[Footnote 8: See Vol. I, pp. 227, 439, 466, 467, 504-507; and above, ch. 14, sec. 8.]
[Footnote 9: See Vol. I, pp. 217, 222-223, 352, 356.]
[Footnote 10: See above, sec 12.]
[Footnote 11: We are expressing here the general opinion, not pronouncing a final justification of competition as a rule of conduct.
On this something will be said later, in ch. 31.]
CHAPTER 21
PUBLIC REGULATION OF HOURS AND WAGES
-- 1. Spread of the shorter working day. -- 2. The shorter day and the lump of labor notion. -- 3. Fewer hours and greater efficiency. -- 4.
Child-labor. -- 5. Child-labor legislation. -- 6. Limitation of the working day for women. -- 7. Limitation of the working day for men. -- 8.
Broader aspects of tins legislation. -- 9. Plan of the minimum wage.
-- 10. Some problems of the minimum wage. -- 11. Mediation and voluntary arbitration. -- 12. Compulsory arbitration. -- 13. Organized labor's attitude, toward labor legislation. -- 14. Organized labor's opposition to compulsory arbitration. -- 15. The public and labor legislation. --16.
The public and compulsory arbitration.
-- 1. #Spread of the shorter working day.# Since about 1880 a shorter working day has been one of the prime objects of organized labor in America. Notable progress was early made in some trades, reducing hours from 11 to 10, or from 10 to 9, and in a few cases from 9 to 8.
In the building trades in the cities, especially, the eight-hour day has come to be well nigh the rule. In 1912 it was estimated[1] that 1,847,000 wage earners were working in the United States on the eight-hour basis; of these 475,000 were public employees. A large proportion of the remainder were women and children whose hours were limited by law, or were men working in the same establishments with them. Since that date the eight-hour day has been more widely adopted both through private action in many establishments and by legislation.
The year 1915 witnessed an especially rapid spread of the eight-hour day.
-- 2. #The shorter day and the lump of labor notion.# The shorter working day is advocated by most workers in the belief that it will result not in less pay per day, but in even greater pay than the longer day, even if the output should be decreased. This view is connected with the lump of labor notion.[2] It assumes that men will work no faster in a shorter day, and that there is so much work to be done regardless of the rate of wages; and concludes that the shorter day will reduce the amount of labor for sale and cause wages to rise.
To the extent, however, that laborers, as consumers, mutually buy each other's labor, evidently this loss due to curtailing production must fall upon the laborers as a class. The workers nearly always call for the same daily pay for a shorter day, which means a higher wage per hour. If wages per hour increase less than enough to make up for the fewer hours,[3] the purchasing power of the workers must be reduced.
If the output per hour is increased proportionally to the pay per hour, the existing wages equilibrium would not be disturbed. But if the output increases not at all or in less than the proportion of the increase in pay, there is an inevitable disturbance of the wage equilibrium. In a competitive industry this would compel a speedy readjustment of wages downward. If a certain group, or large number, of workers were to begin turning out only 80 per cent as large a product as they did before while getting the same money wage, the costs per unit would be thereby increased. Prices must rise or many of the establishments must close, and then prices would rise as a result.
This must throw some of the workmen out of employment and create a new bargaining situation for wages. If the general eight-hour day were applied to every industry and to all wage workers at once, then all workers and all employers in the industry would be in a like situation. But at once there must occur changes of consumers'
choices in a great number of ways. If there are one fifth fewer goods evidently at least one fifth of the consumers must go without. This would largely be the wage workers. The things of which wage labor makes up a large part of the costs will rise in price relative to the things of which self-employed labor and of which materials and machinery make up a relatively larger part. This must compel a reduction of the demand for the products of wage labor relative to other things, and be reflected to labor in a lower wage. This reduction would not necessarily be just in proportion to the reduced output (that is, say, 20 per cent if from 10 to 8 hours, or 11 per cent, if from 9 to 8 hours). It might even be more, but probably would be somewhat less. In any case, both the money wages and the real wages of laborers, either in the particular trade or generally, must be reduced by a general reduction of hours that results in a decreased output. In such cases, even when the workmen by a strike or general movement secured the same wage scale for a day of fewer hours (a higher wage per hour), they would be unable to hold it excepting where they had monopolistic control of the trade.
