Clinton called me that afternoon to brief me on the preparations and to deliver my invitation. I spent the following days discussing steps that could be taken to ensure progress with fellow Arab leaders. I met with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia; King Hamad Al Khalifa of Bahrain; and the emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah. I also consulted on the phone with King Mohammed VI of Morocco and Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. None of us had any illusions as to how difficult the situation was. But most were of the view that despite the apparent concessions the Palestinians had to make by engaging in the negotiations without a full settlement freeze or terms of reference or even an agenda for the negotiations, the talks represent an opportunity that must be supported.
I left for Washington on August 29. Before leaving, I felt it was important to address the Israeli public directly, to try to explain how important it was for them to support courageous decisions. In an interview with Israeli television that aired on August 28, I said that more than ever, we needed politicians with backbones who were prepared to make the difficult decisions necessary for peace. And because politicians tend to get nervous when they face issues of any real magnitude or controversy, they would need to know they had the support of the people to muster up the courage to move forward.
Unfortunately, people on both sides had lost faith in the process. Failure to deliver over numerous rounds of previous talks had led to an alarming erosion of public support for negotiations. Since the Oslo Accords, Israel had gradually shifted to the right-abandoning the Labor Party in favor of more nationalist and religious alternatives. Many of those who had supported the peace process after Rabin's assassination had given up hope or left the country. The Arab world had also been shaken by decades of false promises and reversals. The "security barrier," the land seizures and arbitrary arrests, the Gaza war and the invasion of Lebanon had all taken their toll-and so too had the climate of suspicion and antagonism surrounding the Iraq War. Skepticism was particularly high this time around due to Netanyahu's reputation as an uncompromising hard-liner and to the perception that the Palestinians had been forced to make major concessions by giving up on the requirement that settlement activities halt before talks could begin.
I knew that by supporting direct talks against the backdrop of such public opposition, Mubarak, Abbas, and I would lose political capital among our people, who did not believe much would come out of the negotiations. But we felt the price of abandoning this last chance was too great. We could not afford another period of U.S. disengagement. Here we had a U.S. president who was putting his personal weight behind the process. We could not throw this opportunity away; it would only benefit the spoilers. When I had seen Obama in Washington in April 2009, I had told him that this time the Arabs would not leave him to do the heavy lifting on his own. We were at a decisive crossroads. And we had to make sure we moved in the right direction.
All eyes were on us when Obama, Mubarak, Abbas, Netanyahu, and I walked through the door to a room full of cameras at the White House on the evening of September 1. We were there to send a message of hope and to show that serious action was being taken to resolve a conflict that had for decades evaded the efforts of many good men. That was not an easy message to send amid the general mood of disappointment and disbelief prevailing in the region. People wanted action, not words, and action was what we hoped to achieve in the intense rounds of discussions that would immediately follow. President Obama spoke of his unwavering commitment to resolving the conflict. Mubarak was clear in stressing Arab support for a solution, and I pointed to the difficulties ahead but warned of the disastrous consequences of failure. Netanyahu went to extreme lengths to present himself as a man of peace and addressed Abbas directly, saying he came to Washington to work for a historic peace. Abbas was grand and said he wanted dignity, freedom, and peace for his people and for the Israelis alike.
The public speeches were followed by a dinner hosted by President Obama. Abbas and Netanyahu sat next to each other. Obama emphasized the need for the two leaders to help each other succeed, and said that we would all be there with them as they moved on the difficult path of peace. Abbas and Netanyahu engaged in serious discussions throughout the dinner. Could these two men succeed in brokering a peace deal that would finally free our region from the threat of war? We would have to wait and see. A litmus test was only twenty-three days away. On September 26, the partial moratorium on the building of settlements that Netanyahu had announced in November would expire. The future of the negotiations would hang on his decision of whether or not to renew that moratorium.
The next morning, Abbas and Netanyahu met at the State Department for the first round of negotiations. After an expanded meeting that included members of the Palestinian, Israeli, and American delegations, Netanyahu, Abbas, Clinton, and Mitchell held a smaller meeting before Abbas and Netanyahu met on their own. The parties agreed to refrain from any public statements in order to avoid any provocative announcements that could jeopardize the process. Only Senator Mitchell would make a statement to the press.
