"There might be persons, however, who thought that Jesus suffered death very wrongfully although he never pretended literally to perform those miracles. Yea I conceive it possible that when this language was first adopted, i. e. of his feeding the hungry, opening the eyes of the blind, raising the dead, &c. it was not understood, nor meant to be understood literally. Therefore although the account at first might have been _literally false_, though not so much so as what it grew to be afterward, yet it might have been considered _spiritually true_; and therefore not designed absolutely to deceive. The only difficulty, i.e. the only irreconcilable difficulty, which I conceive in the case, is in supposing that the first disciples could be made to believe in the resurrection, by any evidence which could have existed, and yet the resurrection not to be true. But we must suppose this, I think, in order to raise a reasonable doubt of the truth of the resurrection.
For, if the disciples did not believe it, they could have had no interest or motive, (or certainly no justifiable motive) in making others believe it; and without this, it is difficult to account even for the existence of such a report. I should not think it so strange, however, that others, after the report was once in circulation, and that even St. Paul himself should have been made to believe this, merely by some visionary scene.
"I think therefore the question may be reduced to this point. Which of the two is the most _incredible_, either that the first disciples should absolutely believe in the resurrection, by any evidence which did not grow out of this truth, or that the resurrection should have been absolutely true?
"Here is where the two propositions, when reduced to their simplicity must finally come. And I contend that when two propositions are thus clearly placed before the mind or understanding, whether the judgment be right or wrong, the mind or understanding must reject, yea it is impossible to avoid rejecting, that which to the mind or understanding, is the most incredible.
"But when we admit that the disciples did believe in the resurrection, we are not obliged to admit that they had all or any of the evidences of that fact which have come down to us. This we may suppose might have been mostly or altogether fictitious; written by later hands, and attributed to the apostles. And here we must not suppose that the account was altogether made up at once, but grew gradually; and not to come out in writing until the persons, who could either attest or deny the literal truth of these facts, were taken off of the stage. Here as it respects the records also, the same question again occurs. Which is the most _incredible_ (not to _miraculous_, for one miracle is no more miraculous, that I know of than another; I therefore say which is the most _incredible_) that such histories should have been thus, or in some other way got up, and be believed, altho' the various accounts, so far as they relate to miracles, and other circumstances necessary to be taken into the account only for the sake of supporting the truth of those miracles, should have been altogether fictitious, and such parts only true as could be accounted for in a rational way, without admitting the existence of miracles; or that all those miracles, or at least the most essential of them, should have been literally and absolutely true? The answer to these two propositions, i. e. the above questions, will, and must, decide the whole controversy.
"Now, were it not for the internal evidences which the writings of the New Testament do, and ever will, possess (the external evidences falling so far short of being conclusive in my mind, as I shall show more fully hereafter, when I come to speak of those evidences) I should still be inclined, in my own understanding, to reject the latter proposition in each of the above questions, and adhere to the former.--Much of the external evidence, I am very ready to admit is perfectly consistent with the supposed truth of the internal, but after all, in my humble opinion, it does not quite come to the point.
But the internal evidence, I confess, I cannot withstand. The more I investigate the subject, the more I discover its force, its clearness, and its irresistibility; and although the truth it unfolds is so august, so momentous, so astonishingly and inexpressibly sublime, that it is with the profoundest and most reverential awe I speak, when I acknowledge my faith in the divine origin of those testimonies; yet, as I cannot resist their force, so I am obliged to acknowledge them true. The illusion, however, if it be one, I know is happifying to the mind; but this is no good reason, that I know of, why we should either embrace it ourselves, or propagate it in the world. Although I have endeavoured to calm my conscience, while meditating on my doubts, with the consideration that I am not accountable for the truth or the falsity of the scriptures; yet, I must confess, this did not fully satisfy my mind; and therefore I come to a determination to be more thoroughly persuaded of their truth, if possible, or else be more thoroughly convinced of their fallacy. With this motive I entered on the present controversy; and I feel very happy in its termination, having been much strengthened in my faith thereby, and humbly pray, that should it ever come before the public, it may be blest to the benefit of others.