In a period of rising prices due to an increasing supply of gold, the readjustment of wages (per hour) away from an artificially high level down to a competitive rate goes steadily on. Even when money wages remain the same their purchasing power declines at such times, and this serves soon to bring the high money wages into accord with the lower value of the services.[4]
-- 3. #Fewer hours and greater efficiency.# Quite contrary to the foregoing view is the claim that in the shorter day the rate of work is so increased that the output is at least as large as in the longer day, or even larger. A faster working pace is possible with a shorter day, particularly in those operations calling for physical or mental dexterity. This view is less attractive to the workers than the preceding one, but is more acceptable to the employers and to the public. The change undoubtedly has resulted in many cases in the manner indicated, and could be made to result so in many other cases by applying the methods of scientific management. But it is a change which cannot be repeated indefinitely and under all conditions with like favorable results. Whether in any particular case it can be, depends in part on the length of the working day at the start. Such an increase in output might occur in a change from exhausting hours, as from 12 to 10, and again from 10 to 9, and yet not be possible in a change from 9 to 8. Moreover, the speeding up of the workers beyond a certain point may have had physiological effects outweighing the benefit from shorter hours. It is now said that with the increase of automatic machinery there are more and more workmen who much of the time have merely to watch the machine-tool run, and occasionally adjust the material. There has, however, been collected a notable body of evidence to show that, in many industries and in different establishments using much machinery, a reduction of hours to a number as few as eight has been followed by the increase of the output per worker, or by improvement in the quality of work, or by improvement in the management, resulting in a reduction of the cost of production.
This is often sufficient, or more than sufficient, to compensate for the shorter time. Wages have remained as high as, or higher than, before, and employment has been more regular. So far as this result is due to the individual worker, it is explained by the same evidence referred to below[5] as bearing upon the health of the worker.
This evidence tends to prove that with longer periods of rest and recreation the worker lives in a physical and mental condition fitting him far better for his work, and for continuing his working life.
-- 5. #Child-labor.# All the foregoing arguments are weighed in terms of private incomes and of the value of the products, whereas the main considerations that have of late been influencing legislation and judicial decision in favor of shorter hours have been those of public welfare. The legal limitation of working hours is being treated primarily as a health measure, into the judgment of which is more and more entering a broader conception of the happiness, morality, and opportunities for good citizenship for the worker and his family.
In agricultural conditions, such as have prevailed generally in America, there is little need of limiting the hours of work and the age at which children may begin to work. The barefoot boy trudging over clover fields to carry water to the harvesters may be the happier, healthier, and better for his work. Child-labor in agriculture has never become a social "problem" so long as the children work with their own parents at their own homes; but the labor of children for wages, especially in gangs on large farms (as in beet cultivation and cranberry picking) or in canning factories, has exhibited evils as pronounced as any in urban manufacturing conditions.
The evil of forcing children into factories was early recognized.
The most obvious evils of child-labor are neglect of the child's schooling; destruction of home life; overwork, overstrain, and loss of sleep, with resulting injury to health; unusual danger of industrial accidents; and exposure to demoralizing conditions. The usual assumption that the worker is able to contract regarding the conditions of labor on terms of equality with the employer is most palpably false in the case of children. The child, subject to the commands of his parents and guardians, is not a free agent. Lazy fathers are tempted to support themselves in idleness on the wages of their young children. Often poverty leads the parents to rob their children of health, of schooling, and of the joys of childhood. The competition of child-labor also depresses the wages of adults, and thus the evil grows.
-- 5. #Child-labor legislation.# The limitation of hours was first applied to children working in English factories early in the nineteenth century and thence has extended throughout the world, tardily following the spread of the factory system. The first American law of the kind was in Massachusetts, in 1842, limiting to 10 hours the labor of children under twelve years of age in manufacturing establishments. All the earlier state laws established low minimums of age and high maximums of hours, and were poorly enforced for lack of adequate administrative machinery, this in turn being the result of lack of active public interest. In all these respects many states gradually improved their child-labor laws in the latter part of the last century, and much more rapidly since 1903. Now the maximum working day for children in about one half of the states is 8 hours, in one quarter is 9 hours, and in one quarter is 10 hours (and in a few southern states, 11 hours). Night work by children is very generally forbidden (in about forty states). During the same time the minimum age has been pretty generally raised to fourteen years for factory work, with higher ages (sixteen, eighteen, or even twenty-one) in some states for certain occupations dangerous to health or morals.
In addition to these general limitations, special provision is made for individual examinations to determine whether the child is mentally and physically fit to work and has met the requirements of the compulsory education laws of the state.
The most important child-labor legislation in recent years was the enactment of the long debated national child-labor law (passed in August, 1916). This prohibits the interstate shipment of goods produced in factories wherein any child has, within thirty days, been employed under unfavorable conditions as to hours and time of work as specified in the act. The passage of this act was the culmination of years of efforts in and out of Congress.