Mitchell characterized the talks as "long and productive." He reiterated his belief that the negotiations could be completed in one year and said that Abbas and Netanyahu were committed to approaching the negotiations in good faith. He reiterated their commitment to the "goal of two states for two peoples and to a solution to the conflict that resolves all issues, ends all claims, and establishes a viable state of Palestine alongside a secure state of Israel."
The parties agreed to start working on a framework for a permanent status agreement. Abbas and Netanyahu agreed to meet every two weeks, and the next meeting was set for September 14 and 15. The next round of talks took place in Sharm El Sheikh on September 14 in the presence of Clinton, and continued the next day in Jerusalem under the shadow of the fast-approaching deadline for the end of the moratorium. Mitchell was again the only one to report to the press. This time, he said that the two leaders had reiterated the commitments made in Washington and started to tackle tough issues. He said that the United States would remain engaged as a serious partner. He tried to sound optimistic, but everybody in the region was concerned that the talks were nearing collapse, as all indications from Israel were that settlement building would resume on September 26.
Once the two leaders began to tackle details, the difficulties became more apparent. Abbas told Netanyahu he wanted to move forward on final status issues and presented the Israeli prime minister with the Palestinian positions. He again suggested that they begin with borders and security. But the talks ended on a negative note as Netanyahu insisted that any security arrangement must ensure a continued Israeli presence on future Palestinian eastern and western borders to guard against potential threats. Abbas said he would agree to security mechanisms, including the presence of international forces, but could not accept the presence of any Israeli soldiers on Palestinian land.
The situation deteriorated further over the following days as Israeli politicians made inflammatory public statements saying that settlement building would resume immediately after the end of the moratorium. The Palestinians were emphatic that they would walk out of the negotiations if the Israelis did not extend the moratorium. A crisis seemed inevitable.
President Obama, like all of us, was concerned that all the difficult work that had gone into getting the two sides to the table would be useless unless we could find a way out of the moratorium dilemma. He took advantage of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York to send a powerful message about the need to proceed with the negotiations. "We believe the moratorium should be extended," he said. "We also believe that talks should press on until completed." He told all the gathered heads of state and diplomats, "This time we should search for what's best within ourselves. If we do, when we come back next year, we can have an agreement that will lead to a new member of the United Nations-an independent, sovereign state of Palestine, living in peace with Israel."
Unfortunately, the Israeli government did not heed the call of the U.S. president, of the international community, and of all of us in the region. No sooner had the moratorium ended than announcements were made that more than 840 new units would be built in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Palestinians immediately suspended the negotiations but delayed a formal decision to abandon them to give efforts to resolve the deadlock a chance.
I met Abbas on October 3, six days before a scheduled Arab summit in Libya on October 9. He was frustrated with Israel's failure to renew the moratorium for even a limited period of two to three months during which time he hoped to tackle borders. We explored creative scenarios that could offer diplomacy a new chance. The challenge was to keep the door open for a breakthrough. But the ball was in Israel's court. Before meeting Abbas that day, I received Senator Mitchell, who had just concluded rounds of talks with Israeli leaders and was set to see Abbas in Amman following our meeting. We were all committed to finding a way to break the impasse. I told him that it would be impossible for Abbas to continue with the talks if the issue of settlements was not resolved. Mitchell said he would continue his efforts.
On October 8, Abbas told the Arab League committee that he would withdraw from the negotiations if the Israeli government did not renew the moratorium on settlements. If the freeze was not extended, Abbas said the Palestinians would consider other options, starting with requesting a unilateral U.S. recognition of a Palestinian state. Should the United States refuse to do so, the Palestinians would ask the Arab League members to collectively demand a UN Security Council resolution recognizing a Palestinian state and would seek a UN General Assembly resolution to put the Palestinian Occupied Territories under a UN trusteeship if the United States vetoed such a resolution. "We have exhausted all options," Abbas said. The Arab League committee backed Abbas's decision, but decided to give the United States a month to try and salvage the negotiations before moving on to the options presented by Abbas.