"2d. What you have said on the divine mission, &c. of the apostles is satisfactory. For although it has not fully come to my question, yet it has had the same good effect by convincing me that my question went a little beyond the bounds of reason; for it was too much like asking a blind man how it is that other men see! It is not reasonable to suppose that the apostles themselves could have informed persons who were uninspired to their understanding, how or by what means, they were inspired. It was sufficient to demonstrate the fact by the works which they were enabled to perform, (admitting the account true,) in the name of JESUS.
"3d. My argument respecting a hope of future existence has been extended rather beyond my design. Without taking up time to recapitulate, I will only say I admit the truth of your argument on this subject; neither do I see how it stands altogether in opposition to mine. What I contend for is this. The idea of non-existence, i.e.
of existing only in God, without retaining our individual consciousness of being, does not, like the idea of endless misery, absolutely destroy our present comforts. It only cuts short, or else prevents, future prospects. If it can be demonstrated, as I believe it can, that God is good to the animal creation, in giving them existence, on the supposition, that they have no future state, I contend that man is equally, if not more abundantly blessed, even on the same supposition.--But I never meant to contend that eternal life would not be still infinitely better, according to our conceptions of good, if true. To state a case, which will illustrate in some degree my ideas of this subject, the following may come something nigh it; viz. I should be pleased with the idea of living, say, ten years, in reference only to the blessing of this life, although I might know I should die at that time, provided that, during the ten years, I should enjoy the common blessings of life. This does not prevent my desiring to live longer; neither does a certain knowledge that I shall not prevent me from desiring to live, nor from being pleased with the idea of living, till that time. But let me know for a certainty, or, which would be the same thing to me, let me absolutely believe that I should live fifty years, and that although the ten first would be attended with all the common blessings of life, as usual, yet that the remaining forty years, which would be the remaining whole of my natural life, I should be placed in the most distressed and aggravated circumstances, of which I could possibly conceive; now, in reference to the whole fifty years, could I desire to live? No! I say, I rather choose instant death!
"When I look around on the circumstances and condition of men, I am so fully convinced that the aggregate of happiness so far overbalances the aggregate of misery, that I am firmly of opinion, yea, I do not entertain the least possible doubt of its truth, and therefore think I ever shall contend, that this life is a blessing, and we have abundant reason to be very thankful for it, without the least reference to a future state. But, nevertheless, I am very ready to admit, that, when futurity and immortality are taken into the account, and are connected with the same view of the character of the Deity, these blessings are all extended and magnified to infinity.
"But on the supposition that truth is any where connected with _endless misery_, the scene is wholly changed. On this supposition I am not reconciled to truth at all; I can find nothing in my moral nature, which I call good, but what stands directly opposed to it; Hence, the very brightest and most brilliant part of the picture is deformed by the awful idea; it takes away all the pleasure of investigation, and if this be truth, my only desire and prayer to God, is that I might be permitted to remain eternally ignorant of it! It is my confidence therefore in the goodness of the truth, and this only, which has reconciled my mind to it. You may contend that I have not obtained this confidence without the knowledge of divine revelation.
Be that as it may; on this supposition only I am reconciled, and something must destroy this confidence before I can become unreconciled to truth. I think now I must be fully understood, and will therefore add no more on this subject.
"4th. What you say under the fourth article is satisfactory. Errors, no doubt, may be, and often are committed by applying instructions 'differently from their primary design.'
"5th. Your remarks under the sixth article are very judicious. Much injury no doubt is often done to the truth of divine revelation by contending so tenaciously as some do for things, which, if true, are not essential to its support.--It is often the case that, by trying to prove too much, we weaken the evidence, in the minds of many, respecting the main thing we wish to establish. Hence, the opposer, not being able, or else not disposed, to make proper distinction, considers it all of one piece; and not being able to see the propriety of many things, which are contended for with equal zeal, sets the whole down as a fallacy.
"6th. It is true, I thought you strained the argument a little too far in supposing that the apostles could not have been convinced of the truth of the resurrection by any evidence which could be counterbalanced. This induced me to state that supposed absurdity in still more glaring colors, with a hope that you would thereby be induced to take a review of your argument, and not without some expectation, that you would be able to see some defects in it. But in this I have been disappointed. You still hold on upon your argument, and turn the error wholly on your friend.
