THE ROUTE FOLLOWED.
The _Titanic_ left Southampton on Wednesday, April 10, and after calling at Cherbourg, proceeded to Queenstown, from which port she sailed on the afternoon of Thursday, April 11, following what was at that time the accepted outward-bound route for mail steamers from the Fastnet Light, off the southwest coast of Ireland, to the Nantucket Shoal light vessel, off the coast of the United States. It is desirable here to explain that it has been, since 1899, the practice, by common agreement between the great North Atlantic steamship companies, to follow lane routes, to be used by their ships at the different seasons of the year. Speaking generally, it may be said that the selection of these routes has hitherto been based on the importance of avoiding as much as possible the areas where fog and ice are prevalent at certain seasons, without thereby unduly lengthening the passage across the Atlantic, and also with the view of keeping the tracks of "outward" and "homeward" bound mail steamers well clear of one another. A further advantage is that, in case of a breakdown, vessels are likely to receive timely assistance from other vessels following the same route. The decisions arrived at by the steamship companies referred to above have, from time to time, been communicated to the Hydrographic Office, and the routes have there been marked on the North Atlantic route charts printed and published by the Admiralty; and they have also been embodied in the sailing directions.
Before the _Titanic_ disaster the accepted mail steamers outward track between January 15 and August 14 followed the arc of a great circle between the Fastnet Light and a point in latitude 42 N. and 47 W.
(sometimes termed the "turning point"), and from thence by Rhumb Line so as to pass just south of the Nantucket Shoal light vessel, and from this point on to New York. This track, usually called the outward southern track, was that followed by the _Titanic_ on her journey.
An examination of the North Atlantic route chart shows that this track passes about 25 miles south (that is outside) of the edge of the area marked "field ice between March and July," but from 100 to 300 miles to the northward (that is inside) of the dotted line on the chart marked, "Icebergs have been seen within this line in April, May, and June."
That is to say, assuming the areas indicated to be based on the experience of many years, this track might be taken as passing clear of field ice under the usual conditions of that time of year, but well inside the area in which icebergs might be seen.
It is instructive here to remark that had the "turning point" been in longitude 45 W. and latitude 38 N., that is some 240 miles to the south-eastward, the total distance of the passage would only have been increased by about 220 miles, or some 10 hours' steaming for a 22-knot ship. This is the route which was provisionally decided on by the great trans-Atlantic companies subsequent to the _Titanic_ disaster.
It must not be supposed that the lane routes referred to had never been changed before. Owing to the presence of ice in 1903, 1904, and 1905 from about early in April to mid-June or early in July, westward-bound vessels crossed the meridian of 47 W. in latitude 41 N., that is 60 miles further south than the then accepted track.
The publications known as "Sailing Directions," compiled by the hydrographic office at the Admiralty, indicate the caution which it is necessary to use in regions where ice is likely to be found.
The following is an extract from one of these books, named "United States Pilot (East Coast)," Part I (second edition, 1909, p. 34), referring to the ocean passages of the large trans-Atlantic mail and passenger steamers:
To these vessels one of the chief dangers in crossing the Atlantic lies in the probability of encountering masses of ice, both in the form of bergs and of extensive fields of solid compact ice, released at the breaking up of winter in the Arctic regions, and drifted down by the Labrador current across their direct route. Ice is more likely to be encountered in this route between April and August, both months inclusive, than at other times, although icebergs have been seen at all seasons northward of the parallel of 43 N., but not often so far south after August.
These icebergs are sometimes over 200 feet in height and of considerable extent. They have been seen as far south as latitude 39 N., to obtain which position they must have crossed the Gulf Stream impelled by the cold Arctic current underrunning the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. That this should happen is not to be wondered at when it is considered that the specific gravity of fresh-water ice, of which these bergs are composed, is about seven-eighths that of sea water; so that, however vast the berg may appear to the eye of the observer, he can in reality see one-eighth of its bulk, the remaining seven-eighths being submerged and subject to the deep-water currents of the ocean. The track of an iceberg is indeed directed mainly by current, so small a portion of its surface being exposed to the action of the winds that its course is but slightly retarded or deflected by moderate breezes.
On the Great Bank of Newfoundland bergs are often observed to be moving south or southeast; those that drift westward of Cape Race usually pass between Green and St. Pierre Banks.
The route chart of the North Atlantic, No. 2058, shows the limits within which both field ice and icebergs may be met with, and where it should be carefully looked out for at all times, but especially during the spring and summer seasons. From this chart it would appear that whilst the southern and eastern limits of field ice are about latitude 42 N., and longitude 45 W., icebergs may be met with much farther from Newfoundland; in April, May, and June they have been seen as far South as latitude 39 N. and as far east as longitude 38 30' W."
And again, on page 35:
It is, in fact, impossible to give, within the outer limits named, any distinct idea of where ice may be expected, and no rule can be laid down to insure safe navigation, as its position and the quantity met with differs so greatly in different seasons.
Everything must depend upon the vigilance, caution, and skill with which a vessel is navigated when crossing the dangerous ice-bearing regions of the Atlantic Ocean.
Similar warnings as to ice are also given in the "Nova Scotia (Southeast Coast) and Bay of Fundy Pilot" (sixth edition, 1911), which is also published by the hydrographic office.
Both the above quoted books were supplied to the master of the _Titanic_ (together with other necessary charts and books) before that ship left Southampton.
The above extracts show that it is quite incorrect to assume that icebergs had never been encountered or field ice observed so far south, at the particular time of year when the _Titanic_ disaster occurred; but it is true to say that the field ice was certainly at that time farther south than it has been seen for many years.