As this book goes to press, direct negotiations are on the verge of collapse. We are two weeks away from the expiration of the one-month period given by the Arab League to the United States to get the negotiations back on track. Netanyahu shows no sign of compromise. His argument is that his coalition partners would not support an extension of the moratorium and his government would collapse if he pushed for such a decision. He would need to offer them sufficient incentive to convince them to extend the moratorium, incentives that the United States would have to provide in the form of a new package of financial and military assistance. In frenzied back-channel negotiations, the United States has offered major inducements to Israel to extend, even for as little as three months, the settlement freeze. But Israel, astonishingly, has so far thumbed its nose at these offers.
The United States continues to conduct extensive diplomatic efforts to break the deadlock, but the chances of success are getting slimmer by the day. Many in the Arab world are concerned that the staff changes that are expected to follow the U.S. midterm elections will give a more prominent role in the peace process to Dennis Ross, currently a special assistant to Obama. Because his hard-line positions did not help in moving the peace efforts forward in the past, the fear is that a growing influence by Ross will only be a complicating factor.
It is astonishing that a peace agreement that would open the door for Israel to have normal relations with all of its neighbors was not incentive enough for the Israeli government to give the peace talks a chance by halting settlements for even a limited period. That is a very negative signal to send to the Arab world and to all members of the international community who seek peace in the Middle East as a pillar of global stability. It is a message that will only empower those who have all along bet on our failure. It is also a major blow to all forces of moderation in the region, particularly Abbas. If the Israeli government collapses, Israelis will elect a new government. But if Abbas loses his credibility with his people or is so demoralized that he decides to step down, the whole world would lose a credible partner for peace that cannot easily be replaced.
Abbas told me personally and has made it clear in public that he will make all necessary sacrifices for peace. But he cannot do it on his own. Claims by some in Israel that he could not deliver because of the challenge to his authority by Hamas are mere excuses not to go forward. What Abbas needs is a credible deal to present to his people. Were he to secure such an agreement, he would put it to the people to vote on in a referendum. Nobody would then be able to stand between the Palestinian people and their right to freedom and statehood. But in the absence of an agreement, we will all have to reckon with the real possibility of the total collapse of public support for the peace process and the complete bankruptcy of moderate policies, setting the stage for extremists to take over.
I had hoped, when I set out to write this book, that we would by now be celebrating the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and marking a new era of comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Instead, everyone in the region increasingly fears that we will soon be plagued by yet another devastating war. Israeli policies are mainly to blame for this gloomy reality.
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So to the people of Israel I say: do not let your politicians endanger your nation's security through blind and thoughtless choices that continue to isolate your country. Almost one-third of the countries in the world do not have normal relations with Israel. Even North Korea has a better standing in the international community. A two-state solution with the Palestinians essentially means a fifty-seven-state solution, ensuring that Israel has normal relations with fifty-seven Arab and Muslim states that support the Arab Peace Initiative. If your leaders continue to choose conflict and war, each of you can make a decision to choose peace. For, in the end, only a fair peace with your neighbors can guarantee Israel the security it aspires to.
We don't need to look far into the future to see the problems on Israel's horizon. Simple demographics will alter the composition of Israeli society over the next decade. Currently, Arab Israelis make up around 20 percent of Israeli society. If there is no peace, and Israel continues to control the West Bank, then Arabs will become the majority. How will the Israeli government tackle this situation? If we fail to come to terms and to hammer out a two-state solution, which offers the promise of peace and security for all, the only other option is a one-state solution. That means that the Israeli government will have to give the Palestinians their full political rights as citizens, thereby eroding the Jewish character of the state. The other option would be for Israel to continue to disenfranchise a large proportion of its population, keeping the Palestinians under military occupation and denying them equal rights as citizens, thereby creating a new apartheid state and keeping the whole region hostage to the threat of war.
There are no alternatives. Some voices in Israel have spoken of what they call the "Jordan option," whereby Jordan would become the homeland for the Palestinians. That simply will not happen. We will not allow it; the Palestinians do not want it; and Israel cannot force it, for any attempt to do so will mean war and will expand the area of conflict. Nor will Jordan play any security role in the West Bank. We will not replace Israeli tanks with Jordanians tanks. The only role we will play is to continue to work for regional peace by helping the Palestinians in their effort to establish a viable independent state that will live in peace side by side with a secure Israel.