"But, as this is the turning point, I shall not blame you for straining every nerve, and holding on upon every fibre which gives you the least possible support.
"It would not do for you to give up the idea that the apostles could not have been convinced of the truth of the resurrection by any evidence which could have existed short of the fact's being true; (which, by the way, was what I meant by the first member of my criticism, though not exactly so expressed;) for the moment this is admitted, doubt and unbelief will soon contend that they were so convinced. Imagination may soon call up such evidence in the mind, without supposing any thing miraculous, and all the rest of the account may be supposed to be fictitious. I did not mean to insinuate, however, that you have contended that the apostles must have seen Jesus rise in order to be convinced of the fact. I suppose their seeing him after he was risen was as full a demonstration to them as though they had seen him rise. And if they could not have been convinced of its truth by any thing short of this, then they could not be convinced by any thing short of the fact; i.e. what was the same to them as the fact. The second member of my criticism, viz. 'If the fact did exist there is no evidence which can counterbalance it,' does not, as I conceive, suppose that you contend 'that the fact of the resurrection could not exist without proving itself to the apostles in such a way that no evidence could counterbalance it;' but it supposes that if the fact did exist, no evidence could prove that it did not exist, as it is always difficult to prove a negative, and utterly impossible when the positive is true.--Hence my conclusion; viz. As the apostles were convinced of the truth of the resurrection, which they could not have been only by evidence which could not have existed had not the fact been true, the fact did exist. How far does this criticism fall short of my other? (for it is exactly what I meant by my other.) Or how far does it go beyond your argument?
"Finally, I cannot conceive of any evidence that could sufficiently support the fact that Jesus who was crucified, did actually rise from the dead, if nothing could be brought to counterbalance it, that could possibly admit of being counterbalanced; and again: 'Thus we are brought to the suggestion, that any evidence which could be sufficient to prove such a fact, if no evidence appeared against it, must be such as admits, of no refutation.'
"Unless it may be reasonably supposed that the apostles were not absolutely so guarded against an error of this kind as this argument suggests, I know of no way to withstand its force. And I am sure I feel no disposition to withstand it, even against probability. It is the improbability of the fact it goes to prove, i. e. in my mind, that ever induced me to oppose it.
"I shall now take notice of the external evidence in support of the truth of divine revelation, which you have quoted from Paley in his view of the evidences of christianity.
"In your reply to my seventh number, you mentioned a quotation from the epistle of Barnabas, St. Paul's companion, in the following words, 'Let us therefore, beware lest it come upon us, _as it is written_, there are many called, few chosen.' The object of this quotation is to prove that the gospel of Matthew (from which here is a quotation) was written before this epistle, and here appealed to as to a book of divine authority. And although it is perfectly consistent with such a supposition, yet there is great room to doubt whether such was the fact. Or, at least, there is room to conjecture that the gospel of Matthew might have been written before this epistle, and yet not written till after the destruction of Jerusalem.
"Speaking of the writers of this period, Dr. Priestly observes[7] 'The oldest work of the age, if it had been genuine, is that which goes by the name of _The epistle of Barnabas_. Whoever was the author of this epistle, it was probably written soon after the destruction of Jerusalem.--It abounds with interpretations of the Old Testament which discover more of imagination, than judgement.' By this you will perceive that the authority of this epistle is doubtful. I should also have gathered the same idea, from what Paley himself says, whose work I have examined, on this subject, since I wrote my last number. It might have been written at a much later period than what is supposed and palmed upon Barnabas; and therefore does not, as was supposed, absolutely prove that the gospel of Matthew was written prior to the destruction of Jerusalem. It seems that christians of a later period were in the habit of palming works upon their predecessors; or in other words, writing in their name. After speaking of the epistle of Clemens, Priestly observes (p. 301) there is extant another epistle ascribed to this Clemens, but it is evidently spurious, and was probably written in the middle of the third century. Several other writings were palmed upon him also, especially the _Apostolical Constitution_ and the _Clementine homilies_. The epistle of Barnabas, it seems, is first quoted by Clement of Alexandria, A.D. 194. This certainly gives room for my conjecture for aught which appears to the contrary, it might have been written a whole century after the days of the apostles.