Child-labor legislation viewed as a merely negative policy is not of great moment. Its real significance is to be judged only in connection with the broader social policy of protecting and developing all of the children of the nation to be healthy, intelligent, moral, and efficient citizens. Children growing into blighted and ignorant manhood and womanhood are threats to society.
-- 6. #Limitations of the working day for women#. But little later than the limitation of child-labor usually comes some legislation to limit the hours and conditions of employment of women. The grounds of this policy are that women likewise are less able than men to protect themselves in the labor contract, that they are physically weak and are peculiarly exposed to certain dangers to health, that as future mothers they need protection for their own and the public welfare, and that in the period of maternity the dangers are especially great. The work of women in factories operates in some ways to depress the wages of men, and it is harmful in its effects upon the home and family life. At present five states limit the hours of women to 8 a day, twelve to 9 a day, fifteen to 19 a day, four to 11 or less a day. A number of states forbid the work of women in designated places of work such as saloons, mines, or where constant standing is required. Only as late as 1911, in America, has legislation, now in four states, given maternity protection, as is now more fully provided in European countries in connection with systems of health insurance.
In all of the great industrial countries of Europe night work by women is restricted (prohibited between 10 P.M. and 5 A.M. or yet more narrowly limited); but legislation along this line is found in only eight American states.
-- 7. #Limitations of the working day for men#. The general assumption made in law has been that the adult male worker is competent to judge of the working conditions, hours of labor, and wages, and is capable of protecting his own interests sufficiently by his power of refusal to accept employment. The legislatures have, much more tardily than in their legislation for children and for women, acted contrary to this assumption, but, when this has been done, the courts in America have vigorously asserted the general doctrine and denied the constitutionality of the laws. However, some exceptions were made in legislation, and, after much apparent hesitation and vacillation, were allowed by, the courts to stand, and these have now grown in number until they form an impressive total.
These exceptions have come in various ways. There is first, the eight-hour limitation in public employment, required in federal employment in 1868, really effective since 1892, and now in force likewise in about two thirds of the states. In almost the same jurisdictions--national, state and municipal--eight hours is the legal day on work done in private business for the governments. Work on railroads and street railways, particularly in the direct operation of trains, such as the work of dispatchers, signal men, and trainmen, is subjected to a large variety of regulative measures, hours being limited in some cases to 8, in others to 9, 10, 12, or 16, and in a number of cases a specified minimum number of hours of rest is required after the maximum hours of labor. These laws are primarily for the protection of the public, but they afford a protection to the employee much needed, as many well-authenticated cases of excessive and exhausting hours demonstrate.
The limitation of hours has very recently been extended to many private businesses in which exceptional conditions exist affecting the health of the workers or the safety of the public. This development has occurred almost entirely since the United States Supreme Court in 1898 (Holden vs. Hardy) sustained a Utah statute limiting to eight the hours of labor in underground mines. Now 8 hour laws in certain specified cases are found applying to mines, smelters, tunnels, and a variety of other kinds of work, and in a few cases the limit is 9, 10, or 11 hours.
-- 8. #Broader aspects of this legislation#. The subject took on a new aspect when the legislature of Oregon, in 1913, declared broadly that "no person shall be hired, nor permitted to work for wages, under any conditions or terms, for longer hours or days of service than is consistent with his health and physical well-being and ability to promote the general welfare by his increasing usefulness as a healthy and intelligent citizen," and fixed ten hours as the limit of work consistent with such a measure of health and welfare, in work in any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment. This law was sustained by the Supreme Court of that state and was carried on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.[6] In support of the law there was presented a voluminous brief giving a most impressive body of evidence from scientific and from practical business sources, to show the many evils, popularly unsuspected or underestimated, that result from long hours even in industries of no exceptional hazards.[7] Physiological and psychological tests demonstrate that the fatigue following more than a moderate working period not only reduces immediate efficiency, but so poisons the system that greater liability to accident, disease, intemperance, immorality, and premature decay, results.
Two main purposes appear somewhat intermingled in this legislation in limitation of hours. The first purpose is to protect the public directly where the safety of others is dependent on the health and efficiency of the worker. The second purpose is to protect directly the worker's health and welfare, that policy being recognized to be in the long run the best likewise for the public welfare. In legal reasoning it is being recognized that the individual wage-worker, even the adult male, is not in a position to judge the number of hours he ought, for his own good, to work, and is unable to fix the length of his own working day. As a matter of economic theory, the usance of a child, a woman, or a man, is merely that kind and amount of service that can be given out by each without repressing the normal possibilities of growth, reducing the normal health and vigor, or shortening the normal period of healthy productive human existence.[8]
It is becoming a general social policy to prevent the abnormal strains of industry that cause the unnatural deterioration of the human factor in industry. A wage-worker may be permitted to sell his daily _net_ fund of working power--his usance--but not his life.