Israel has a clear choice. Does it want to remain fortress Israel, peering over the ramparts at increasingly hostile and aggressive neighbors? Or is it prepared to accept the hand of peace offered by all fifty-seven Muslim states and finally integrate itself into its region, accepted and accepting?
My father spent more than forty years searching for a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and for a comprehensive peace in the region. But even though he struggled until his dying day, he did not see it come to pass. My great-grandfather, Abdullah I, was assassinated in Jerusalem, paying the ultimate price for his pursuit of peace in a climate of war. We all hope that this conflict does not claim more brave leaders and continue through future generations.
In 2009, I named my oldest son, Hussein, crown prince in accordance with the Constitution, which states that "the Royal Title shall pass from the holder of the Throne to his eldest son" but gives the king the right to select one of his brothers as heir apparent. This was a difficult decision. I would have preferred that he avoid the extra scrutiny that goes with the position, and be blessed with teen years as unpressured as mine were. But in the end I felt that it was best for the country, and for my son, to be clear about where I saw destiny taking the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Hussein is now sixteen. My most fervent hope is that when, in the fullness of time, he assumes his responsibilities, he will not be struggling with the same conflict that took his great-great-grandfather's life.
Over a decade ago, in the last months of his life, my father raised himself from his sickbed to address Yasser Arafat and Benjamin Netanyahu at the signing of the Wye Accords. He understood how fragile the dream of peace could be and was under no illusions as to the difficulties that lay ahead. He said, "I think such a step as is concluded today will inevitably trigger those who want to destroy life, destroy hope, create fear in the hearts and minds of people, and trigger in them their worst instincts. They will be skeptical on the surface, but if they can, they will cause damage, wherever they are and wherever they belong."
My father spoke at a time when trust between Israelis and Palestinians was high and many hoped the leaders on both sides would build on this foundation to achieve a lasting peace. The last decade of neglect has seen trust and hope fall to new lows and has strengthened those bent on destruction.
Every family, in East Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv, in Ramallah and in Jaffa, in the end, wants the same things: a peaceful and dignified life; the ability to fulfill their potential and to secure a better future for their children. Our better nature compels us to always look toward the light. I cannot believe that the people of Israel and Palestine want to continue to kill and be killed. We must all pray that their political leaders will give them the opportunity to live in peace and dignity.
Unless we see some positive breakthrough in the next year, I fear that we will miss our last chance for peace in a generation, and condemn our region to suffer another cycle of violence, war, and death. I fear that we are slipping into the darkness. But that does not have to be the future for our region. Our people want peace. It is our responsibility as leaders to make this much-eroded dream come true.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
Not that long ago, I was speaking to some friends about how remarkable it was to me that more than ten years had passed since I had become king. We talked about the extraordinary series of events that Jordan, the Middle East, and the world had been through in that decade and my hopes that the next ten years would see greater safety, prosperity, and opportunity for all our citizens. Most of all, we talked about my conviction that the world is at a crossroads. In early 2009, it seemed to me that the stars could be uniquely aligned to give us a chance to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to achieve the regional peace that had eluded past generations. I said that I would continue to do everything I could to make that happen.
During that discussion, one of my friends suggested that this would be a good time for me to write a book about what I had seen and done, and what I dreamed about for the future.
I had never given much thought to writing a book. My army training leads me to prefer courses of action with timelier outcomes. And besides, I thought, I'm a young man who, God willing, has only just begun his time as King of Jordan. But someone pointed out that my father had published a book, Uneasy Lies the Head Uneasy Lies the Head, in 1962, the year I was born, describing his first ten years as king. I have always found following my father's example to be a wise course, so I began to give it serious thought.
The first step was to find a publisher who might be interested in bringing this story to a wider audience, and Andrew Wylie and Scott Moyers of Wylie & Company, one of America's most respected literary agencies, helped me to navigate the complex waters of international publishing. With their help, I was introduced to Clare Ferraro and Joy de Menil of Viking Penguin. Clare immediately believed that I had a story to tell that would be of interest to the reading public and we began to work together on the process of producing a book. Joy was assigned as my editor, and throughout I have benefitted greatly from her razor-sharp intellect, broad knowledge of politics and history, and keen sense of how to present complex facts in a simple manner. She helped me pull together the threads of a varied life into a coherent narrative. Her assistant, Chris Russell, was also a tremendous help.