[Footnote 7: Ch. Hist. vol. i. p. 200.]
"The next which Paley mentions is an epistle written by Clement, bishop of Rome. This is the same which Priestly calls _Clemens_. 'This epistle,' he says, 'was held in the highest esteem by all christians, and, like the scriptures, was publicly read in many churches.' In this epistle of _Clement_, you say, 'he quotes Matt. v. 7. xviii. 6.' But how does he quote those passages? Not as the writing of Matthew, but as the words of 'our Lord.' Although this therefore, as I have before suggested, is perfectly consistent with the supposed truth, it falls far short, in my mind, of proving that the gospel of Matthew, was written before this epistle. Clement or Clemens might have written this by tradition even if he had never seen the gospel of Matthew, or any other. It only proves that these words in the gospel and those in the epistle were indebted to the same original source, viz. the words of Jesus. I am not disposed to dispute, however, the genuineness of this epistle. 'It is an earnest dissuasive,' says Priestly, 'from the spirit of faction, which appeared in the church of Corinth, and which, indeed, was sufficiently conspicuous when Paul wrote his epistles.'
"'Another work of doubtful authority,' says Priestly, 'is _the Shepherd of Hermes_, by some thought to be that Hermes who is mentioned by Paul in his epistle to the Romans; but by others supposed to be either spurious, or to have been written by a later Hermes, or rather Hermes, brother of Pius, bishop of Rome, about the year 140.
Whoever was the author of this work (and though it was so much esteemed by many christians, as to be publicly read in their churches) it is certainly a very poor performance.' If this work therefore be of so late a date, as, according to this account, it may be, and, from all which appears to the contrary, we may presume it is, as the first quotation of it is by Irenaeus, A. D. 178, it falls short of the proof we want.
"The same observations will apply to the allusions to the gospels in the epistles of _Ignatius_, as was mentioned in regard to the epistle of _Clement_. They are not literal quotations, and therefore might have been only traditions. I consider them no certain proof that the gospels were written previous to this time, though it is very natural to suppose _that_ to have been the fact. The same will apply to the epistle of _Polycarp_, as we know not exactly what was meant at that time by the scriptures; neither do allusions to certain passages in the scriptures, especially such as the words of Jesus, prove the existence of those scriptures at that time.
"In the time of Eusebius there were extant _five books of Papias, bishop of_ Hierapolis in Syria, of _the interpretation of the divine oracles_. 'Papias,' says Priestly, 'was a great collector of the sayings of the apostles; and one of the traditions preserved by him was that, after the resurrection, Christ would reign upon earth a thousand years, an opinion which, from his authority, was long respected by many.'[8] Papias, it seems, is the first who speaks of the gospels by name, and he mentions only Matthew and Mark. That all the gospels, however, existed in his day, and also bore the names which they now do, I should not be disposed to dispute; neither is there any thing to contradict the idea of their being written by the persons reputed to be the authors of them.
[Footnote 8: Ch. Hist. vol. i. p. 203 Euseb. Hist. Lib. iii. Cap. 39 p. 135.]
"But, supposing a few of these first bishops had taken it into ther heads, having succeeded so well, during a little respite from persecution, in consequence of those troublesome times at the destruction of Jerusalem, as to get appointed to their respective offices, and thinking it would lead greatly to their future success, I say, supposing they had taken it into their heads to write the four gospels and the acts of the apostles themselves, embracing all the traditions, which they knew, of the apostles, dressed up in the figurative style in which those things, even from the first, had been reported, together with many fictions of their own. And that they did write these books in the name of the apostles; who would be likely, or would be able, to contradict them? Or supposing, without any previous concert, some one should have written the gospel of Matthew; another, after having seen it, should write one in the name of Mark; a third, who had seen them both, should write that of Luke, and the acts of the apostles; and a fourth should write that of John.--These, of course, would make their first appearance at different times, and in different parts of the country; or, in other words, in different countries. Some story or other might have been got up, in regard to their first discovery, which should go currently with the common people, and which, after the works were received as canonical, would of course be done away.