-- 9. #Plan of the minimum wage.# Even more recent than the legislative regulation of hours downward is the attempt to regulate wages upward in the case of certain low-paid wage-workers. The modern[9] movement for the minimum wage began in Victoria in 1896, and it soon extended to nearly all the other Australasian states. Great Britain applied the plan in 1910 to industries in which wages were exceptionally low. The plan was first adopted in the United States by Massachusetts in the year 1912, tho in an emasculated form, and spread so rapidly that at the end of 1915 it was found in at least 11 states. Minimum wage laws usually lay down "a living wage" as the standard to be used, and either prescribe a flat rate of wages, or, more often, leave the decision in each case to the wage commission established to administer the law.
Generous sympathies have guided this movement of which much has been hoped and which, on the other hand, has always had its adverse critics. The most that can be claimed for it by its friends after more than twenty years of experience, is that the "dire predictions" have not been verified. In truth it would seem that the plan as yet has not been tried on a scale that could yield very large fruits either for good or for evil. The persons whom it is sought to aid are only selected groups of the lowest paid workers, generally limited to minors and young women, who in many cases are those of immigrant families in urban districts. A large volume of discussion on this subject has developed, mostly of an _a priori_ nature, of which we may here touch only a few of the salient points.
At first glance the principles involved in the legislation limiting hours and those in minimum wage legislation may seem to be the same.
But an important difference soon appears. In the former case the evil is that of a too long working period, injurious to health, and this can be reached directly and stopped by an efficiently administered law. But in the latter case the real evil is industrial weakness and incapacity such that the workers are unable to command "a living wage"
in a competitive market. A minimum wage law, by itself, neither cures the industrial incapacity nor ensures employment to the industrially weak at any wage. The law does not attempt to compel employers to employ at the legal minimum wage every one who wishes to work; it merely declares that the employer shall _not_ employ any one whom, in his employ, he finds to be not worth that high a wage.
-- 10. #Some problems of the minimum wage#. Unless the demand for a particular kind of service is absolutely inelastic (a rare if not impossible situation in a large market), there must be fewer jobs for the less capable workers at high than at low wages, other prices remaining the same. Further, some of the less capable workers must be crowded out of such jobs as remain; for an artificially higher wage attracts into an occupation some from other occupations before paid more highly. It seems to be admitted by the friends of minimum wage legislation that this result is logically to be expected and that to some degree it appears. Of course it is never possible to tell to just what extent workers have been and are being excluded in this way from any particular establishment or occupation. Forbidden to earn what they can, the poorer workers must become dependent on charity. It may be said, and perhaps truly: better this than underpaid labor destructive to the health of the workers and evil in its competitive effects upon other wage workers.
In most discussions of the wages of women there is a ready confusion of sympathetic ideals of what one would like to see with the cold facts as they are. Women's services (especially those of young women) have increasingly of late been coming upon the labor market in such a way as to cause abnormal congestion in a few occupations. Employers have not caused low wages in these cases. Partly these occupations are the clean, light, and agreeable ones, partly they have a relative social glamour, largely they can be followed for a few years near the home of the worker, nearly always they may be undertaken with brief training and little skill. Investigation has shown that at least eighty per cent of this group of girl workers live at home. A wage that is amply a "living wage" when used as a pro-rata contribution to an American family income is frequently insufficient for the girl living "independently." Such a girl is, under the conditions, unable to earn a living in her chosen occupation, and it may be better to recognize that fact and to deal with such individual cases as appear among the one fifth of all girls employed.
The one unquestioned service of the minimum wage law is that of diagnosing the evil of low wages rather than in remedying it.
The minimum wage law brings to light the industrial incapacity of particular individuals to earn a living wage. The direct remedy is to abolish the incapable workers or their incapacity by such methods as regulating foreign or cityward immigration, custodial care of the physically, mentally, and morally weak, vocational guidance, and more effective measures of industrial education. Alongside of the abnormally low paid occupations or elsewhere in the industrial organization are other occupations in which with, or often even without, special training, the sweated workers could get, competitively, more than the minimum wage, if they could, or would, qualify for the work.
