In this state of things, at 7.30 p.m. a fourth message was received, and is said by the Marconi operator Bride to have been delivered to the bridge. This message was from the steamship _Californian_ to the steamship _Antillian_, but was picked up by the _Titanic_. It was as follows:
To CAPTAIN, _Antillian_:
Six-thirty p. m., apparent ship's time; latitude 42 3' N., longitude 49 9' W. Three large bergs 5 miles to southward of us. Regards.
LORD.
Bride does not remember to what officer he delivered this message.
By the time the _Titanic_ reached the position of the collision (11.40 p. m.) she had gone about 50 miles to the westward of the indicated position of the ice mentioned in this fourth message. Thus it would appear that before the collision she had gone clear of the indicated positions of ice contained in the messages from the _Baltic_ and _Californian_. As to the ice advised by the _Caronia_ message, so far as it consisted of small bergs and field ice, it had before the time of the collision possibly drifted with the Gulf Stream to the eastward; and so far as it consisted of large bergs (which would be deep enough in the water to reach the Labrador current) it had probably gone to the southward. It was urged by Sir Robert Finlay, who appeared for the owners, that this is strong evidence that the _Titanic_ had been carefully and successfully navigated so as to avoid the ice of which she had received warning. Mr. Ismay, however, stated that he understood from the _Baltic_ message that "we would get up to the ice that night."
There was a fifth message received in the Marconi room of the _Titanic_ at 9.40 p. m. This was from a steamer called the _Mesaba_. It was in the following terms:
_From "Mesaba" to "Titanic" and all east-bound ships_:
Ice report in latitude 42 N. to 41 25' N., longitude 49 to longitude 50 30' W. Saw much heavy pack ice and great number large icebergs. Also field ice. Weather good, clear.
This message clearly indicated the presence of ice in the immediate vicinity of the _Titanic_, and if it had reached the bridge would perhaps have affected the navigation of the vessel. Unfortunately, it does not appear to have been delivered to the master or to any of the officers. The Marconi operator was very busy from 8 o'clock onward transmitting messages via Cape Race for passengers on board the _Titanic_, and the probability is that he failed to grasp the significance and importance of the message, and put it aside until he should be less busy. It was never acknowledged by Capt. Smith, and I am satisfied that it was not received by him. But, assuming Sir Robert Finlay's contentions to be well founded that the Titanic had been navigated so as to avoid the _Baltic_ and the _Californian_ ice, and that the _Caronia_ ice had drifted to the eastward and to the southward, still there can be no doubt, if the evidence of Mr. Lightoller, the second officer, is to be believed, that both he and the master knew that the danger of meeting ice still existed. Mr. Lightoller says that the master showed him the _Caronia_ message about 12.45 p. m. on April 14, when he was on the bridge. He was about to go off watch, and he says he made a rough calculation in his head which satisfied him that the _Titanic_ would not reach the position mentioned in the message until he came on watch again at 6 p. m. At 6 p. m. Mr. Lightoller came on the bridge again to take over the ship from Mr. Wilde, the chief officer (dead). He does not remember being told anything about the _Baltic_ message, which had been received at 1.42 p. m. Mr. Lightoller then requested Mr. Moody, the sixth officer (dead), to let him know "at what time we should reach the vicinity of ice," and says that he thinks Mr.
Moody reported "about 11 o'clock." Mr. Lightoller says that 11 o'clock did not agree with a mental calculation he himself had made and which showed 9.30 as the time. This mental calculation he at first said he had made before Mr. Moody gave him 11 o'clock as the time, but later on he corrected this, and said his mental calculation was made between 7 and 8 o'clock, and after Mr. Moody had mentioned 11. He did not point out the difference to him, and thought that perhaps Mr. Moody had made his calculations on the basis of some "other" message. Mr. Lightoller excuses himself for not pointing out the difference by saying that Mr.
Moody was busy at the time, probably with stellar observations. It is, however, an odd circumstance that Mr. Lightoller, who believed that the vicinity of ice would be reached before his watch ended at 10 p.m., should not have mentioned the fact to Mr. Moody, and it is also odd that if he thought that Mr. Moody was working on the basis of some "other"
message, he did not ask what the other message was or where it came from. The point, however, of Mr. Lightoller's evidence is that they both thought that the vicinity of ice would be reached before midnight. When he was examined as to whether he did not fear that on entering the indicated ice region he might run foul of a growler (a low-lying berg) he answers: "No, I judged I should see it with "sufficient distinctness"
and at a distance of a "mile and a half, more probably 2 miles." He then adds:
In the event of meeting ice there are many things we look for. In the first place, a slight breeze. Of course, the stronger the breeze the more visible will the ice be, or, rather, the breakers on the ice.