"As a justification of the above hypothesis (which I am very sensible is not without its difficulties) in addition to what have said in regard to the writings palmed upon Clemens, I will mention the following from Priestly's Ch. Hist. vol. ii. p. 412. It appears to have been a quotation from Sozomen, by Socrates, Lib. vii. chap. 19, p. 307. '_The revelation of Peter_, which is rejected as a spurious book by the ancients, is read once every year in some churches in Palestine on good Friday, which is a religious fast in commemoration of our Lord's sufferings. The book that is called the _revelation of the apostle Paul_, which was unknown to the ancients, is greatly commended by many of the monks. Some say that this book was first found in the reign of Theodosius. For they say that in the house of Paul at Tarsus, there was a marble chest in a subterraneous place, in which this book was deposited, and that it was discovered by a particular revelation.'
"Any work of this kind, got up at so late a period as that of the reign of Theodosius, would not be likely to be generally received among the churches; yet if it could be received by any, why might not a similar work, or similar works, which made their appearance so soon after the apostles, as might well be supposed to have been written by them and when too, the churches were few in number, without the least suspicion of fraud, have been received by all? Or if any fraud had been suspected, yet, believing in the main thing which all these were designed to support, those frauds whatever they _were_, might have been considered really _pious_!
"But, sir, you will perceive that I am not altogether pleased, nor fully satisfied, with this argument. I know it has its difficulties; but the question is, whether it has greater than the one which it is brought to oppose? The question is _not_, whether these things look probable? For I acknowledge they do not look probable. But the question is, which is the most _incredible_; either that the above hypothesis, or something like it, should be true; or else that the extraordinary miracles, related in the books referred to, should be true? If there were no better evidence in favor of the miracles than that which I have been examining, I should be obliged to decide against the latter, let me think what I might respecting the former.
The most that we can say of this testimony is, it does not contradict the truth of those histories, but, so far as it goes, it is perfectly consistent with the truth of the main question. The weight of this testimony therefore, whatever it is, seems to be on the side of the truth of christianity.
"But what carries the most conviction to my mind is _not_ who wrote those books; not the manner in which they have been handed down to us, nor in which they can now be traced to the apostles; but the manner in which the _story itself is_ told. It must be confessed that, excepting a few things, which may be supposed to have been early interpolations, it carries in it all the internal marks of TRUTH. When this is admitted, we must also admit the propriety of bringing in these external evidences as auxiliaries; and when we find that they also, instead of being contradictory _to_, are perfectly consistent _with_ the supposed truth, they add _not a little_ to the weight of testimony. Hence we find that our faith is strengthened by the consideration of circumstances, which would not have been sufficient, in themselves alone, to have originated, or produced, that faith. The question may be still asked, why do you now believe? To which I give this plain and simple answer. It is because, notwithstanding the _incredibility_ of the miracles of Christ, and of the apostles, and the resurrection, the truth of which these miracles go to confirm and substantiate; yet, the idea that this story should ever have been told in the manner it is, without having truth for its foundation, in spite of all my _incredibility_, is still more _incredible_! And it is my humble opinion that whoever will give themselves the trouble, to pay the same attention to the subject, must be of the same opinion: for, I am inclined to think that no one has been more predisposed to unbelief. Not that I ever felt any real opposition to the truth of the holy scriptures, as I now understand them, but I did not wish to be deceived. I had rather that my hopes and expectations should never be raised, than to have them raised upon a fruitless or spurious foundation.
"But after all, it will be perceived that I make no pretensions to a _miraculous_, or _mysterious_, conversion. My conversion, whatever it is, is altogether rational. It grows out of the evidence which I plainly have before my eyes. And it is my humble opinion that those who pretend to such conversions ought to be able to confirm the same by miracles, the same as the truth was first confirmed; and unless they can do it, it ought to be considered as nothing more than mere _pretension_.--According to the ideas of some, and of much too of that which is termed _orthodox_, every conversion is as much a _miracle_ as was the resurrection of Christ. But as this is a fact, which if true, is entirely out of sight of the unconverted, and of which they can form no conception, nor judge of it in any sense whatever, is it not reasonable that they should have a demonstration of its truth, by some fact, of the truth of which they can judge, that they may know that the work is of God? And until we have such demonstration, may we not consider all such pretensions to be of men?
"With these remarks I hasten to a _CONCLUSION_.