-- 11. #Mediation and voluntary arbitration#. The labor controversies in which the public has the largest interest as a third party[10]
are those which result or may result in strikes. The public interest becomes acute when a strike results in interference with the individual freedom of other workers and of nonparticipants, when it causes a blocking of the highways and disturbance of the peace, and when it prevents the regular production and transportation of the commodities which the public consumes. The public, therefore, has steadily become more interested in all methods and agencies designed to conserve better relations between employers and wageworkers, and to diminish or, if possible, to do away with strikes when individual and collective bargaining between the two parties fail.
_Mediation_, or conciliation, is the effort of a third party to get the two parties to a trade dispute to come together to agree peaceably upon a settlement. Mediation may be voluntarily undertaken in a particular case by any citizen or by a public official, usually the executive (mayor, governor, or President); or it may be by a regular public state or national commission charged with this duty (as in some 17 states).
_Arbitration_ is the decision, by a disinterested person (or commission) to whom it is submitted, of the exact terms, after a provisional settlement of a dispute. It is voluntary when the parties agree in advance to accept the verdict, and compulsory when they are compelled by law to submit to arbitration and abide by the verdict.
Some provision either of voluntary private or of public agencies to mediate between the parties in labor disputes and to facilitate voluntary arbitration has been made of late in most communities of the civilized world, including 32 of our states, and the nation as a whole particularly in respect to disputes between railroads and train operatives engaged in interstate commerce.[11] No one objects to them, and they accomplish much good, but fail oftenest in the greater emergencies because of the unwillingness of one or the other party to submit the case, or because of lack of any power to enforce the decisions.
-- 12. #Compulsory arbitration#. The serious question in the subject of arbitration concerns the introduction of the principle of coercion by government, in compulsory arbitration. This, in principle, is pretty radically different from voluntary arbitration, for as it denies to the parties the right to settle their dispute by private agreement, it becomes in effect the legal regulation of rates of wages and conditions of work. In principle this was involved in the legal regulation of wages in England from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The plan is closely approached in the industrial courts that are now provided in a number of European countries for a cheap and expeditious settlement of small disputes regarding trade matters, arising in the relations between employer and employees. The new modern development began when New Zealand passed a compulsory arbitration act in 1894, followed to some extent since by all the other Australian states, largely through the action of the Labor party. Through the operation of its act New Zealand came to be called the "land without strikes," tho the description was inaccurate, especially after 1907. The Canadian Industrial Disputes Act of 1907 is an example that has had influence upon public opinion everywhere, and has been followed to some extent in recent legislation in New Zealand, America, and elsewhere. It involves the compulsory principle in a limited degree, making it unlawful in public utilities and mines to change the terms of employment without thirty days' notice, or to strike or lock-out until after investigation and hearing before a board to be nominated for the purpose. The Colorado Act of 1915 goes even beyond the Canadian act in its scope. The plan seems destined to have wider applications and a larger development in the not distant future. Let us note the general attitude of the various interests concerned.
-- 13. #Organized labor's attitude toward labor legislation#. Labor organizations hitherto have been in their legal nature almost entirely private and voluntary. They are seldom incorporated and are rarely even recognized in any way by legislatures and by courts, which deal merely with the members as individuals.[12] Their private character, combined with their limited membership as compared with the total population, leaves them without the power to accomplish legally by themselves the results which they desire in their own interest. Hence they are tempted at times to usurp public authority over the field of private rights in industry.[13] In other cases, when they have come to the end of their unaided powers, they invoke the aid of the law to accomplish their objects. But the appeal of organized labor to the law is special and qualified, being confined to cases where the actions of others are controlled to the advantage of the union, such as regulating the work of women and children, controlling the acts of employers in respect to construction of factories, and limiting the length of trains. This does not imply a peculiarly selfish attitude on the part of organized labor. Action together in any social group always develops in men their loyalty and spirit of cooperation without always making them more considerate to those outside of their group.
Indeed, often men acting through their chosen officials, private or public, are more selfish collectively than they are individually.
The leaders of any group of men, whether of wage workers, merchants, manufacturers, or political constituents, find it necessary to show that the interest of their supporters rather than a broader "sentimentality" is uppermost in their thought. And further, the jealousy of any limitation of their power is as powerful a motive in one group of men as in another. All are made of the same human clay.
But the stronger and more successful a labor organization is, the more vigorously do its leaders resist any legislation that limits the functions and field of action of the labor leaders, or that settles labor troubles in a way that makes the voluntary labor organization less necessary to the individual worker. Of course self-help, as a spirit and as a policy, is a virtue, if it does not sacrifice the rights of others. But if the facts above suggested are borne in mind they will help to explain the otherwise often puzzling attitudes of organized labor toward different measures of social legislation.