He is then asked whether there was any breeze on this night, and he answers:
When I left the deck at 10 o'clock there was a slight breeze. Oh, pardon me, no; I take that back. No, it was calm, perfectly calm--
And almost immediately afterwards he describes the sea as "absolutely flat." It appeared, according to this witness, that about 9 o'clock the master came on the bridge and that Mr. Lightoller had a conversation with him which lasted half an hour. This conversation, so far as it is material, is described by Mr. Lightoller in the following words:
We commenced to speak about the weather. He said, "there is not much wind." I said, "No, it is a flat calm," as a matter of fact.
He repeated it, he said, "A flat calm." I said, "Quite flat; there is no wind." I said something about it was rather a pity the breeze had not kept up whilst we were going through the ice region. Of course, my reason was obvious: he knew I meant the water ripples breaking on the base of the berg * * * We then discussed the indications of ice. I remember saying, "In any case, there will be a certain amount of reflected light from the bergs." He said, "Oh, yes, there will be a certain amount of reflected light." I said or he said--blue was said between us--that even though the blue side of the berg was towards us, probably the outline, the white outline, would give us sufficient warning, that we should be able to see it at a good distance, and as far as we could see, we should be able to see it. Of course, it was just with regard to that possibility of the blue side being toward us, and that if it did happen to be turned with the purely blue side toward us, there would still be the white outline.
Further on Mr. Lightoller says that he told the master nothing about his own calculation as to coming up with the ice at 9.30 or about Mr.
Moody's calculation as to coming up with it at 11.
The conversation with the master ended with the master saying, "If it becomes at all doubtful let me know at once; I will be just inside."
This remark Mr. Lightoller says undoubtedly referred to ice.
At 9.30 the master went to his room, and the first thing that Mr.
Lightoller did afterwards was to send a message to the crow's nest "to keep a sharp lookout for ice, particularly small ice and growlers,"
until daylight. There seems to be no doubt that this message was in fact sent, and that it was passed on to the next lookouts when they came on watch. Hitchins, the quartermaster, says he heard Mr. Lightoller give the message to Mr. Moody, and both the men in the crow's nest at the time (Jewell and Symons) speak to having received it. From 9.30 to 10 o'clock, when his watch ended, Mr. Lightoller remained on the bridge "looking out for ice." He also said that the night order book for the 14th had a footnote about keeping a sharp lookout for ice, and that this note was "initialed by every officer." At 10 o'clock Mr. Lightoller handed over the watch to Mr. Murdoch, the first officer (dead), telling him that "we might be up around the ice any time now." That Mr. Murdoch knew of the danger of meeting ice appears from the evidence of Hemming, a lamp trimmer, who says that about 7.15 p. m. Mr. Murdoch told him to go forward and see the forescuttle hatch closed--
as we are in the vicinity of ice and there is a glow coming from that, and I want everything dark before the bridge.
The foregoing evidence establishes quite clearly that Capt. Smith, the master; Mr. Murdoch, the first officer; Mr. Lightoller, the second officer; and Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, all knew on the Sunday evening that the vessel was entering a region where ice might be expected; and this being so, it seems to me to be of little importance to consider whether the master had by design or otherwise succeeded in avoiding the particular ice indicated in the three messages received by him.
SPEED OF THE SHIP.
The entire passage had been made at high speed, though not at the ship's maximum, and this speed was never reduced until the collision was unavoidable. At 10 p. m. the ship was registering 45 knots every two hours by the Cherub log.
The quartermaster on watch aft when the _Titanic_ struck states that the log, reset at noon, then registered 260 knots, and the fourth officer, when working up the position from 7.30 p. m. to the time of the collision, states he estimated the _Titanic's_ speed as 22 knots, and this is also borne out by evidence that the engines were running continuously at 75 revolutions.
THE WEATHER CONDITIONS.
From 6 p. m. onward to the time of the collision the weather was perfectly clear and fine. There was no moon, the stars were out, and there was not a cloud in the sky. There was, however, a drop in temperature of 10 in slightly less than two hours, and by about 7.30 p.
m. the temperature was 33 F., and it eventually fell to 32 F. That this was not necessarily an indication of ice is borne out by the sailing directions. The Nova Scotia (S. E. Coast) and Bay of Fundy Pilot (sixth edition, 1911, p. 16) says:
No reliance can be placed on any warning being conveyed to a mariner by a fall of temperature, either of the air or sea, on approaching ice. Some decrease in temperature has occasionally been recorded, but more often none has been observed.
