_ 222 History of Scientific Ideas_, ii., 110, 111.
_ 223 History of Scientific Ideas_, ii., 111-113.
_ 224 Nov. Org. Renov._, pp. 286, 287.
_ 225 History of Scientific Ideas_, ii., 120-122.
_ 226 Nov. Org. Renov._, p. 274.
_ 227 Hist. Sc. Id._, i. 133.
228 Dr. Whewell, in his reply (_Philosophy of Discovery_, p. 270) says that he "stopped short of, or rather passed by, the doctrine of a series of organized beings," because he "thought it bad and narrow philosophy." If he did, it was evidently without understanding this form of the doctrine; for he proceeds to quote a passage from his "History," in which the doctrine he condemns is designated as that of "a mere linear progression in nature, which would place each genus in contact only with the preceding and succeeding ones." Now the series treated of in the text agrees with this linear progression in nothing whatever but in being a progression.
229 Supra, p. 137.
_ 230 Vulgar Errors_, book v., chap. 21.
_ 231 Pharmacologia_, Historical Introduction, p. 16.
232 The author of one of the Bridgewater Treatises has fallen, as it seems to me, into a similar fallacy when, after arguing in rather a curious way to prove that matter may exist without any of the known properties of matter, and may therefore be changeable, he concludes that it can not be eternal, because "eternal (passive) existence necessarily involves incapability of change." I believe it would be difficult to point out any other connection between the facts of eternity and unchangeableness, than a strong association between the two ideas. Most of the _a priori_ arguments, both religious and anti-religious, on the origin of things, are fallacies drawn from the same source.
233 Supra, book ii., chap. v., -- 6, and chap. vii., -- 1, 2, 3, 4. See also _Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_, chap. vi.
and elsewhere.
234 It seems that this doctrine was, before the time I have mentioned, disputed by some thinkers. Dr. Ward mentions Scotus, Vasquez, Biel, Francis Lugo, and Valentia.
235 I quote this passage from Playfair's celebrated _Dissertation on the Progress of Mathematical and Physical Science_.
236 This statement I must now correct, as too unqualified. The maxim in question was maintained with full conviction by no less an authority than Sir William Hamilton. See my _Examination_, chap. xxiv.
_ 237 Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain-Avant-propos._ (uvres, Paris ed., 1842, vol. i., p. 19.)
238 This doctrine also was accepted as true, and conclusions were grounded on it, by Sir William Hamilton. See _Examination_, chap.
xxiv.
239 Not that of Leibnitz, but the principle commonly appealed to under that name by mathematicians.
_ 240 Dissertation_, p. 27.
_ 241 Hist. Ind. Sc._, Book i., chap. i.
_ 242 Novum Organum_, Aph. 75.
243 Supra, book iii., chap. vii., -- 4.
244 It is hardly needful to remark that nothing is here intended to be said against the possibility at some future period of making gold-by first discovering it to be a compound, and putting together its different elements or ingredients. But this is a totally different idea from that of the seekers of the grand arcanum.
_ 245 Pharmacologia_, pp. 43-45.
246 Vol. i., chap. 8.
_ 247 Nov. Org._, Aph. 46.
248 Playfair's _Dissertation_, sect. 4.
_ 249 Nov. Org. Renov._, p. 61.
_ 250 Pharmacologia_, p. 21.
_ 251 Pharmacologia_, pp. 23, 24.
252 Ibid., p. 28.
253 Ibid., p. 62.
254 Ibid., pp. 61, 62.
_ 255 Supra_, p. 450.
_ 256 Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind_, vol. ii., chap. 4, sect.
5.
257 "Thus Fourcroy," says Dr. Paris, "explained the operation of mercury by its specific gravity, and the advocates of this doctrine favored the general introduction of the preparations of iron, especially in scirrhus of the spleen or liver, upon the same hypothetical principle; for, say they, whatever is most forcible in removing the obstruction must be the most proper instrument of cure: such is steel, which, besides the attenuating power with which it is furnished, has still a greater force in this case from the gravity of its particles, which, being seven times specifically heavier than any vegetable, acts in proportion with a stronger impulse, and therefore is a more powerful deobstruent. This may be taken as a specimen of the style in which these mechanical physicians reasoned and practiced."-_Pharmacologia_, pp. 38, 39.
_ 258 Pharmacologia_, pp. 39, 40.
259 I quote from Dr. Whewell's _Hist. Ind. Sc._, 3d ed., i., 129.
_ 260 Hist. Ind. Sc._, i., 52.
_ 261 Nov. Org._, Aph. 60.
262 "An advocate," says Mr. De Morgan (_Formal Logic_, p. 270), "is sometimes guilty of the argument _a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_: it is his business to do for his client all that his client might _honestly_ do for himself. Is not the word in italics frequently omitted? _Might_ any man honestly try to do for himself all that counsel frequently try to do for him? We are often reminded of the two men who stole the leg of mutton; one could swear he had not got it, the other that he had not taken it. The counsel is doing his duty by his client, the client has left the matter to his counsel. Between the unexecuted intention of the client, and the unintended execution of the counsel, there may be a wrong done, and, if we are to believe the usual maxims, no wrong-doer."
The same writer justly remarks (p. 251) that there is a converse fallacy, _a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid_, called by the scholastic logicians _fallacia accidentis_; and another which may be called _a dicto secundum quid ad dictum secundum alterum quid_ (p. 265). For apt instances of both, I must refer the reader to Mr. De Morgan's able chapter on Fallacies.
263 An example of this fallacy is the popular error that _strong_ drink must be a cause of _strength_. There is here fallacy within fallacy; for granting that the words "strong" and "strength" were not (as they are) applied in a totally different sense to fermented liquors and to the human body, there would still be involved the error of supposing that an effect must be like its cause; that the conditions of a phenomenon are likely to resemble the phenomenon itself; which we have already treated of as an _a priori_ fallacy of the first rank. As well might it be supposed that a strong poison will make the person who takes it strong.
264 In his later editions, Archbishop Whately confines the name of Petitio Principii "to those cases in which one of the premises either is manifestly the same in sense with the conclusion, or is actually proved from it, or is such as the persons you are addressing are not likely to know, or to admit, except as an inference from the conclusion; as, _e.g._, if any one should infer the authenticity of a certain history, from its recording such and such facts, the reality of which rests on the evidence of that history."
265 No longer even a probable hypothesis, since the establishment of the atomic theory; it being now certain that the integral particles of different substances gravitate unequally. It is true that these particles, though real _minima_ for the purposes of chemical combination, may not be the ultimate particles of the substance; and this doubt alone renders the hypothesis admissible, even as an hypothesis.
_ 266 Hist. Ind. Sc._, i., 34.
267 "And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin."
268 Some arguments and explanations, supplementary to those in the text, will be found in _An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_, chap. xxvi.