Relying on one's memory alone would be a very bad way to produce a memoir. I have sought the help of countless people to refresh my recollections and sharpen my judgments. I have also drawn on many documents and records from our archives to provide context, color, and clarity where memories might fade. I have endeavored to make this book as accurate as possible. But I know that whenever you have more than one person in a room, particularly when trying to reconstruct complex and important discussions on topics like Middle East peace, you can count on multiple recollections of what transpired. All I can say is that this book is my best effort to share with you my memories, impressions, and views.
Countless people played important roles in helping bring this project to fruition. Space allows me to thank by name just a few of them-but I am deeply grateful to many others whose contributions have been significant and who will go unnamed.
First, I must single out several members of my staff at the Royal Court whose contributions were extraordinary. Ayman Safadi, my adviser, has been the overall project manager, whose tireless work, energy, attention to detail, and persistence in bringing the book to a higher level made this project possible. Without his involvement, the book would never have gone to print. Mohammad Abu Taleb, keeper of the Royal Privy Purse, has been tremendously energetic, optimistic, and enthusiastic as he shepherded this complex project smoothly to a conclusion. I could not have asked for a better person to help make sure that everyone involved met their deadlines and remained focused. Nadine Khamis, projects manager at the Royal Privy Purse, has been invaluable in sorting through the complex legal nuances of publishing a book in many different countries and languages. My private secretary, Shereen Shuwayhat, did a fantastic job transcribing many, many hours of conversations, which were the basis for the written material in the book. She also helped me track down resource documents and kept track of the many drafts of the various chapters as I worked on them to make sure that I was accurately conveying my thoughts.
The chief of royal protocol, Amer Al-Fayez, and his staff, particularly Seeta Talhouni Mirza, were essential in coordinating the scores of interviews with current and former Jordanian officials to ensure that the book thoroughly reflected the views of those who were most knowledgeable about the events I describe. Widad Maria Salah and Shaza Moghraby at the Media and Communication Directorate at the Royal Court did a tremendous job in researching and reviewing materials for the book. My thanks also go to Dr. Jafar Hassan, former director of the International Affairs Directorate at the Royal Court, and as of December 14, 2009, minister of planning and international cooperation, who helped in retrieving scores of critical documents from the royal archives. Also deserving appreciation is Haron Hassan, who has helped create a Web site for the book.
Many friends, family members, and current and former Jordanian officials shared their recollections to help flesh out my memories of events past. A partial list of them includes: HM Queen Rania, HRH Princess Muna, HRH Prince Feisal, HRH Prince Ali, HRH Prince Ghazi, HH Prince Zeid, Zaid Rifai, Field Marshal Abdul Hafez Kaabneh, Dr. Samir Mutawi, General Ahmed Sarhan, Dr. Marwan Muasher, Nasser Judeh, Samir Rifai, Karim Kawar, Dr. Bassem Awadallah, Brigadier Ali Jaradat, Lt. Col. Nathem Rawashdeh, Dr. Mutayyam al O'ran, Dr. Eric Widmer, and Robert Richer.
Special thanks go to Drosten Fisher for his invaluable help with the writing of what has become Our Last Best Chance Our Last Best Chance. Drosten attended Oxford and Georgetown Universities. An Arabic speaker and a thoughtful student of the Middle East, Drosten kindly took a leave of absence from his work at a consulting firm to help me with the project. He has proven to be a terrific choice in helping me to assemble, shape, and present my thoughts on paper.
As in all things, I am enormously grateful to my extended family. Readers of this book will know that my six sisters, four brothers, and numerous aunts, uncles, and cousins have played a critical role in making me who I am and in helping me achieve whatever good I have accomplished in my life. My father, His Late Majesty King Hussein, and my mother, Her Royal Highness Princess Muna, gave me an opportunity to live an extraordinary life, to see what few have seen, and to do my best to serve the people of Jordan.
God has given me many blessings. But the greatest of all is to be husband to Rania, and father to our children Hussein, Iman, Salma, and Hashem. They are the lights of my life.