Sir Ernest Shackleton was, however, of opinion that--
if there was no wind and the temperature fell abnormally for the time of the year, I would consider that I was approaching an area which might have ice in it.
ACTION THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN.
The question is what ought the master to have done. I am advised that with the knowledge of the proximity of ice which the master had, two courses were open to him: The one was to stand well to the southward instead of turning up to a westerly course; the other was to reduce speed materially as night approached. He did neither. The alteration of the course at 5.50 p. m. was so insignificant that it can not be attributed to any intention to avoid ice. This deviation brought the vessel back to within about 2 miles of the customary route before 11.30 p. m. And there was certainly no reduction of speed. Why, then, did the master persevere in his course and maintain his speed? The answer is to be found in the evidence. It was shown that for many years past, indeed, for a quarter of a century or more, the practice of liners using this track when in the vicinity of ice at night had been in clear weather to keep the course, to maintain the speed and to trust to a sharp lookout to enable them to avoid the danger. This practice, it was said, had been justified by experience, no casualties having resulted from it. I accept the evidence as to the practice and as to the immunity from casualties which is said to have accompanied it. But the event has proved the practice to be bad. Its root is probably to be bound in competition and in the desire of the public for quick passages rather than in the judgment of navigators. But unfortunately experience appeared to justify it. In these circumstances I am not able to blame Capt. Smith. He had not the experience which his own misfortune has afforded to those whom he has left behind, and he was doing only that which other skilled men would have done in the same position. It was suggested at the bar that he was yielding to influences which ought not to have affected him; that the presence of Mr. Ismay on board and the knowledge which he perhaps had of a conversation between Mr. Ismay and the chief engineer at Queenstown about the speed of the ship and the consumption of coal probably induced him to neglect precautions which he would otherwise have taken. But I do not believe this. The evidence shows that he was not trying to make any record passage or indeed any exceptionally quick passage. He was not trying to please anybody, but was exercising his own discretion in the way he thought best. He made a mistake, a very grievous mistake, but one in which, in face of the practice and of past experience, negligence can not be said to have had any part; and in the absence of negligence it is, in my opinion, impossible to fix Capt.
Smith with blame. It is, however, to be hoped that the last has been heard of the practice and that for the future it will be abandoned for what we now know to be more prudent and wiser measures. What was a mistake in the case of the _Titanic_ would without doubt be negligence in any similar case in the future.
THE COLLISION.
Mr. Lightoller turned over the ship to Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, at 10 o'clock, telling him that the ship was within the region where ice had been reported. He also told him of the message he had sent to the crow's nest, and of his conversation with the master, and of the latter's orders.
The ship appears to have run on, on the same course, until, at a little before 11.40, one of the lookouts in the crow's nest struck three blows on the gong, which was the accepted warning for something ahead, following this immediately afterward by a telephone message to the bridge "Iceberg right ahead." Almost simultaneously with the three-gong signal Mr. Murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order "Hard-a-starboard," and immediately telegraphed down to the engine room "Stop. Full speed astern." The helm was already "hard over," and the ship's head had fallen off about two points to port, when she collided with an iceberg well forward on her starboard side.
Mr. Murdoch at the same time pulled the lever over which closed the water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms.
The master "rushed out" onto the bridge and asked Mr. Murdoch what the ship had struck.
Mr. Murdoch replied:
An iceberg, sir. I hard-a-starboarded and reversed the engines, and I was going to hard-a-port round it, but she was too close. I could not do any more. I have closed the water-tight doors.
From the evidence given it appears that the _Titanic_ had turned about two points to port before the collision occurred. From various experiments subsequently made with the steamship _Olympic_, a sister ship to the _Titanic_, it was found that traveling at the same rate as the _Titanic_, about 37 seconds would be required for the ship to change her course to this extent after the helm had been put hard-a-starboard.
In this time the ship would travel about 466 yards, and allowing for the few seconds that would be necessary for the order to be given, it may be assumed that 500 yards was about the distance at which the iceberg was sighted either from the bridge or crow's nest.
That it was quite possible on this night, even with a sharp lookout at the stemhead, crow's nest, and on the bridge, not to see an iceberg at this distance is shown by the evidence of Capt. Rostron, of the _Carpathia_.
The injuries to the ship, which are described in the next section, were of such a kind that she foundered in 2 hours and 40 minutes.