 24, is most significant. Its Ambassador in England communicated a note to Sir Edward Grey in which it justified Austro-Hungarian grievances and ultimatum by saying that
"under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate."
The note added:
"The Imperial Government [Germany] want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned."
[English "White Paper," No. 9.]
On July 25, probably to the great surprise of both Germany and Austria, which had definitely calculated upon Servians non-compliance with the ultimatum, the latter country, under the conciliatory advice of Russia and England, made a reply in which, at some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign State, it substantially accepted all but one of the demands of Austria, and as to that it did not, in terms, refuse it, but expressed its willingness to refer it either to arbitration or to a conference of the powers.
[English "White Paper," No. 39.]
No court would question for a moment the conclusion that the reply was a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands, nor indeed did either Germany or Austria seriously contend that it was not. They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances, calling the concessions "shams," and of this it is enough to say that if Germany and Austria had accepted Servians reply as sufficient, and Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises thus made in the utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and no general war. Indeed, both Russia and England pledged their influence to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of Austria. The outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or leave to the powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem. Austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily attained by having the neutral powers appoint a commission of jurists to make such investigation.
On July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the German Ambassador to use his good influences at Vienna to secure an extension of time. To this most reasonable request the answer and action of the German Government was disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to "pass on" the suggestion, but the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that as the Austrian Prime Minister was away from Vienna there would be delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended, and
"he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government _wished to give the Servians a lesson and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that the Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands_."
He added that Germany did not want a general war and "he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 11 and 18.]
Immediately on the issuance of the ultimatum the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, had most inopportunely taken himself to Ischl, where he remained until after the expiration of the time limit.
Access to him proved difficult, and the Russian Charge at Vienna, having lodged a pacific protest with the Acting Foreign Minister in order to take no chances, telegraphed it to Berchtold at Ischl. Nevertheless, Berchtold's apparently designed absence from the capital was Germany's excuse for its failure to get the time limit extended.
If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to Vienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace.
Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.
Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on the morning of July 25 offered
"to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy."
[English "White Paper," No. 17.]
As Russia was the member of the Triple Entente most interested in the fate of Servia, what proposal could have been more conciliatory or magnanimous?
On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four powers (including Germany) should unite