"Foresight will exert an influence on future events by establishing an analogy between them and the actual incidents which, of necessity, will lead to the adoption or rejection of present projects.
"It is to be observed that all these faculties are subordinate, one to the other, and, in proportion to the unfolding of the fan, we can prove that all the blades previously mentioned have concurred in the formation of the blade of which we are now speaking.
"In order to foresee disasters it is necessary that the perception--visual or auditory--of said disasters should already have imprest us.
"We have kept intact the memory of them, since it is reconstructed emotion which guides our thoughts.
"These same thoughts, in extending themselves, form groups of thoughts harmonious in character, all relative to the one, which is the object of the debate.
"Our mind becomes more active in recalling the incidents, the remembrance of which marks the time which has elapsed between the old perception and the present state of mental absorption.
"The faculty of deduction, which is born of these different mental conflicts, permits me to foresee that circumstances of the same nature will lead to others similar to those we have already mentioned.
"We have merely sketched rapidly the scale of sensations which follow each other, in order to reach the explanation of how foresight is formed, this faculty of which we are now speaking.
"By assimilating these present facts with those of the past, we are permitted to draw a conclusion, relating to the same group of results, because of the conformity of those past facts to the present questions.
"Foresight is passive; between it and precaution there is the same difference as between theory and practise.
"Precaution is preeminently active, and it marks its first appearance by means of foresight, but does not stop in this effort until it has rendered foresight productive.
"It is well to foresee, but it is precious to preclude.
"The second part of the act of precaution can, however, only be accomplished after having permitted the brain to register the thoughts which determine the first part of this act."
In order to understand this very subtle difference, but very important one, which classifies these two sentiments, the old sage gives us the following example:
"Let us suppose," he says, "that, on a beautiful day in spring, a man starts out for an excursion which will last until the dawn of the following day.
"If he has common sense, he will say to himself that the sun will not be shining at the time of his return, that the nights of spring are cold, and that this one will be no exception to the rule.
"This is foresight.
"If common sense, with all its consequences, takes possession of him, it will increase his power of reasoning. He will think that, in order to avoid suffering from the change of temperature, it would be well to cover himself with a cloak.
"And, even tho the sun shone, he would not hesitate to furnish himself with this accessory, which in fact will render him the greatest service.
"This is precaution.
"This quality is indispensable to the formation of the reasoning power; for, in addition to the necessity of foreseeing certain results, it permits also of directing their course, if it be impossible to exempt them completely.
"Reasoning is the art of developing, to the highest degree, the suppositions resulting from deduction.
"One is usually mistaken as to the exact meaning of the words 'to reason,' and people seldom attach the importance to them which they should.
"One is apt to think that the gift of reasoning is bestowed upon every one.
"Perhaps; but to reason, following the principles of justice and truth, is an operation which can only be performed by minds endowed with common sense.
"In order to arrive at this result, it is essential to impress upon oneself the value of the words, 'to deduct accurately,' after having produced the radiation of thoughts which depend upon the object in question, and to foresee the consequences of the facts that a resolution could determine.
"Above all, to avoid contentment with the approximate, which conceals many pitfalls under false appearances.
"Without permitting oneself to express useless trivialities, not to neglect to become impregnated with those axioms which have been rightfully baptized, 'wisdom of nations.'
"They are generally based on a secular observation, and are the product of many generations.
"It would be puerile to attach vital importance to them, but one would surely regret having entirely scorned their counsel.
"Too much erudition is at times detrimental to reason, based on common sense. Altho fully appreciating science, and devoting serious study to it, one would do well to introduce the human element into his knowledge.
"There are some essential truths which modify daily life without, for this reason, lessening their importance.
"Some of them are of premature development; others are of miniature growth.
"To reason without offending common sense, it is, therefore, indispensable to consider time, place, environment, and all the contingencies which could arise to undermine the importance of reasoning."
After having reviewed all these phases, we shall then extend, in accord with Yoritomo, the last blade of this rudimentary fan, and we shall find judgment.
"This one is the index to that quality of mind called conviction.
"This mental operation consists in drawing together many ideas that their relative characteristics may be determined.
"This operation takes the place contiguous to reasoning, of which it is the result.
"Judgment determines its character after having registered the reasons which ought to indicate its position; it deducts the conclusions imposed by the explanatory principle, and classifies the idea by submitting it to the valuation placed upon it by judgment.
"All judgment is either affirmative or negative.
"It can never be vascillating nor neutral.
"In this last case it will assume the title of opinion, and will attribute to itself the definite qualities which characterize judgment.
"It is, however, at times subjected to certain conditions, where the principles on which it is based are not sufficiently defined, and, therefore, becomes susceptible to a change, either of form or of nature.
"It is possible, without violating the laws of common sense, to establish a judgment whose terms will be modified by the mutation of causes.
"But common sense demands that these different influences should be foreseen, and that these eventualities should be mentioned when pronouncing the judgment."
We have reached the last blade of the symbolic fan, described by the philosopher, for many secondary qualities may be placed between the principle blades.
But faithful to his explanatory method, he wished to indicate to us the broad lines first, and also to state the indispensable faculties constituting common sense, by teaching us their progression and development.
He desired to demonstrate to us also how much all these qualities would be lessened in value if they were not united and bound together in the order in which they ought to manifest themselves.
"We have all possest," said he, "some fans whose point of reunion was destroyed in part or altogether lost.
"What becomes of it, then?