"In taking leave of this subject, considering it probable that these letters will, at some future time, come before the public, it is but just that I should more fully avow my motives in this controversy. You will have perceived, all along, the ground on which I stood. I have endeavoured to personate an honest inquirer after truth; but one who was filled with doubts concerning every thing of which there is not positive demonstration. How far I have acted up to such a character, you and the public can best judge.
"I thought, however, I should be the most likely to do this, by bringing those objections, and these only, which, at one time or another, have occupied my own mind. But, that the controversy might not appear as a mere _farce_, or like a man raising objections against himself (in which case he generally takes care to raise none but what he thinks he can answer) and that I might engage all your interest and energy on the subject, I have carried the idea, through the whole, both by my letters and by my private conversation with you during the time (as you very well know) that those objections were now laboring in my mind with all their force. I have therefore endeavoured to dispute every inch of ground, and give way only as I found myself obliged to give way, by the force of your arguments. That I have not acted my part better must be imputed to want of ability and not to want of good will. I have endeavoured to throw every block in your way which I could think of, without deviating from the character which I had assumed; and that I have not made your task more arduous, is because I did not see how I could do it without betraying a manifest dishonesty on my part. The result is such as I anticipated.
"My real motive must be my only apology for the part I have taken. You know that no work of the kind has ever been really and seriously attempted by any one who is avowedly of our order; that our religious opponents are continualiy throwing the gauntlet of aspersions at us, as being nothing more than mere pretenders to christianity, but in reality, _Deists_ in disguise. To repel, therefore, those charges, as well as to let the unbelieving world know our views on this subject, I thought a work of this kind was really needed. And it appeared to me that the work, in the first place, would be more likely to be read, and, in the end, more sure of success, to have it come forth by the way of controversy, than what it would in any other way.
"It is true, I may not have brought all the objections which some would wish to have brought; but if what I have brought are so far removed as not to remain a serious obstacle in the mind of candid readers (which I conclude will be the case, with others, as it is with me) then all objections may be as easily removed.
"That this work may be an instrument, in the hands of God, of removing the prejudices from the minds of many of our religious opponents, of strengthening the faith of many who are wavering, and, as it were, halting between two opinions, and of calling up the attention of those who, like Gallis, 'care for none of these things,' is the sincere prayer of:
"Yours in the bonds of the gospel.
"A. KNEELAND."
LETTER IX.
_Dear sir, and brother_,--A careful perusal of your tenth number has given me much satisfaction, and seems to suggest that my reply may be general. You discover the rational ground on which your scruples are removed, and state no difficulty that you do not surmount.
I agree with you, that the gloomy doctrine of eternal misery, when by the imagination it becomes incorporated into the system of divine revelation, "reverses the whole scene," and renders that, which in its divine and native beauty possesses the most powerful attractions, the most deformed picture that ever repelled the human affections. It is this heaven-dishonouring doctrine, so repugnant to and irreconcilable with the known goodness of God manifested to all nations in his divine providence, that has, more than any thing else, so buffeted all the best feelings of man, as in thousands of instances to drive the heart of benevolence to lay aside the scriptures to whose authority this unmerciful doctrine has been erroneously ascribed.
But let the scriptures be once considered as free from the above horrible sentiment as in reality they are, they will then perfectly correspond with the demonstrations of universal benevolence and grace, rendered conspicuous in all the ways of God; they will also compare as a perfect transcript of that inward light and love which renders man an image of his ever adorable Creator.
As the christian church emerges from the city of mystery Babylon and its suburbs, and advances into the light of the wisdom of God, the doctrine above mentioned loses its influence and its votaries; nor will it be in the power of our self-styled orthodox clergy, long to chain the public mind to such a forbidding absurdity.
Nothing discovers the deplorable state of depravity, to which the human mind is subject, by force of tradition, more than the unnatural and absurd notion of enhancing future bliss, by beholding fellow creatures of the nearest connexion in a state of indescribable misery, there to remain time without end!
It seems to us astonishing that parents were ever capable of causing their children to pass through the fire to an idol, but what is this compared with what our pious fathers and mothers have believed concerning their children's sufferings in the eternal world, for the glory of that God who is the Father of the spirits of all flesh?