"6. The Indian Divisions should be moved to the neighbourhood of Lille as soon as the Field Marshal reports that they are ready.
"The G.O. C.-in-C. hopes that these proposals are in accordance with the views expressed by the Field Marshal in his letter of September 30th, and he would be glad to be assured of this as soon as possible in order that steps may be taken to execute them.
(Signed) "J. JOFFRE."
I acknowledged the above in these terms:--
"October 1st, 1914.
"The Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces has duly received the note dated October 1st, 1914, from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
"He is extremely glad to find that the proposals contained in his last note meet with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief.
"Such modifications as are suggested in the present note are perfectly feasible, and Sir John French will give immediate effect to them.
"The necessary orders were issued to-day, and the preliminary movements are now in progress.
"The Field Marshal hopes that the 2nd Cavalry Division will commence its march towards Lille on the morning of October 3rd."
CHAPTER VIII.
THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP.
In our appreciation of the situation at British Headquarters on October 1st it was considered that the reduction of Antwerp was at this moment the great objective of the enemy. Personally, I had no reason to think that Antwerp was in any immediate danger, and therefore a message which I received from the Secretary of State on October 2nd came as a most disagreeable surprise.
I was informed that a serious situation had been created at Antwerp, which was in grave danger of falling in a short time.
Further information reached me at 3 a.m. on the 3rd from London that the Belgian Government, acting on the advice unanimously given by the Superior Council of War in the presence of the King, had decided to leave at once for Ostend. It was further stated that the King, with the Field Army, would withdraw from Antwerp in the direction of Ghent to protect the coast-line and in the hope of being able to co-operate with the Allied Armies. The message added that the town could hold out for five or six days, and that the decision to evacuate was taken very seriously as a result of the increasingly critical situation.
It is needless to say that I was perturbed on receipt of this news, It was difficult to understand why the Belgians, who had fought so well at Liege, were unable to do more in defence of a fortress which was much stronger, and situated, moreover, in a position where it could be supported by the British Fleet.
I fully realised the consequence of the capture and occupation of Antwerp by the Germans. It was impossible to say how much of the coast-line the captured _terrain_ would include, but there could be no doubt that the Channel ports would be gravely imperilled.
Operating from such a base, there would appear to be no insuperable obstacle to an immediate German advance on Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. The Belgian Army was in no condition to resist such an advance. The occupation of these places and the formation of a defensive line which would include the whole of the Pas-de-Calais, might become a _fait accompli_ before the troops could arrive from the main theatres to prevent it.
But here, again, we have an example of the over-confidence which for ever possessed that army which set out for "world conquest." As on the Marne, so at Antwerp, they were not prepared to seize the psychological moment and to play boldly for the great stake.
It is seldom that fortune offers another chance to a military leader who has once failed to gather the rich harvest which she has put into his grasp. Yet the German Emperor presents, together with his great General Staff, one of the few instances in history of a Commander-in-Chief so soon being given a splendid opportunity to retrieve such mistakes as those of September 5th and 6th.
With all these tragic possibilities in my mind in these early October days, I redoubled my endeavours to effect a speedy move of the British forces to the north. Added to the other cogent reasons to which I referred in the last chapter was now the most vital of all--the relief of Antwerp.
Lord Kitchener did not make things easy for me.
Keenly desirous to influence the course of operations, his telegrams followed one after another each containing "directions" regarding a local situation of which, in London, he could know very little.
For instance, in one message he told me he was communicating with General Joffre and the French Government, but, as he did not do so through me, I was quite unaware of what was passing between them, yet all the time he was urging me to make what I knew to be impracticable suggestions to General Joffre. This could only lead to misunderstandings and confusion of ideas, and I must repudiate any responsibility whatever for what happened in the north during the first ten days of October. I was explicitly told by the Secretary of State for War that the British troops operating there were not under my command, as the following telegram shows:--
"Have already given Rawlinson temporary rank. I am sending him instructions regarding his action Antwerp. The troops employed there will not for the present be considered part of your force."
Rawlinson, I may remark, had been sent for to meet the 7th Division at Ostend and take command of it.
Had I been left to exercise my full functions as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in France, I should certainly have made different dispositions with regard to the disposal of these troops. I regret that I must record my deliberate opinion that the best which could have been done throughout this critical situation was _not_ done, owing entirely to Lord Kitchener's endeavour to unite in himself the separate and distinct _roles_ of a Cabinet Minister in London and a Commander-in-Chief in France. I feel it only right and in the interest of my country, with a view to any war we may be engaged in in the future, to make this plain statement of fact. The calamity at Sedan was due in part to interference from Paris with the Army in the field, and the American Civil War was more than probably prolonged by the repeated interference on the part of the Secretary of State with the Commanders in the field.
As to the method of employing the 7th Infantry and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, the following telegram will show that the French Commander-in-Chief completely concurred in my views:--
"General Commanding-in-Chief to Col. Huguet, October 8th, 8.45 a.m.:--
"The Commander-in-Chief has the honour to inform Marshal French that he entirely agrees with the ideas on the subject of employing the whole of the British Forces united.
"He estimates that, in the actual situation of Antwerp, the reinforcement of the garrison by the 7th English Division will not have any effect on the fate of the place.
"In these conditions he believes on the contrary that it is very advantageous that this English Division should unite as early as possible with the main body of the British Forces in the northern zone.
"Will the Marshal be kind enough to inform Lord Kitchener of the Commander-in-Chief's views of the situation?
"He will ask the President of the Republic to confirm these views to the British War Minister."
As to the confusion of ideas to which I have referred, the following telegram which I found it necessary to address to the Commander of the 7th Division, Sir Henry Rawlinson, will show that it existed up to the 11th instant:--
"Your message No. 19, addressed to Lord Kitchener and repeated to me, received. I really do not understand whether you regard yourself as under my orders or not; but if you do, please be good enough to explain your situation clearly without delay, as I have no knowledge of any necessity for your re-embarkation or of your intention to do so.
"Hazebrouck will be in occupation of the 3rd Corps to-morrow morning.
"Be good enough to answer me by some means at once, as my own and General Joffre's plans are much put out and perhaps compromised by all this misunderstanding."
To this Rawlinson replied that he was under my orders, and proceeded to give me the information I requested.
Such, then, was the general atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty in which I had to work after the fall of Antwerp until towards the 10th of the month (October), when at length the Secretary of State for War consented to allow me full liberty of action to direct the movements of all British Forces in France.
Some 3,000 marines had been landed in Dunkirk towards the end of September and, when Antwerp was threatened, Lord Kitchener--saying nothing of it to me--arranged with General Joffre that the latter should send one or two French Territorial Divisions to join them and act with them.
The first intimation I had of this was a wire from Lord Kitchener, received late at night on October 3rd, which ran as follows:--
"I do not know when the two Divisions promised by the French Government from Havre will be able to start.
"Could you ascertain this and let me know your views on the situation and how you contemplate acting?"
To this I replied in the early hours of the 4th:--
"I do not know what has passed direct between English and French Governments, but French General Headquarters told me positively in answer to repeated enquiry that they are only sending one Territorial Division from Havre to Ostend, which they say is to start at once by sea.
"With reference to the last sentence in your message 1315, please refer to my message F272 dispatched last night at 7.30. I shall get report from officer I sent yesterday to Bruges and Antwerp directly and will wire again."
That part of my message F272 (referred to above), which bears on the subject, runs as follows:--