It may be useful here to give some definitions of the various forms of ice to be met with in these latitudes, although there is frequently some confusion in their use.
An iceberg may be defined as a detached portion of a polar glacier carried out to sea. The ice of an iceberg formed from a glacier is of quite fresh water. Only about an eighth of its mass floats above the surface of sea water.
A "growler" is a colloquial term applied to icebergs of small mass, which therefore only show a small portion above the surface. It is not infrequently a berg which has turned over, and is therefore showing what has been termed "black ice" or, more correctly, dark-blue ice.
Pack ice is the floating ice which covers wide areas of the polar seas, broken into large pieces, which are driven ("packed") together by wind and current, so as to form a practically continuous sheet. Such ice is generally frozen from sea water, and not derived from glaciers.
Field ice is a term usually applied to frozen sea water floating in much looser form than pack ice.
An icefloe is the term generally applied to the same ice (i.e., field ice) in a smaller quantity.
A floe berg is a stratified mass of floe ice (i.e., sea-water ice).
ICE MESSAGES RECEIVED.
The _Titanic_ followed the outward southern track until Sunday, April 14, in the usual way. At 11.40 p. m. on that day she struck an iceberg and at 2.20 a. m. on the next day she foundered.
At 9 a. m. (_Titanic_ time) on that day a wireless message from the steamship _Caronia_ was received by Capt. Smith. It was as follows:
CAPTAIN, _Titanic_:
West-bound steamers report bergs, growlers, and field ice in 42 N., from 49 to 51 W., April 12. Compliments.
BARR.
It will be noticed that this message referred to bergs, growlers, and field ice sighted on April 12--at least 48 hours before the time of the collision. At the time this message was received the _Titanic's_ position was about latitude 43 35' N. and longitude 43 50' W. Capt.
Smith acknowledged the receipt of this message.
At 1.42 p. m., a wireless message from the steamship _Baltic_ was received by Capt. Smith. It was as follows:
CAPT. SMITH, _Titanic_:
Have had moderate, variable winds and clear, fine weather since leaving.
Greek steamer _Athenai_ reports passing icebergs and large quantities of field ice to-day in latitude 41 51' N., longitude 49 52' W. Last night we spoke German oiltank steamer _Deutschland_, Stettin to Philadelphia, not under control, short of coal, latitude 40 42' N., longitude 55 11'
W. Wishes to be reported to New York and other steamers. Wish you and _Titanic_ all success.
COMMANDER.
At the time this message was received the _Titanic_ position was about 42 35' N., 45 50' W. Capt. Smith acknowledged the receipt of this message also.
Mr. Ismay, the managing director of the White Star Line, was on board the _Titanic_, and it appears that the master handed the _Baltic's_ message to Mr. Ismay almost immediately after it was received. This no doubt was in order that Mr. Ismay might know that ice was to be expected. Mr. Ismay states that he understood from the message that they would get up to the ice "that night." Mr. Ismay showed this message to two ladies, and it is therefore probable that many persons on board became aware of its contents. This message ought in my opinion to have been put on the board in the chart room as soon as it was received. It remained, however, in Mr. Ismay's possession until 7.15 p. m., when the master asked Mr. Ismay to return it. It was then that it was first posted in the chart room.
This was considerably before the time at which the vessel reached the position recorded in the message. Nevertheless, I think it was irregular for the master to part with the document, and improper for Mr. Ismay to retain it, but the incident had, in my opinion, no connection with or influence upon the manner in which the vessel was navigated by the master.
It appears that about 1.45 p. m. (_Titanic_ time) on the 14th a message was sent from the German steamer _Amerika_ to the Hydrographic Office in Washington, which was in the following terms:
_Amerika_ passed two large icebergs in 41 27' N., 50 8' W., on April 14.
This was a position south of the point of the _Titanic's_ disaster. The message does not mention at what hour the bergs had been observed. It was a private message for the hydrographer at Washington, but it passed to the _Titanic_ because she was nearest to Cape Race, to which station it had to be sent in order to reach Washington. Being a message affecting navigation, it should in the ordinary course have been taken to the bridge. So far as can be ascertained, it was never heard of by anyone on board the _Titanic_ outside the Marconi room. There were two Marconi operators in the Marconi room, namely, Phillips, who perished, and Bride, who survived and gave evidence. Bride did not receive the _Amerika_ message nor did Phillips mention it to him, though the two had much conversation together after it had been received. I am of opinion that when this message reached the Marconi room it was put aside by Phillips to wait until the _Titanic_ would be within call of Cape Race (at about 8 or 8.30 p. m.), and that it was never handed to any officer of the _Titanic_.
At 5.50 p. m. the _Titanic's_ course (which had been S. 62 W.) was changed to bring her on a westerly course for New York. In ordinary circumstances this change in her course should have been made about half an hour earlier, but she seems on this occasion to have continued for about 10 miles longer on her southwesterly course before turning, with the result that she found herself, after altering course at 5.50 p. m., about 4 or 5 miles south of the customary route on a course S. 86 W.
true. Her course, as thus set, would bring her at the time of the collision to a point about 2 miles to the southward of the customary route and 4 miles south and considerably to the westward of the indicated position of the _Baltic's_ ice. Her position at the time of the collision would also be well to the southward of the indicated position of the ice mentioned in the _Caronia_ message. This change of course was so insignificant that in my opinion it can not have been made in consequence of information as to ice.